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Abstract
Entry strategies for the turbulent markets of Eastern and Central Europe are high on
the strategic agenda of firms, who wish to capitalise upon the opportunities, which
they represent, whilst minimising the risks. The rapidity and discontinuity of the change
in these countries calls into question the validity of rational planning approaches to
assessing market attractiveness. It also calls for re-examination of a number of the
theories proposed for determining mode of entry. These are often predicated upon data
gathered in stable market environments.
Literature relevant to the study of international entry strategies can be found in the
fields of marketing, corporate strategy, international business, economics and
organisational behaviour. This thesis takes the view that it is important not to prejudge
which, if any, of the existing theories are relevant to study of entry into Eastern
Europe.
Therefore, it takes an inductive, interdisciplinary approach to studying the entry
decisions of fifteen multinational corporations in Ukraine. In-depth analysis of case
studies in business-to-business service, mass-market and high-margin consumer goods
and industrial product sectors is used to gain an understanding of these decisions. Data
are explored within and between cases, to identify patterns of similarity and difference.
Firms are analysed according to demographic, location-specific and strategic variables
derived from a review of literature. From this analysis, four groups of investment
behaviour can be identified on the dimensions of criteria for entry, acceptance of risk
and level of commitment to Ukraine. Both competitive and co-operative entry
strategies are found. During the period of data collection, five additional decisions
were made. Both positive decisions, to expand in Ukraine, and negative decisions not
to expand or to withdraw were seen. Data were analysed to identify the explanatory
variables for these differing fortunes. The findings are then set against their theoretical
context to draw conclusions.
Chapter 1 - Introduction
"'If you could remove the uncertainty, there would be a major investment
boom in 1995, leading to sustained and rapid growth to the end of the century.'
If indeed: a condition of Himalayan proportions." The Economist, January
21st. 1995.
This assessment of the Russian economy, by Professor Richard Layard of the
London School of Economics, points to the critical role of uncertainty in
evaluating the attractiveness for foreign investors of markets in transition. The
question of how to capitalise upon the potential of the emerging Eastern and
Central European markets, whilst minimising the risks of operation in an uncertain
environment, has risen to the top of the strategic agenda for many multinational
corporations.
This thesis analyses the entry choices, which multinational corporations make in
turbulent markets. The study is based on case analyses of fifteen entry decisions
made with respect to the Ukrainian market. An interdisciplinary approach is
adopted to allow for the inclusion of a broad range of variables, which might play a
role in these decisions. An in-depth, theory-building methodology is preferred, as
the process of transition to free market economy is one which calls into question
the validity of existing theories, predicated upon empirical data collected in stable
markets.
Success in international business may be attributed to a single phenomena, such as
innovation in research and development or in marketing, but, more frequently, it is
comprised of an amalgamation of factors:
"the success of the modern international corp oration is increasingly determined
by the ability to organise natural resources, information, money and people
across national boundaries, both within and between organisations" (Dunning
1989)
Such conclusions have prompted calls, within the field of international business, for
inter-disciplinary research approaches. Initially, international research tended to
develop as an extension of existing disciplines, such as marketing or finance. A
limitation of single disciplinary research might be the exclusion of important issues,
which lie outside it's boundaries. Yet, researchers adopting an inter-disciplinary
focus may face confront "warnings not to dabble in other experts' areas" (Buckley
1991b).
Within the field of marketing, the pre-eminence of quantitative, positivist studies
has opened the discipline to the charge of "New Marketing Myopia" (Brownlie et
al 1994). In the early 1980's, Day and Wensley (1983) suggested that the way
ahead for marketing may be to adopt a more strategic focus. Hunt (1994) contends
that, in the intervening decade, marketing "has made (...) few original
contributions to the "strategy dialogue." He identifies over-emphasis upon
quantitative studies as a contributory factor.
Easterby-Smith et al. (1991) suggest that the choice of methodology is influenced
by the author's philosophical preferences and the nature of the research question.
The literature relating to entry mode choice spans the disciplines of corporate
strategy, marketing, organisational behaviour, international business and
economics. The author's background is in the field of marketing. However, this
does not imply agreement with the emphasis of a significant proportion of
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marketing literature upon theory-testing rather than theory building (Desphande
1983, Hirschman 1986, Hunt 1994).
Nowhere does a focus upon deductive methodologies present more of a problem
than in researching Eastern Europe. Thomas (1993) says: "there is no precedent
for a transition from planned to free market economy." Egan claims (1993):
"In the market renaissance of Eastern Europe there is a cloudy past, an
uncertain present and a speculative future (...) The research problem becomes
acute, when the boundaries of knowledge are pushed beyond the environs of
received wisdom."
Such is the situation in this research. Consequently, the 'chosen methodology must
not prejudge which, if any, of the existing literature is relevant in answering the
research question.
Moreover, against this turbulent backdrop, a number of areas of accepted wisdom
must be subjected to further scrutiny. Many of the rational planning approaches to
market selection were predicated upon the stable market environments of the
1960's and 1970's (Paul et al 1978, Kami 1976). However, their validity for the
current period of discontinuous change has been challenged (Edwards and Harris
1977). Studies of internationalisation and entry mode choice propose models,
whose empirical bases are in stable, advanced economies (Johanson and Vahine
1977, Ansoff 1984). These may have limited explanatory power in uncertain
market conditions.
Hunt (1994) also suggests that, despite the growing importance of "alliances,
partnerships and relationships" in the field of marketing, research has paid little
attention to the positive value of relationships. This claim overlooks the
contributions to the marketing field, from the late 1970's onwards, of the
interactiOn marketing and network literature (Hãkansson 1982, Turnbull and
Cunningham 1981, Easton and Axelsson 1991). Johanson and Mattsson (1994)
sum up the difference between the marketing mix model and the markets as
networks view as:
"In the marketing mix model, studies of the role of exchange are basically
limited to a comparative static perspective (...) In the network approach, the
role of exchange is to co-ordinate the activities and resources controlled by one
actor, with the activities and resources controlled by another actor (...) instead
of focusing on the allocation of resources, the network approach is interested
in the creation and co-ordination of resources through interaction in network
relationships." pg. 323 - 324
Inter-organisational relationships, both within channel dyads and with a broader
sphere of stakeholders, may be relevant to study of the entry choices of
multinational corporations in Ukraine. Johanson and Mattsson (1988) contend that,
for highly internationalised firms in highly international industries:
"A further internationalisation of the firm only means marginal changes in
extension and penetration, which on the whole do not imply any qualitative
changes to the firm (...) Both with regard to extension and penetration the firm
has possibilities to use positions in one net for bridging over to other nets." pg.
314
Thus, from a network perspective, investment decisions are not viewed as isolated
incidents, but in relation to other stakeholders.
This thesis does not seek to prejudge the relevance of existing research. However,
to ensure the internal validity of data, some structure had to be imputed.
Propositions were gathered from a number of fields. Data were gathered using a
semi-structured research instrument. Respondents placed their own emphasis on
those issues, which they considered to have been the most important in their
investment decisions. By a process of pattern-matching, data were explored to
identif' explanatory variables.
Harrigan (1983) suggests the use of fine-grained methodologies for in-depth or
exploratory studies. Bonoma (1985) concludes that qualitative techniques, such as
case studies, are best suited to theory building. Thus, the preferred methodology
for this research is the use of case studies. Support for this choice comes from Yin
(1983), who sees the case study as being appropriate to answer "how" or "why"
questions about a contemporary event or events, over which the investigator has
little or no control.
The empirical evidence, for this research, consists of twenty investment decisions.
Data collection spanned the period from July 1993 to March 1994. From July to
November 1993, data were collected for fifteen decisions to enter, or not to enter
Ukraine. However, during the period of data collection, the market conditions in
Ukraine worsened dramatically. By late 1993, five of the firms had made additional
decisions, either to expand, or to exit from the Ukrainian market. Analysis of the
additional decisions is also included in the thesis.
Following this introduction, chapter two reviews the literature, which is relevant to
formulation of the research question and development of the research instrument.
The scope of the relevant literature is broad. Accordingly the chapter synthesises
the major contributions, rather than presenting an exhaustive review. From this
synthesis, propositions are derived, which form the basis of the research
instrument.
In chapter three, the choice of an in-depth, theoiy-building methodology is
explained. Subsequently, the research process is described to show how it
addresses the issues raised by carrying out rigorous academic research in a
turbulent environment. The next two chapters provide the main presentation of the
research data. Firstly, in chapter four, the composition of uncertainty in the
Ukrainian environment is explored. Furthermore, the issue of how to analyse the
environment is addressed. A contextual trend is derived, against which data can be
analysed. Secondly, in chapter five, the data are presented by industry. The
industry-level context is explored under the headings of business-to-business
services, high-margin and mass-market consumer goods and industrial and high-
technology products to identify the major influences upon the decisions studied.
Case histories are presented for each of the fifteen firms. These are grouped under
the relevant industry heading. Summary data are presented in tabular form.
Chapters six and seven cross-analyse the case data. In chapter six, the data on entry
decisions are explored, across industry sector, to identify patterns of similarities
and differences. Data are analysed by criteria for investment, attitude towards risk
and level of commitment. From this analysis, typologies of market entry decision-
making behaviour are presented. In chapter seven, data are studied for the
expansion and exit decisions of five firms, which made additional decisions during
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the period of data collection. Data are analysed to identify explanatory variables for
the differing experiences of multinational corporations in Ukraine.
Chapter eight sets the findings of the study in their theoretical context, in order to
derive conclusions. Finally, chapter nine looks at limitations of the study and
identifies areas for future research.
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review
Within the field of management, research into international entry decisions exists
within the areas of marketing, strategy, organisational behaviour and finance. It builds
upon concepts drawn from both economics and sociology. Accordingly, synthesis of
the literature is complicated both by the breadth of the field and by divergent
methodological approaches. However, the greatest challenge in this chapter is that of
identifying unif'ing themes to provide a framework for the literature review.
Firstly, definitions of uncertainty and risk are considered. Then, the consequences of
uncertainty are explored under headings, which build on the framework of Forsgren
(1989). Forsgren distinguishes between research, which adopts a rational-planning
approach, and that which identifies patterns from streams of activities. Furthermore,
he divides research into hierarchical studies, which assume firm-specific advantage and
atomistic competition between firms (Buckley and Casson 1976, Porter 1985) and
those which see the international firm as a "coalition of interests"(Cyert and March
1963), with a resource dependence upon other players in the environment (Pfeffer and
Salancik 1978). Forsgren juxtaposes these two dimensions to form a matrix. For the
purposes of this review, however, each of these categories is taken separately.
Finally, the nature of the growing body of research into East and Central Europe is
considered.
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2.1 The Composition of Uncertainty
Analyses of risk and uncertainty in international investment decision-making vary both
in terminology and taxonomy.
An important distinction between the two terms is that made by Knight (1921).
Uncertainty is a composite of many hard and soft variables and, as such, is
immeasurable. Risk, however, is the measurable impact of uncertainty upon the firm.
The firm can quantify risk by some measure, usually financial:
"Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the familiar notion
of risk, from which it has never properly been separated. The term "risk", as
loosely used in every day speech and in economic discussion really covers two
things which, functionally at least, in their causal relations to the phenomena in
question are categorically different (...) The essential fact is that "risk" means in
some cases a quality susceptible of measurement, while at other times
something distinctly not of this character (...) We shall restrict the term
"uncertainty" to cases of the non-quantitative type".
Uncertainty is seen to stem from imperfection of knowledge:
"We do not perceive the present as it is, and in its totality, nor do we infer the
future from the present with any high degree of dependability, nor yet do we
accurately know the consequences of our actions. In addition (...) we do not
execute our actions in the precise form in which they are imagined and willed.
(pg.203)
Miller (1992) builds on this distinction, defining uncertainty as the "unpredictability of
environmental or organisational variables that impact corporate performance" and risk
as "unpredictability in corporate outcome variables.
In operating internationally, finns must overcome high levels of uncertainty.
Mascarenhas (1982) indicates that there are higher levels of uncertainty in international
business than in domestic operation:
"If the domestic business environment can be labelled uncertain, the
international business environment is doubly so. In going overseas, firms face,
in addition to domestic sources of uncertainty, foreign exchange and political
risk. Unfamiliarity with operating in a new environment, aggravated by
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labour restrictions, different cultures and infrastructural difficulties contributes
to the uncertainty of the international environment."
Moreover, the period of discontinuous change, which has characterised the
international environment since the mid 1970's, increases the levels of uncertainty faced
by firms. This, in turn, compounds the risks which pertain to their decisions. The
current situation in Eastern Europe is one, of which Thomas (1993) says: "there is no
precedent for a transition from a planned to free market economy."
Egan (1993) claims:
"In the market renaissance of Eastern Europe there is a cloudy past, an
uncertain present and a speculative future (...) The research problem becomes
acute, when the boundaries of knowledge are being pushed beyond the
environs of received wisdom"
Within the literature, greater attention has been paid to the composition of macro-level
environmental uncertainty, than to either industiy- or firm-level analyses (Miller 1992).
Research tends to focus on specific categories of uncertainty, such as political
uncertainty (Rummel and Heenan 1978, Smith 1971) or psychic distance (Klein and
Roth 1990). However, Miller (1992) sees limited value in research which stresses the
impact on firms of one, or a limited subset, of the influences in the international
environment. Such research, he feels, may overlook the impact of related variables:
"A significant shortcoming in much of the existing risk and uncertainty
literature is the emphasis on particular uncertainties rather than a
multidimensional treatment of uncertainty."
A number of frameworks have been proposed in the literature for holistic consideration
of uncertainty. These suggest the inclusion of a broad spectrum of variables. Buckley
(1991) identifies a continuum of research foci from economic analyses, which tend to
emphasis external market influences upon decisions, through to strategic
considerations, which emphasise the role of managerial discretion. Pettigrew (1985a,
1985b) refers to the "outer" and "inner" context of the firm.
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General Environmental Uncertainties
Political Uncertainties
War
Revolution
Coup détat
Other political turmoil
Induatry Uncertainties
Input Market Uncertainties
Quality Uncertainty
Shifts in Market Supply
Changes in quantity used
Firni Uncertainties
Operating Uncertainties
Labour Uncertainties
Labour Unrest
Employee Safety
Input Supply Uncertainties
Raw Materials Shortages
Quality Changes
Spare Parts Restrictions
Production Uncertainties
Machine Failure
Other random factors
Governmental Policy Uncertainties Product Market Uncertainties
Fiscal and Monetary controls 	 Changes in Consumer tastes
Price Controls	 Availability of Substitutes
Trade Restrictions	 Scarcity of Compleinentaiy goods
Nationalisation
Government Regulation
Barriers to Earnings Repatriation
Inadequate Provision of Public Services
Macroeconomic Uncertainties
Inflation
Changes in relative price
Foreign Exchange rates
Interest rates
Terms of trade
Competitive Uncertainties
Rivaliy among competition
New Entrants
Technological Uncertainty
Product Innovations
Liability Uncertainties
Product Liability
Emission of pollutants
R&D Uncertainty
Uncertain results of R&D
Social Uncertainties	 Credit Uncertainty
Changing Social Concerns 	 Problems with collectibles
Social Unrest
Riots	 Behavioural Uncertainty
Demonstrations	 Managerial or employee
Small-scale terrorist movements	 self-interest
Natural Uncertainties
Variations in Rainfall
Hurricanes
Earthquakes
Other natural disasters
Figure 2.1
A number of frameworks split the variables into three groups. Dunning's eclectic
paradigm (1982) highlights the influences of location-specific, ownership-specific and
firm-specific factors. Kotler (1991) distinguishes between uncontrollable, macro-
environmental factors, semi-controllable factors in the proximate environment and
controllable factors at the channel level. Similarly, Miller (1992) categorises variables
under the headings of General Environmental, Industry and Firm Uncertainties (See
Figure 2.1). Whilst the framework of Reve and Stern (1980), built upon by Achrol,
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Reve and Stern (1983), divides variables into macro- and micro-level. The micro-
environment of the firm is further split into the secondary-task or industiy-level
environment and the primary task, or firm-level, environment (See Figure 2.2).
A comprehensive review of the influences of variables, in each of these tiers, upon the
investment decisions of multinational corporations is presented in the remainder of the
literature review. The framework, used in this research for the purposes of analysis, is
that of Achrol, Reve and Stern (1983). This is seen to provide the best visual
representation, as it differentiates between the input and output sectors of the channel
environment and between the regulatory and competitive sectors of the lateral
environment.
2.2 Rational Planning Approaches
Consideration has been given to methods of assessing of international risks and
opportunities within the fields of corporate planning, finance and marketing.
Literature tends to use the terms uncertainty and risk interchangeably. However, the
distinction, made in the previous section, will be used in this review. Studies of
economic and political uncertainty predominate (Smith 1971, Kern 1985, Perlitz 1985,
Rummel and Heenan 1978). Methods proposed for the assessment of the risks, which
this uncertainty poses, range from observation to quantification, via Delphi techniques
and multivariate analyses. There are a variety of aims, such as understanding the
cyclicality of economic and political development (Smith 1971), the composition of
political and economic uncertainty (Perlitz 1985, Rummel and Heenan 1978) and that
of ranking countries by assigning scores. Such techniques are seen to help firms in the
decision-making process.
"At a practical level, the growing use of structured analyses for assessing
country risks can be seen as a natural reaction to the increasingly difficult and
complex problems facing those involved in international activities. Essentially,
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this type of systematic approach attempts to identify explicitly and to quantify
the international risks arising from business operations." (Kern 1985).
BASED ON FIG.1 EN1RONMENT OF MARKETING DW*IEL DYADS
Ø4ROL. REV! MID STERN JOURNAL OF MARKE11NG 1993
I = INTEREST GROUP	 CO r COMPETITOR
C = CUSTOMER	 S = SUPPLIER
Figure 2.2
Risk assessment models allow for systematic appraisal of investment decisions and for
comparison between investment opportunities. They build awareness, in decision-
makers, of the factors, which may have an impact on the success or failure of
investment decisions. Published risk indicators, such as those from Business
Environment Risk Indicators or Economic Intelligence Unit, allow firms to use
objective data, based on expert opinions.
However, risk analysis may not improve the decisions which firms make. There is a
tendency to make normative assessments based on risk level. Both Goodnow and
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Hansz (1972) and Litvak and Banting (1968) describe countries as hot or cold,
dependent on their risk and opportunity scores. "Hot" countries are seen to be
attractive and "cold countries less attractive. Yet, "hot" countries may not necessarily
represent the best investment opportunities for a firm. There may be intense
competition, from indigenous and other international finns.
A number of limitations of risk analysis relate to the dangers of "ad hoc" quantification
(Rummel and Heenan 1978). Firstly, assigning scores may mask complex phenomena.
It may lead to premature screening out of countries, in which profitable opportunities
exist. Secondly, quantitative approaches have difficulty in incorporating "soft" factors,
such as cultural and social differences, which may be critical to success of failure of
market entry. Finally, such simplistic classification does not take into account the
nature of the decision, nor else the characteristics of the firm, making the decision.
The second of these issues may be addressed by reference to the significant body of
research, which focuses on ways of classifying cultural, or "psychic" uncertainty.
Hofstede (1980) differentiates between the predominant culture of different national
subsidiaries of IBM on the dimensions of masculinity/femininity, power distance,
uncertainty avoidance and individuality! collectivism. Hall (1960) distinguishes
between high- and low-context cultures. High-context cultures give greater emphasis
to the non-verbal context of business dealings, than do low-context cultures. Such
considerations should be considered alongside quantitative risk assessment models.
Analysis of the cultural characteristics of a market, compared to the host country of
the investing firm, might indicate the level of psychic distance. Psychic distance is
defined as cultural dissimilarity, stemming from differences in language and customs.
Forsgren (1990) defines it as: "all those factors which hinder information flows
between two units." The greater the psychic distance, the higher the level of risk in
international transactions (Klein and Roth 1990).
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Another limitation of risk indicators from secondary sources is that they do not take
into account the decision, which is being taken. Kern (1985) stresses that the range of
variables, which might play a role in international investment decisions, is broad. Most
models can only focus on a limited subset of these variables. Consequently, he supports
the use of Delphi techniques, as a means whereby finns can pick out the variables most
relevant to a specific decision. Another technique, which can juxtapose macro- and
micro-level consideration, is matrix-analysis (Hedley 1977, Cushman 1979, Wind and
Mahajan 1981, Wind and Douglas 1981, Perlitz 1985).
Matrix analysis can capture a snapshot of the business portfolio of a firm. Well known
matrix, or portfolio models, such as the Boston Consultancy Group (BCG) matrix,
show the resource implications of strategic business units, which are at different stages
of their lifecycle. A number of attempts have been made to extend existing models into
the domain of international business (Cushman 1979. Perlitz 1985). These offer
managers the ability to visualise the relative merits of a range of options. Matrices,
such as the General Electric (GE)-Multifactor model allow firms to balance macro- and
micro-level considerations.
However, the dangers of portfolio analysis are well-documented. Single variate
analyses, such as the BCG matrix, are susceptible to criticism of the dimensions chosen
(Day 1977, Wensley 1981). In the international realm, Perlitz (1985) extends the BCG
matrix, to analyse the relative attractiveness of countries. He uses GDP growth and the
country's share of world exports as the dimensions. However, assessing attractiveness
on the basis of only two variables, even if their validity is acknowledged, may overlook
important issues.
Nor are the problems of matrix analysis resolved by use of composite axes. Matrices
may still be subject to bias from managers (Wind and Mahajan 1981). The weighting or
scoring of variables might be biased to arrive at a preferred outcome. Ghemawat
15
(1991) suggests that such errors may be either "honest mistakes or deliberate
distortions." Furthermore, matrix analysis may limit the creativity of managers by
prescribing preferred strategies (Wind and Mahajan 1981, McKiernan 1992).
In marketing literature, Greenley and Bayus (1993) conclude that tools such as the
PLC, portfolio analysis and perceptual mapping are perceived to be of little value in
helping managers to make marketing decisions. A key reason for the inadequacy of
such tools may be that the value of outputs is dependent upon the availability and
reliability of data inputs.
McDonald and Leppard (1992) argue that the reduction of complex problems to two-
dimensional matrices is an acceptable and pragmatic approach:
"We accept that the purists among our readers might comment that the
matrices we have included here are an oversimplification of complex problems.
We would not argue with them on this issue, because intellectually, there is a
lot of truth in what they say. Nevertheless, when practical decisions are
required in a hard and competitive world, any "tools" which lead to higher
quality outputs are not to be spurned lightly." pg. 3
Indeed, nor should they be! However, reducing the assessment of market attractiveness
to two-dimensional models is at best difficult, at worst, dangerous.
A further challenge to the value of matrix-based approaches and to rational planiling,
as a whole, is posed by turbulent market conditions. Corporate planning gained
credence in a period of relative stability. Paul et al (1978) contend:
"With strategic planning's dependence on accurate forecasts, it probably was
not accidental that such planning gained a wide acceptance during the 1960's,
which were relatively stable and hence enabled forecasters to demonstrate
sufficient accuracy.
Kami (1976) concurs:
"Corporate planning during the 1960's was relatively easy. Businesses could
concentrate on international operations, because external assumptions were
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"givens" with long-range predictability and few fluctuations (...) planning
techniques of extrapolation and mathematical computation of future trends
based on past history worked quite well."
He concludes that these techniques are not suited to the additional demands of
discontinuity:
"New conditions require new thinking, new techniques and new timing. It is
time to proceed with a sweeping "self-renewal" to cope with the era of
unpredictability."
The suggested new techniques may include tools such as scenario planning (Leemhuis
1985). Ghemawat (1991) suggests that scenario-building may be valuable in
overcoming uncertainty. He contends that scenarios should be possible, but extreme.
They must also be sufficiently different from each other that one option does not
"outshine all the others across all scenarios." pg. 122.
New thinking might infer suggestions, such as that of Edwards and Harris (1977), that
planning will cease to be a long-range process, but rather will be a "series of discrete
and sometimes unrelated steps." Harrison (1976) suggests that long range plans will be
hampered by uncertainty:
"At present it is very difficult and probably impossible to make a reliable 5 year
forecast. Any plan based on such a forecast is unlikely to come to fruition, as
anticipated" pg. 91
As a result, plans are being seen as less of a "blueprint for the firm's future" and more
as "a tentative aid to decision-making." Flexibility is of increasing importance. Firms
do not wish to be "locked in" to a plan of action, which may be inappropriate before its
implementation.
Investment decisions might no longer be decided, if ever they were, by a process of
rational planning. Simple choices, such as risk versus reward decisions, might be
involved (Leemhuis 1985). Cardozo (1989) argues that higher risks may be acceptable
to firm, if there is an expectation of higher returns.
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The question as to the value of rational planning in turbulent market conditions raises
issues pertinent to this thesis. How do multinational corporations assess the
attractiveness of the uncertain markets of Eastern Europe, subject, as they are, to
discontinuous change? Are rational planning techniques, predicated upon data gathered
in stable markets, applicable to such turbulent markets? What impact does the
environmental uncertainty have upon the level of risk which they perceive to be
acceptable in entering the market?
2.3 Identifying Patterns from a Stream of Activities
2.3.1 Behavioural Studies of Decision-making
Buckley (1989) refers to behavioural studies of foreign investment decisions as the
"Corporate Decision-Making Approach". The work of Aharoni (1966) makes a
valuable contribution to this field. In his study of foreign direct investment by US
manufacturing firms in Israel, Aharoni focuses upon "the nature of the decision-making
process in complex organisations". In doing so, he aims to identify:
"elements in the baffling complexity of the organisational system which could
explain the behaviour and make the variables inter-related and sensible." (pg.
ix)
Aharoni rejects the notion of rational decision-making behaviour, which he associates
with the economic perspective on decision-making, for it assumes:
"a single decision-making unit with a single set of utility preferences, a
knowledge of a reasonably full range of action alternatives and their
consequences, and the capacity to make the appropriate calculations for
selecting a course of action of maximum utility"
He contends, instead, that decision-making can only be understood as a process:
"Decisions cannot be analysed in isolation from the system in which they take
place. Small day-to-day choices and acts create unintended consequences and
limit the decision-maker's freedom of choice in other, completely unrelated
18
areas of endeavour. Any one decision is a part of a continuous stream of
activities, and it is influenced by past decisions, interpersonal relations and
other ongoing activities of the decision-maker." pg. 18
Aharoni's work makes three valuable contributions to understanding of foreign
investment. Firstly, it identifies conditions, under which tolerance of uncertainty may
vary. If individuals are held accountable for a decision, they may be less willing to
tolerate high levels of uncertainty. Secondly, it raises the issue of the cost of gathering
information. Perception of uncertainty decreases, as the amount of information one has
increases:
"organisations are continually gathering data and using them. However, partly
because of the cost of information, partly because of the inability to get all of it,
a formidable shroud of uncertainty remains." pg. 299
In consequence, organisations may need to include the cost of gathering information in
any investment analysis. However, the cost of striving for perfect information may be
so high that it exceeds the risks of the decision. In this situation, the economic
argument might be to accept the uncertainty and invest in the market. Thirdly,
gathering information plays an important role in building commitment to the decision:
"In the process of gathering information, the investigator creates commitments
through a perpetual sequence of encounters with other individuals" pg. 300
Such political considerations, within firms, have significant consequences for decision-
making. Management may not use all of the available information. More importantly,
the development of commitment to a project may lead to the screening of information:
"so that only data conforming to previously held beliefs are gathered." (Aharoni 1966)
The role of self-interested individuals within the organisation is reminiscent of the
work of Cyert and March (1963), who highlight the role of "coalitions of interest" in
finns. It is the central tenet of a significant body of research in the strategic decision-
making area.
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One such stream of research, leading from the Aston studies of decision-making,
highlights the importance of political processes in strategic decision-making (Wilson et
al 1986; Hickson et al 1986). Political activity may lead to "quasi-decisions" in which
decision-making becomes a satisficing process, designed to reach a preferred outcome
(Hickson et al 1986). Decisions can be classified as "bounded" or "unbounded".
Bounded decisions are constrained by pre-established organisational rules and
procedures. However, unbounded decisions, which use new types of data or involve
new areas of decision-making, are prone to conflict. Those with power are able to
further their own interests (Wilson et al 1986). Higher risks can be seen to pertain if
decisions are "precursive": that is happening for the first time (Hickson et al 1986).
Like the rational planning literature, this research was carried out in stable market
conditions. However, if the risks of making a precursive decision in stable market
conditions are high, then an indication can be gained of the perceived risk involved in
entering Ukraine. This is a precursive decision under conditions of uncertainty.
Forsgren (1989) stresses the political dimension of international investment decisions
in multinational corporations. The organisational structure is no longer "mother-
daughter" or "centre-periphery." It is geocentric (Perlmutter 1966), in that it operates
globally using a matrix organisational structure. Hedlund (1986) builds upon the
concept of the geocentric organisation in describing the "hypermodern" multinational
corporation as "heterarchic." Heterarchy is an extension of geocentrism in the strategic
sense. The heterarchic organisation seeks competitive advantages globally, rather than
building on a firm-specific advantage in the domestic market. Furthermore, the
heterarchic organisation is characterised structurally, in that it must address the
conflicting demands of being both globally co-ordinated and responsive to the demands
of local markets.
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In the heterarchic multinational, subsidiaries may have sufficient power to instigate and
implement investments. Forsgren sees three major implications of this. Firstly, strategic
investments result from political processes in the group and involve actors from
subsidiaries, as well as top managers. Secondly, heterarchic structures may move the
locus of decision-making away from the home-market, thus enforcing the globalisation
of the managers' mental-map. There may be psychic distance within the firm, as well as
externally. Finally, their may a "struggle for legitimacy and symbolic action" between
the Head Office and the subsidiary. Subsidiary managers may feel that they need to
signal their importance by making large and visible decisions.
2.3.2 Studies of the Internationalisation Process
Within a number of fields, attempts have been made to look at the dynamics of the
internationalisation process. Welch and Luostarinen (1988) suggest a gap between
studies of the export decision and research into multinational enterprises. Recognition
of this gap prompted the development of "process models" of internationalisation:
"In essence, a more longitudinal view, a process perspective was called for."
A number of process models have been proposed. Aharoni (1966) builds a five stage
model, which focuses upon the process of making the foreign investment decision. In
the first stage, there must be a strong initiating force to propel the firm towards
Foreign Direct Investment. In the second stage, investigation will be required. This
may further the process or else lead to its abandonment. In the third stage, the decision
is made to invest. In the fourth stage, the negotiation of the decision is carried out.
Finally, the process will be subject to reviews and changes.
Other process models focus upon the stages of internationalisation from initial
international operation to investment. However, their stages and the variables, upon
which these are predicated, vary. Perlmutter (1966) bases the stages upon the firm's
cultural orientation. Three distinct orientations are identified. In the ethnocentric
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orientation, the domestic culture dominates the firm. A polycentric orientation results,
when the distinction between the domestic and "foreign" culture becomes blurred.
Geocentric orientation refers to the stage, in which the firm operates as a multinational
or global player. Ansoff (1984) proposes the stages of export, international and
multinational firms. The distinction between the last two categories seems analogous to
the move to from polycentrism to geocentrism.
Brooke (1986) sees the process of internationalisation as incremental. An initial
distinction is made between selling knowledge and selling goods and services. Goods
and services may be exported, distributed via sales and marketing subsidiaries or
through a manufacturing subsidiary. Knowledge will remain as a contractual
agreement, until the decision is eventually made to invest in a subsidiary. Progression
to the next level of investment comes, when the previous mode is found to be
"inadequate." The nature of this inadequacy is not explored. However, it is suggested
that it may result either from unprofitability, or from too much success.
Probably the best known model of the internationalisation process is that of the
Uppsala school (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul 1975; Johanson and Vahlne 1977).
This stage model depicts a linear progression from exporting through knowledge
agreements to foreign direct investment. The progression between these stages is based
on the contention that firms' export and expansion decisions are inhibited by lack of
knowledge of foreign markets. High levels of uncertainty, which must be overcome
when entering new geographic markets, will result in the decision to use lower-
commitment modes of operation. Firms will tend to enter those markets with lower
psychic distance first. As the firm increases its knowledge of a market, it will increase
its commitment to it.
The empirical evidence, upon which the incremental model is based, relates largely to
Scandinavian firms (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul 1975; Wiedersheim-Paul et al
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1978, Juul and Walters 1987). However, it has also been found to be a valid descriptor
of firms in some industries in Japan (Yoshihara 1978), Germany (Dichtl et al 1984) and
the USA (Davidson 1983). A number of studies suggest the relevance of this model of
internationalisation for firms in the early stages of internationalisation (Cavusgil and
Nevin 1982; Buckley, Newbould and Thurwell 1979).
Yet, the model has been found to be invalid in a number of other situations (Turnbull
1987; Sullivan and Bauerschmidt 1990, Erramilli and Rau 1990; Clark and Mallory
1992, Jatar 1992). Firstly, there is a debate as to what constitutes the discrete stages of
the model and, indeed, as to the first or lowest stage of commitment (Turnbull 1987,
Erramilli 1990). Secondly, empirical evidence exists to suggest that firms do not follow
a uni-directional process (Jatar 1992, Terpstra and Yu 1990). Firms may follow
different patterns of entry and expansion, depending upon their strategic intent in
operating in the market. Jatar (1992) found that MNCs entering the Venezuelan
brewing industry used high commitment modes of operation to open up end-user
markets, but reverted to lower commitment modes once the distribution channels were
established. Tersptra and Yu highlight "piggybacking," in which firms enter markets
using experience gained from partner finns.
The validity of the model may be related to the type of product or service. Research
into the internationalisation of service firms suggests that high commitment modes of
operation may be necessary, because of the inseparability of the service from its
provider (Zeithaml 1985, Berry 1980). However, Erraniilli (1990) counters this view,
proposing a distinction between "hard" services, where production and consumption
can be de-coupled, and "soft" services, where they cannot. Whilst providers of soft
services may need to enter international markets via knowledge agreements or FDI,
hard services can be exported, especially given advances in technology (Dahringer
1991). Research also suggests that the entry choices of service firms may be restricted
by high host-government tariff, and non-tariff barriers (Nicolaud 1989). The
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incremental model is also found to be invalid for high technology industries (Sharma
and Johanson 1987).
Length of international experience may influence entry mode. Significant international
experience allows firms to generalise between similar markets and may result in firms
skipping stages, or making larger steps (Forsgren 1989). Erramilli (1991) finds that
service firms with greater international experience are more likely to enter markets,
which are culturally dissimilar, than those with little experience.
Moreover, the empirical evidence for the model originates from stable, economically
advanced nations. Accordingly, it is not clear whether it can be applied to turbulent
market environments. Reid (1983) concludes that the Uppsala model is too
deterministic and general. The firm's choice of entry and expansion modes is selective
and context-specific. It can be explained by heterogeneous resource patterns and
market opportunities. Indeed, in subsequent research, Johanson and Vahine (1990)
acknowledge that the explanatory power of the stage model is partial. Larger steps in
the internationalisation process may be made if the firm has high levels of resources.
Significant length of international experience allows the generalisation of experiences
between similar markets. The model may not be applicable to decisions relating to
turbulent markets.
More importantly, however, the basis of the model is open to criticism. Penrose (1959)
identifies two types of knowledge: experiential, which cannot be transferred, and
objective, which can be taught. Johanson and Vahine (1977) contend that the
knowledge required to overcome market uncertainty must be experiential and market
specific. However, the growth ofjoint ventures and other modes of co-operation
suggests that knowledge can be shared, to the mutual benefit of firms.
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2.4 Atomistic Studies
Given the limitations of the stage model approach, Welch and Luostarinen (1988)
suggest that the way ahead in studies of internationalisation may be to explore further
the choices, which underpin the process. They identify these as risk, control and
commitment. Miller (1992) stresses that firms must address the key issues of control
and flexibility in order to "manage uncertainty."
Research into the degree of control, which the firm exercises over its operations, tend
to be centred in economics literature. Key streams of literature are those of
internalisation, the development of multinational firms and transaction cost analysis.
Internalisation of firm-specific assets, as a means of overcoming market imperfections,
is a central tenet of theories as to the development of multinational corporations
(Hymer 1960, Buckley and Casson 1976, Rugman 1980, Teece 1986). Buckley and
Casson (1976) highlight a number of rival theories which contribute to this debate.
a) The Hymer-Kindelberger Theory
b) Aliber' s Theory of Currency Area
c) Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as a result of diversification
d) Vernon's Product Cycle Theories
e) Knickerbocker's Oligopolistic Reaction Theory
Aharoni's Behavioural Process (See Section 2.3.1)
g) Spreading Risk through FDI
2.4.1 The Hymer-Kindelberger Theory
The seminal work of Hymer, in his PhD thesis (1960), gave rise to a school of
literature often referred to as the "Hymer-Kindelberger" school. This body of literature
addresses the question of why foreign-owned firms are able to compete with
indigenous competition in an international market. Indigenous firms have the
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advantage of local knowledge, whilst foreign competitors must overcome the costs
incurred by serving the market at a distance.
The explanations, which are put forward, rest upon the idea that the foreign firm has
an exploitable firm-specific advantage (Buckley and Casson 1976, Hood and Young
1979). Kindelberger (1969) saw this advantage as resulting from marketing skills,
superior management techniques, or possession of a patented technology. Caves
(1971) focused upon the ability to differentiate products. Whilst Hirsch (1974) viewed
firm-specific advantage as coming from continuous research and development activity.
However, Buckley and Casson (1976) highlight certain key limitations of these
arguments. Firstly, it is assumed that finns will be able to exploit advantages, which
they possess. Secondly, there is no explanation why finns invest in certain of their
assets and not in others. Finally, theories tend to imply that firms make a single
innovation. If this were the case, then licensing might, equally, be used to exploit the
advantage.
2.4.2 Aliber's Theory of Currency Area
The work of Aliber (1970) is seen by Buckley and Casson (1976) to be in a similar
vein to that of the Hymer school. It poses the same question of ability to compete in
international markets. Aliber contends that currency variations play a role in foreign
direct investment. The relative strength of the home currency of the multinational
means that it can capitalise the same stream of expected earnings at a higher rate than
host country firms (Hood and Young 1979). Buckley and Casson acknowledge the
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explanatory power of this theory in the case of the post-war expansion of US
Multinational Corporations into Europe. This might be related to the relative strength
of the dollar during this period. Similarly, Japanese firms' expansion into South-East
Asia in the 1960's and 1970's might relate to the strength of the yen. However, in
general the theory is questioned as it cannot explain:
"the widespread cross-investment between Europe and the US. Nor could it
account for either the investment of US firms within the dollar area, or
multinational investment in LDCs where capital markets may be non-existent
and foreign exchanges highly regulated." Hood and Young 1979, pg. 51
For the latter reason, Aliber's theory provides little insight into the entry by
multinational corporations into Eastern Europe.
2.4.3 Foreign Direct Investment as a Result of Diversification
Research suggests that large firms tend to broaden their business both geographically,
and in terms of product range (Caves 1971, Rumelt 1974, Grant et al. 1988). The
tendency to diversifj might be based on proactive criteria, such as exploitation of a
firm-specific advantage, or reactive criteria, such as domestic saturation or excess
managerial capacity (Olson and Wiedersheim-Paul 1978).
2.4.4 Vernon's Product Cycle Theory
The product cycle theory of Vernon (1966) identifies three phases in the life of a
product, introduction, maturity and decline. These phases have related consequences
for the production and marketing strategies of a firm. At the early stage of the product
cycle, price elasticity is low, but products may need to be refined to meet customer
needs and wants. At the second stage, there is less need for flexibility and greater need
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for cost efficiency. At the final stage, competition may be based entirely on price and
the product may become a commodity.
These differing requirements have consequences for the international strategy of the
firm. Buckley and Casson (1976) describe these as follows: the first phase looks at the
determinants of the initial location of production, the second whether a market should
be serviced by exports or by investment, and the final phase at how the firm can best
compete against indigenous competition. Hood and Young (1979) suggest that the
first stage requires only domestic production, the second exploiting international
opportunities and the last relocating production facilities to areas with low labour
costs. This might relate to the interest of some multinationals in locating production
facilities in Eastern Europe.
However, the assumptions, upon which Vernon's model are based, relate to the stable
market conditions of the 1960's. It may be applicable to the post-war expansion of US
firms into Europe. However, the model's assumptions may no longer be valid. Labour
costs in Europe have increased, therefore US firms are unlikely to enter the market in
search of cheap production. It is not clear that the model is applicable in the current
turbulent environment. Furthermore, Hood and Young (1979) suggest that, like
Johanson and Vahine's incremental model of internationalisation (1977) Vernon's
theory may be more applicable to firms, which are making their first international
investment, than to multinational corporations.
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2.4.5 Oligopolistic Reaction Theory
Oligopolistic reaction theory was proposed as an explanation of the foreign direct
investment behaviour of multinational corporations by Knickerbocker (1973).
According to this theory, firms in the same industry sector tend to enter an
international market at around the same time. Thus, once the market leader has
entered, other firms in the sector follow. Buckley and Casson (1976) summarise this as
follows:
"the timing of foreign investment is determined largely by reaction to
competitors' investments (...) Once one firm invests in a region, the optimal
strategy for other firms is to 'follow the leader', even if this confers no
immediate advantage on the follower, but simply spoils the market for the
leader." Buckley and Casson 1976, pg. 78
However, they emphasise that Knickerbocker's work was inconclusive. Investment
behaviour of a lead firm may prompt oligopolistic reactions. However, the timing of
entry might, alternatively, be explained by possession of superior market information.
Hence a firm, which has better market intelligence systems than rivals, may be able to
assess the potential of a new market first. Accordingly, it would be the first to enter.
Other firms within the sector might revise their opinions of the market's attractiveness,
based on the knowledge that a competitor found it sufficiently interesting to enter. In
this case, firms are indirectly influenced by each other, but are responding to the same
set of market conditions.
Similarly, the time lag between the first and last entrants may depend upon the speed at
which they assess market attractiveness. Hence Buckley and Casson stress:
"if there is a high degree of uncertainty or the initiating firm does not appear to
be doing very well, then firms may defer their investment, so that they can
benefit from the experience of the initiator. On the other hand, if there is little
uncertainty, or the initiating firm is earning high profits, firms will tend to
respond very quickly (...) The theory, therefore, predicts that, across industries,
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bunching of foreign investment will be positively associated with profitability
and with the stability and cohesion of the market concerned." pg. 79
In Knickerbocker's view, the firms in this study should cluster together in their entry
decisions. However, as the market conditions in Ukraine are very uncertain, Buckley
and Casson's would expect the following firms to await the outcome of the leader's
investment decision, before making a decision themselves.
2.4.6 Spreading Risk Through FDI
This extends the idea of an individual investor minimising risk by choosing a portfolio
of investments in the international domain, rather than a single one. Thus, this view
would contend that the multinational firm invests in a portfolio of countries to
minimise the risk of economic downturn in any one market (Markowitz 1970). An
efficient portfolio of investments would be one, in which "risk-aversion and expected
value of returns are balanced" (Hood and Young 1979).
Both Buckley and Casson (1976) and Hood and Young (1979) point to the limited
explanatory power of this theory. If multinational corporations followed a process
similar to that of individual investors, one might expect them to take a large number of
minority stakes. No insight is given into the decision to opt for a controlling interest in
an operation:
"There is (...) apr/ma fade case that a portfolio designed to reduce risk
through diversification will not consist of direct investments, but of relatively
small shareholdings in a large number of assets" (Buckley and Casson, pg. 82).
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Furthermore, Buckley and Casson (1976) contend that multinational corporations do
not need to diversi& to reduce risk for their shareholders. Shareholders do this by
investing in several ventures rather than one.
2.4.7 Buckley and Casson's Theory
As an alternative to these theories of multinational development, Buckley and Casson
propose a comprehensive model, comprised of four sets of factors which influence the
long-term development of a multinational corporation. These are:
(z) Industry-spec/Ic factors
(ii) Region-spec/Ic factors
(iii) Nation-spec/Ic factors and
(iv)Firm-specific factors
The main emphasis is placed on the first of these sets of factors. The location strategy
of a vertically-integrated firm is seen to be determined by a combination of
comparative advantage, barriers to trade and regional incentives to internationalise.
Buckley and Casson propose that firms:
"will be multinational whenever these factors make it optimal to locate different
stages of production in different nations" pg. 35
Attention is paid to the role of knowledge, which may be internalised because of the
problems arising from pricing and protecting it in the external market.
This view is supported by the findings of Rugman (1980), who suggests that the
multinational enterprise exists as a response to government-induced failure, such as
tariffs and controls. Internalisation, he contends, may overcome market imperfections
in the pricing of knowledge and information. Hood and Young (1979)suggest that a
difficulty may arise when validating the internalisation hypothesis empirically. A key
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contribution, in attempts to understand the decision to internalise or to access
resources externally, may be offered by transaction costs analysis.
2.4.8 Transaction Cost Ana'ysis
Williamson (1975, 1981) uses transaction costs as a means of explaining the choice
between internalising a capability and accessing it externally. In his view, governance
structure is determined by the costs of transacting outside the organisation.
Behavioural factors, such as the bounded rationality of managers and opportunistic
behaviour, increase transaction costs. In situations of small numbers bargaining, when
there are few alternative suppliers or buyers, and in cases of high asset specificity,
hierarchical control is seen to reduce uncertainty.
Transaction costs need not be a rival to internalisation theory. Teece (1986) contends
that theories of internalisation can be complemented by transaction cost analysis. The
transaction is seen as a means of comparing the interaction between buyers and sellers
in free markets and in hierarchies. Buyers and sellers become locked into relationships
by the creation of transaction-specific assets. However, self-interest will result in
opportunistic behaviour, as both parties seek to gain as much of the advantages of the
transaction, as possible. Internalisation is seen as a governance structure which reduces
opportunism. Teece (1986) concludes:
"Developing the rent stream associated with [certain unique] assets often
requires the extension of some kind of hierarchical control structure over
productive assets, which are distributed internationally. Within this hierarchical
control structure, technology and other intangible, difficult-to-protect- and-
transfer assets can often be deployed more economically and securely."
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There are many criticisms of the transaction cost approach. Firstly, it assumes that
opportunistic behaviour exists only in transactions outside of the firm, a view
challenged by the evidence of behavioural studies (Cyert and March 1963, Aharoni
1966; Hickson et al 1986). Secondly, transaction cost analysis focuses upon dyadic
relationships. Yet, the dyad may be affected by the actions of other firms, or indeed the
network of firms with which it is interconnected (Johanson and Mattsson 1987).
Finally, Teece (1986) suggests that transaction costs can be used to gain a fuller
understanding of internalisation. However Buckley (1988) points to the difficulty of
operationalising transaction cost analysis. Transaction costs can be classified into
information costs, bargaining costs, enforcement costs and governance costs, but there
are no estimates of how significant these are, in comparison to transport or marketing
costs.
2.4.9 Control versus Risk
Despite their limitations, transaction costs have formed the basis of a number of studies
(Anderson and Gatignon 1986, Klein and Roth 1989, Jarillo 1988). Anderson and
Gatignon (1986) use transaction costs to explore the relationship between control and
risk. Control implies commitment of resources, which in turn, creates risks for the firm.
The optimal entry mode is seen to be a trade-off between the level of control, which
the firm chooses and the risk which this poses in terms of resource commitment.
Incremental models suggest that greater control is taken, in an international market as
uncertainty is overcome. However, Erramilli (1991) suggests that product or service
firms may have different criteria for the level of control, which they choose. He depicts
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a "U-shaped" relationship between experience and desired level of control. Firms with
little international experience and those with significant levels both require a high level
of control. Desire for high levels of control, in firms with little international experience,
may be based on the concern with psychic distance and uncertainty suggested by
Johanson and Vahlne (1977).
Those finns with high levels of experience were often concerned about guaranteeing
consistent service quality across markets. Erramilli suggests that perceived need for
control may be higher for service industries than manufacturing firms and that, in
consequence, international operation for service firms may involve higher levels of risk.
Shared control is more likely when asset-specificity is high, when services are
inseparable and as country-risk increases (Erramilli 1991). Thus, the service firms in
this research might be expected to make different entry choices to the product firms.
2.4.10 Commitment
Throughout the literature, the concept of "commitment" recurs. However, different,
and sometimes contradictory, definitions are proposed. To Aharoni (1966)
commitment is built during the process of foreign investment decision-making. As the
decision nears implementation, previous actions have built "commitment" to its taking
place. Essentially, therefore, commitment is an organisational phenomenon.
To Johanson and Vahlne (1977), commitment seems to equate most readily to "total
investment," all that the firm puts at stake in making an investment. This may include
financial resources and company reputation. This must be surmised, as they do not
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clearly define the composition of commitment. By this view, commitment is
predominantly a financial concept.
Ghemawat (1991) sees commitment as "the tendency of a strategy to persist over
time." He proposes the concept of "cumulative constraints," which may incline the firm
to remain with a course of action, once it is initiated. This view of commitment offers a
significant contribution to understanding the investment decisions of multinational
corporations. Ghemawat contends that commitment should be considered in
conjunction with competitive intensity. For example, if a firm commits to the
development of a new technology, which provides an advantage over competitors, it
calculates the likely return based on the potential benefits it will accrue. If competitors
develop the same, or a substitute technology, during the period of development, the
return may be significantly reduced. The firm:
"tends to assume away any differences in the reactions of competitors and
other interested parties to the organisation's choice of one strategic option
(intended long-term positions) as opposed to another. Ghemawat pg. 80
Furthermore, commitment to a strategy may be altered by subsequent events:
"the receipt of new information may induce the organisation to revise its course
of action (...) [However, calculation of return on investment] assumes that the
organisation will persist, without further recourse, with the course of action
favoured by the option it initially elects to pursue." pg. 80
Ghemawat stresses the need for organisations to be flexible and to adapt, in the light of
competitive reactions. Firstly, Ghemawat highlights the number of revisions which
firms make even to commitment-intensive decisions. Secondly, he challenges the
assumption that "investment always reduces flexibility, while not investing always
preserves it" pg. 124
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Building upon Ghemawat's view of commitment, a distinction can be drawn between
the concepts of control and commitment, where the latter implies being locked into a
course of action. A firm can opt for a high level of control, without necessarily having
a high level of commitment. For this research, the distinction could be important.
Choosing a high level of control, such as direct investment, may not commit a firm to
the Ukrainian market.
Whilst Ghemawat still implies an atomistic view of competition, his recognition of the
need for flexibility and his consideration of inter-relationships between the decisions,
which a firm makes, and those of other firms, is nearer to the view of network theory.
2.5 The Inter-relationship of Firms
The question of co-operation, rather than competition, between firms raises another
possible source of influence upon international investment decisions. The firm may be
affected by its relationships with customers, suppliers, competitors and other
stakeholders in its environment.
In 1965, Alderson identified a relative dearth of literature in the marketing field which
looked at co-operative rather than competitive behaviour:
"Co-operation is as prevalent in economic activity as competition... Economists
speak of competitive theory, of pure and perfect competition. There is no
corresponding development of co-operative theory, no concepts of pure and
perfect co-operation"
The last three decades have witnessed a significant growth in research focusing upon
the benefits of co-operation as well as competition.
The traditional view of marketing is that it is an exchange process between buyers and
sellers (Bagozzi 1975). Basic assumptions of the "Marketing Mix" approach are of
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atomistic competitors serving buyers, who must decide between the relative merits of
their product or service offering (Johanson and Mattsson 1994). However, a growing
body of literature, within the marketing, field focuses on the benefits of co-operation,
rather than competition.
Research into marketing channels, into the interaction between industrial buyers and
sellers and into networks, centres upon consideration of the nature of exchange
relationships. Johanson and Mattsson (1994) see the temporal focus as a key
distinction between this research and the marketing mix approach. They contend that
the marketing mix approach implies static comparison. The firm is concerned with the
attractiveness of their product or service, compared to competitors. This is essentially
static, although there may be development of products over time. The network
perspective is considered to be more dynamic. The focus is upon the development of
the relationship between a buyer and seller over a period of time. Channel literature,
interaction models and network research differ essentially in the type and number of
relationships which they study.
Channel literature focuses upon the nature of the relationship between sellers and the
channel intermediaries, which they use to reach the end consumer. Literature in the
channel strategy area has emphasised the roles of power and trust. Two main
perspectives have been adopted. Firstly, that which focuses upon power imbalances,
which may result in conflict (Lusch 1976, Etgar 1978, Hardy and Magrath 1989).
Conflict in the relationship is often seen to preclude co-operation (Lusch 1978, Etgar
1978). However, power imbalance need not lead to conflict, if both channel members
attain mutually beneficial goals. Indeed Boulding (1965) contends that conflict can
even stimulate performance, provided it does not exceed certain levels. The second
approach contends that co-operation, based on trust and goal congruence, may offer
significant benefits to both partners (Young and Wilkinson 1989, Narus and Anderson
1986, Jackson 1985).
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Originally based on research carried out in Sweden, at Uppsala University and
Stockholm School of Economics, the work of IMP, the Industrial or International
Marketing and Purchasing Group, across Europe has given rise to a valuable body of
research. This centres around the interaction between industrial buyers and sellers
(Turnbull and Cunningham 1981, HAkansson 1982, Turnbull and Valla 1986). The
buyer need not be a channel intermediary.
The interaction model (Hâkansson and Ostberg 1975, HAkansson and Wootz 1975a,
1 975b) marks a decisive watershed in marketing literature. Previous research
differentiated little between industrial and consumer marketing. However Häkansson
and Ostberg view industrial buyers as characterised by their concentration and relative
power. This makes them active participants in the exchange process.
In the interaction mode! (Figure 2.3) the degree of social exchange and mutual
adaptation are seen as key determinants of power dependence and, hence, relationship
stability. Successful relationships are seen to be built upon trust, rather than formal
commitment (Hâkansson 1982). Strong inter-firm relationships favour information
exchange, which is a key stimulus of innovative product development.
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The network paradigm builds upon the work of the interaction model. It differs in its
focus. In its simplest form, the network may simply be seen as aggregation of the
interaction model. However, a key distinction is that each relationship may be
influenced by other direct and indirect relationships, which the actor has. Hence, the
network approach assumes strategic interdependence of the firm with other firms in the
environment (Johanson and Mattsson 1985). Seyed-Mohamed and Bolte (1992)
express this as follows:
"The position of a firm, in a network, is directly dependent upon its relationship
with counterparts, but indirectly dependent upon the counterpart's
relationships with others" pg. 215
A key issue in network research is the complexity of the field of relevant literature. A
range of complementary, and often overlapping, bodies of literature contributes its
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development. However, these are not similar in all respects. Views do not always
remain constant. Authors have developed their research over time, often arriving at
different conclusions. Moreover the terminology can be confusing:
"The same terms may be used but they are often built up from different
assumptions and have different meanings" Axeisson 1992)
The network has variously been defined as:
"A set of relationships, whereby actors gain access to scarce resources"
(Hâkans son and Johanson 1992)
"the totality of all units connected by a certain type of relationship" (Aldrich
and Whetton 1981)
"the totality of relationships among firms engaged in production, distribution
and the use of goods and services in what might best be described as an
industrial system" (Easton 1992)
"consisting of 'nodes' or positions (...) and links manifested by interactions
between the positions" (Thorelli 1986)
Whilst Thorelli (1986) saw the network as intermediate organisational type, between
markets and hierarchies, the other definitions focus upon the fact that the firm is
embedded in its environment. Identification of the key features of the network is often
influenced by the focus of the research. Hence, Hâkansson and Johanson (1992) stress
the key role of "actors" who perform and control "activities" in order to access
"resources." By this definition, relationships between actors are a means of gaining
access to scarce resources, in a way reminiscent of Pfeffer and Salancik's resource
dependence model (1978).
Johanson and Mattsson (1987) focus upon the relationships within networks. Whilst
Easton (1992) offers a comprehensive review of the provenance and composition of
the network under the headings of "networks as relationships", "networks as
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structures", "networks as positions" and "networks as process." Adopting these
headings the following key features of networks can be identified:
2.5.1 Networks as Relationships
In his seminal article, Thorelli (1986) highlights the flow of power, information, money
and utilities within the network. He stresses that flows of goods and money may be less
important than those of information and power. Mattsson (1984) also distinguishes
between technical, knowledge, economic or social exchanges. At different times a
relationship may involves some, or all, of these types of exchange. In industrial
networks economic exchange is a given. However, non-economic exchange:
"may moderate the importance of purely economic considerations such as price
in deciding the continuity of the relationship (Easton 1992).
It is recognised that, in other types of networks, economic exchange may be absent.
Indeed, there may be relationships of other types within industrial networks, such as
informational or social links between competitor firms.
Relationships may be direct or indirect. Indirect relationships can be seen as providing
the linkages, which distinguish between interaction studies of dyadic exchange and
network approaches (Easton 1992). Firms may act as flow through nodes for
exchanges between two other firms (Easton and Lundgren 1992, Smith and Laage-
Hellman 1992).
Moreover, relationships may be of different strength. Strong, stable relationships are
seen as a valuable means of overcoming uncertainty. Firms may gain information
through their relationships (Jarillo 1988). They can gain significant benefits from
building ongoing relationships, in which partners may increasingly tailor their mode of
operation to foster the co-operation (Turnbull and Cunningham 1981, Cunningham and
Culligan 1991). The development of stable relationships, within networks, has been
described as "co-ordination" (Hertz 1992) or "structuring" (Hâkansson 1992).
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2.5.2 Networks as Structures
The number of relationships, their "quality," or intensity, and their "type," or closeness
to the core activities of the firm, are defined by Thorelli (1986) as determining whether
a network is tight or loose in its structure. Thorelli recognises the co-existence of
conflict and co-operation within the network:
"We should expect the struggle for resources requisite for survival and growth
to be reflected in intra-network friction and conflict as well as co-operation.
Clearly the network is a polity, a 'political organism.' "pg. 40
The firm must not view itself as isolated, but in relation to other firms, with which it is
connected. The current structure of the network, and the investment in relationships to
date, will have an impact upon the opportunities which the firm has in the future
(Mattsson 1989). This is because the position, which the firm holds in the network, is
defined by its relationships with other firms. In "tightly-structured" networks
(Johanson and Mattsson 1988), there is high inter-dependence between actors, bonds
are strong and the position of firms vis a vis each other is well-defined. In "loosely-
structured networks" the bonds between actors are weak, and the positions which they
hold are less well-defined.
2.5.3 Networks as Positions
Thorelli (1986) defines position as a "location of power to create and/or influence
networks." Positions are seen to be important for the development of the firm. A key
implication of the network perspective is that the firm must invest in developing its
position in the network:
"On entering a network the new member faces the strategic challenge of
positioning himself among the pre-existing members of the network (...) The
established members may have to do some repositioning to accommodate the
new member (...)."positioning of the firm in the network becomes a matter of
as great strategic significance as positioning its product in the marketplace."
Thorelli 1986, pg. 42
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The investments which the firm makes, both in its internal development and within the
external market, are seen to be influenced by its network relationships:
"Positions take time and resources to develop. The firm's access to other finns'
assets is mediated by its positions and those positions are in themselves a result
of investment processes.(...) Present positions define restrictions and
opportunities for the future use of(...) assets and development of the positions"
Johanson and Mattsson 1985 pg. 188
This interdependency between firms is supported in later research (Johanson and
Vahlne 1990) (See Figure 2.4)
FOCAl. FIRM COMMITMENT	 CURRENT BUSINESS	 COMMITMENT AND OMI.EDGE
AND KNOWLEDGE	 ACTMTIES	 Off OTHER ACTORS IN
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Figure 2.4
Hâkansson and Snehota (1989) also recognise the imperative of studying the firm in
relation to other firms:
"Reciprocal knowledge and capabilities are revealed and developed jointly and
in mutual dependence by the two parties. Distinct capabilities are thus
generated and have meaning in an organisation only through the medium of
other parties. They are unique to each party, since no two sets of related
organisations are alike. In this sense, the identity of an organisation is created in
interaction with its major counterparts." pg. 191
Johanson and Mattsson (1985) distinguish between micro-positions and macro-
positions. Micro-positions are characterised by:
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"a) the role of the firm in relation to the [other] firm
b) its importance to the other firm
c) the strength of the relationship with the other firm"
whilst macro positions are characterised by:
"a) the identity of the other firms with which the firm has direct relationships
and indirect relationships in the network
b) the role of the finn in the network
c) the strength of the relationships with other firms
d) the importance of the firm in the network"
This distinction allows for further consideration of the development of firms in
networks. Originally, macro-positions were seen to be aggregations of micro-positions
(Johanson and Mattsson 1987), but subsequent research amends this view (Johanson
and Mattsson 1988). Macro positions are affected by interdependencies in the whole
network, as well as by the direct relationships, which determine micro-position.
Aggregation of micro-positions cannot reflect the complexity of the interactions, which
define the macro-position. A key consequence of this distinction is the view that
networks should be studied holistically and cannot meaningfully be disaggregated.
However, a disparity of views can be seen within the network literature.
In studies of the relationship, the network is often simplified to its most basic level,
that of the single relationship. Thus, the dyad has been used by Easton and Araujo
(1992) in their analysis of economic and non-economic exchange types. Similarly,
Ford, Hâkansson and Johanson (1986) consider the co-existence of co-operation and
conflict within the single relationship. Whilst Smith and Laage-Hellman (1992) use the
triad as a vehicle to demonstrate more complex resource transformation patterns in
relationships.
However, this atomistic approach has key limitations. It oversimplifies the nature of
the relationship. If micro-positions cannot be aggregated to form macro-positions, then
extrapolation of a single relationship can never fully express the network. Nor can
atomistic studies reflect the richness of complex interchanges between firms.
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Yet, the alternative holistic approach to the study of networks is also fraught with
problems. Sharma (1989) takes a macro-level approach, in his study of network
operation in the technical consultancy market. Similarly, Lorenzoni and Ornati (1988)
consider constellations of firms within the Italian textile industry. A major difficulty in
holistic consideration of the network is that of deciding the boundaries of the network.
Moreover, the complexity, which results from the holistic approach, makes it difficult
to see how it could be developed beyond case analyses of specific industries, without
becoming unwieldy.
A compromise is proposed by Cunningham and Culligan (1991), who recognise the
existence of "focal nets". A focal net is seen to consist of:
"relations above a certain minimum degree of closeness to a focal or "hub"
firm. The focal net defines the set of the most important relationships for that
focal firm at any one point of time."
Andersson et al (1990) take a similar view, claiming:
"Industrial networks are unbounded and can extend without limits. Boundaries
suitable for analytical purposes can be drawn, as a result of perspectives,
intentions and interpretations"
Whilst it is recognised that it may exclude some relationships, this pragmatic approach
is favoured for this research, as a way of taking into account the impact of the most
important of the focal firm's relationships.
2.5.4 Networks as a Process
The flexibility of the network is an important facet of its value as an organisation form
(Miles and Snow 1986). Hence, whilst both IMP studies and network literature stress
the value of long-term stable relationships, both recognise the dangers of stagnation.
Consequently, Hãkansson (1992) recognises the role of both "structuring" and
"heterogeneity" within networks. Lundgren (1992) focuses upon continuous and
discontinuous change within networks. Young and Wilkinson (1994) recognise that
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different duration and types of relationships may be best suited to different purposes.
Whilst Young and Denize (1994) find that some buyers stay with existing suppliers,
even when they are no longer gaining good service, because they are "stuck" in the
existing relationship. There is a recognition in the literature that loosely-structured
networks are subject to greater change than those which are tightly structured. This
may relate to the strength of the positions, which the actors have developed.
Another key dimension of the network as a process is the co-existence of conflict and
co-operation. The firm may have information links with its competitors. However, it
will not co-operate with it in ways which jeopardise its own welfare. The balance
between these apparently contradictory forces is explored by Cunningham and Culligan
(1991), who consider the ways in which co-operative relationships can contribute
towards the creation and continuation of competitive advantage.
2.6.1 Networks and Internationalisation
The network view of the firm has particular implications for research into
internationalisation. A number of variables have been proposed by extant literature as
potential influences upon the decision to enter new international markets and upon
ently mode. The network view opens up the possibility that the most appropriate
organisational mode is co-operation, either formally or informally. Robinson (1986)
concludes:
"It boils down to which value-added links are most likely to enjoy international
economies of scale (...) if performed by external specialist firms, economies
which may swamp any benefits derived from the internalisation of the
transaction"
Jarillo (1988) suggests that finns should access resources externally, if the cost of
doing so is less than internalising the transaction.
A stronger contention of the network paradigm is that the actions of firms cannot be
viewed atomistically, but must be understood in the context of the relationships, which
they have with other stakeholders in the market. Research shows that the market entry
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of firms is influenced by relationships which they have in home and host market
networks:
"According to the network model, the internationalisation of the firm means
that the firm establishes and develops positions in relation to counterparts in
foreign networks." (Johanson and Mattsson 1988).
"A corner stone in the network view is that it regards firms as engaged in more
or less lasting relationships with other actors in the business arena, the main
managerial task being to handle their interaction." (Forsgren and Johanson
1992, pg. 2)
Thus, from a network perspective, internationalisation is the process whereby the
number and strength of the relationships between the different parts of the global
network increases. The position, which an individual actor holds in a network, may
differ between markets. Forsgren and Johanson (1992) contend:
"Sometimes the firms compete on their own, sometimes they co-operate with
other actors in ever changing patterns. The traditional distinct roles in the
market place as suppliers, customers and competitors are becoming mixed.
Competitors in one market co-operate in another and are suppliers and
customers to each other in a third." pg. 1
As, in the strictest sense, network theorists would contend that the world market is
part of the same network, Johanson and Mattsson (1988) adopt the convention of
referring to subsets of the overall network as "nets." They identi& the existence of
national "nets" and of production "nets," for firms producing the same product. This
latter seems to equate to industries. Based upon degree of internationalisation of the
firm, and of the industry sector, in which it operates, Johanson and Mattsson identi&
four types of firms. They see each of these as facing different imperatives in
international development (See Figure 2.5):
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Whilst the Early Starter cannot count on using existing reationshIps to InternationalIse,
the other three types can use existing domestic, or international, links. The Lonely
International must compensate for its isolation in the foreign market by close
integration of activities within its own multinational organisation. The Late Starter can
be "pulled out" by customers or suppliers:
"Thus market investments in the domestic market are assets which can be
utilised when going abroad. In that case it is not necessary to go from the
nearby market to more distant markets and the step abroad may be rather large
in the beginning."
The International Among Others operates in global markets against global competition.
Its activities are closely related to other firms in the same national or production nets.
This type of firm is seen as having greater ability to externalise activities. Therefore,
Johanson and Mattsson contend that the theory of internalisation is less relevant:
"If both the firm and its environment are highly internationalised, it seems that a
model which aims to explore Multinational Enterprise loses some of its
relevance for analysis of further internationalisation."
Similarly, the stages model is seen to be less applicable to highly internationalised firms
in highly internationalised industries. ForstrOm (1991) concurs with the view that the
further internationalisation of multinational firms may raise a different set of issues.
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2.6.2 The Transition from Hierarchies to Markets: the Role of Networks
Whilst it would be untrue to suggest that management research was not previously
interested in Eastern and Central Europe (Ciéslik 1989, Nigh et al 1990), liberalisation
has brought an exponential growth in the body of literature addressing the issues of
operation in the region (Kraljic 1990, Czinkota 1991, Hooley et al 1992, Cox and
Hooley 1993, Pitt-Watson 1993, Lawrence and Vlatchoukis 1993, Yamin 1994,
Paliwoda 1995).
Much of this literature focuses upon the opportunities and obstacles in the process of
transition to free market economy. This may take the form of analysis of a particular
aspect of the environment (Kraljik 1990, Czinkota 1991). It may offer practical
insights into the nature of doing business in Eastern and Central Europe (Paliwoda
1995). Or else, it may centre upon the problems faced in the 'marketisation' of Eastern
Europe (Yamin 1994, Hooley et al 1992, Cox and Hooley 1993). Empirical evidence
suggests a tendency by western firms to enter Eastern Europe via Joint Venture
agreements. Therefore, another prevalent theme is that of the criteria behind
investment via Joint Ventures and the ways in which they can be successfully
implemented (Nigh et al 1990, Lawrence and Vlatchoukis 1993).
Amongst the research, which seeks to address the issues of western business operation
in Eastern Europe, little emphasis is given to the need to approach these markets
differently to advanced economies. Pitt-Watson (1993) suggests that the direct transfer
of western models and strategies may not be appropriate for these markets. However,
some research pays little heed to the different demands of markets in transition. Hooley
et al (1992) and Cox and Hooley (1993) compare the nature of marketing across three
Central European countries. However, they use a research instrument predicated upon
the assumptions of stable, advanced economies. Even after translation of the
instrument into the appropriate language, many of the concepts are alien and open to
49
misunderstanding. Other important issues may not be covered by a deductive research
technique.
The difference between centrally-planned and free market economies is highlighted by
a growing body of literature, within the network field. In western economies, an
organisation tends to have direct relationships with its suppliers and customers, and
indirect relationships with a broader range of stakeholders (Achrol, Reve and Stern
1980). However, Mattsson (1993) highlights the lack of direct channel relationships in
centrally-planned economies. The main transactions were between the government and
individual firms within the supply chain. He describes this as "ann's length transactions
between 'faceless' buyers and sellers".
Salmi (1993) highlights the stability of networks in the administered system. This
stability she relates to the clear definition of network roles and the high degree of
regulation of exchange. However, De Wit and Monami (1993) point to the contrast
between the stability of the previous system and the current period of metamorphosis.
Some actors have disappeared, whilst others have become increasingly important.
Moreover, the nature of resource flows has changed fundamentally.
There is an ongoing debate as to the nature and indeed existence of networks within
the emergent markets. Snehota (1994) contends that the countries were previously
hierarchies, and, as such, networks cannot be said to have existed. They may, however,
offer a key contribution in the progress towards market economies.
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2.7 Networks: Between Markets and Hierarchies, or Markets as Networks?
The preceding review of the literature has explored four separate strands which
contribute to understanding of the entry mode choices of multinational corporations. In
conclusion, this section explores the areas where the literature converges and offer
complementary contributions to understanding.
A valuable, integrative role is played by existing inter-disciplinary considerations of
entry mode choice. Buckley et al 1990 offer an integration of the international
marketing and international business views of foreign market servicing. Forsgren
(1989) juxtaposes the different strands of internationalisation literature presented in the
preceding analysis to identif' four schools of thought, which cut across disciplinary
area (See Figure 2.6).
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Casson (1994) explores the rival suggestions of an incremental process (Johanson and
Wiedersheim-Paul 1975, Johanson and Vahlne 1977) or the simultaneous market entry
pattern proposed by research into globalisation. This latter is based upon the argument
that consumers world-wide are homogeneous (Ohmae 1990) and that, if markets
differ, it is in unique ways which invalidate the benefit of cumulative international
investment (Porter 1980).
In conclusion, Casson finds support for each theory. Sequential entry beginning with
proximate markets is a means of deferring the high entry costs of entry into markets
with high psychic distance. If the home culture of the firm is idiosyncratic, then it faces
high costs in entering any international market and may do so sequentially.
Simultaneous internationalisation is favoured if there is value in pre-empting.
competitors or if the international experience and "confidence" of managers is high, In
this thesis, the firms do not come from idiosyncratic cultures. There are high levels of
international experience and value in pre-empting competitors. Casson's research
would imply multinational corporations would favour simultaneous entry into the
countries of Eastern Europe.
Buckley and Casson (1981) also look at the dynamics of internationalisation. Three
types of costs are identified: a non-recoverable set-up cost, a recurrent fixed cost
relating to expenses associated with the mode of operation and a recurrent variable
cost. Based on the last two of these categories, they explore the cost implications of
export, licensing and direct investment and identify the optimal timing of the switch
between the different modes.
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The contribution of Buckley and Casson (1981) highlights am issue which runs
through the literature of all disciplines, that of choosing between the alternative modes
of international operation. A key part of the debate is that of whether the network is a
separate mode or that markets are comprised of networks.
Jarillo (1988) contends that network literature tends towards description of the
network. He ascribes this to its origins in organisational behaviour. Whilst he
recognises the valuable contribution of such work to understanding of the network, he
contends that the network may play an important strategic role.
Jarillo views the network as a choice of mode which may include shared equity
ventures as well as informal co-operation. This beief derives €om the d titio of
Thorelli (1986) that the network is a hybrid mode of organisation between hierarchy
and the market (Williamson 1975):
"For expository purposes we may think in terms of a spectrum of
arrangements, from loose to tight, from arm's length bargaining to total
integration, from spot transactions via standing relations to the internalisation
of markets (...) at one end of the spectrum is what we may call the open
market. At the other we find the firm which is relatively self-sufficient in terms
of vertical or functional integration. In some ways these distinctions are
analogous to Williamson's (1975) markets and hierarchies, although he
would likely include as part of 'markets' a number of in-between forms where
we would rather apply the generic term networks." pg. 37
This definition of the network is used by a number of works which study the choice
between the network and alternative modes of operation. Lorenzoni and Ornati (1988)
see 'constellations' of small firms as being developed by entrepreneurs as the most
appropriate mode of operation. Miles and Snow (1986) relate the preferred mode of
operation to the environment in which the firm operates. The dynamism of the network
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makes it the most effective organisational form in the current turbulent environment.
By this argument, networks would be favoured by firms entering the turbulent markets
of Eastern Europe.
Transaction cost analysis is used by a number of the works which relate to choice of
organisational mode. Jarillo (1988) concludes that the choice between competing
modes can be determined by the respective costs of transacting within and outside of
the organisation. If an internal activity is described as an internal cost (IC), the cost of
subcontracting is comprised of the external price (EP) charged by the supplier and the
cost of transacting outside of the organisation (TC) and this gives the total cost of
externalising the activity (EC) then:
"an activity will be integrated (thus shaping a hierarchy) when EP + TC > IC"
pg. 35
That is an activity will be internalised only if the total costs of externalising the activity
are greater than those of keeping the activity within the organisation. This definition
allows that the transaction costs element may be increased by the danger or "costs" of
disclosing information on proprietary technologies. Therefore the external cost may be
higher for firms in high technology industries or where there is a concern to protect
knowledge-based assets.
Transaction costs are related to international entry mode choice by Robinson (1986):
"it boils down to which value-added links are most likely to enjoy international
economies of scale (...) if performed by external specialist firms, economies
which may swamp any benefits derived from the internalisation of the
transaction."
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The role of transaction costs in international business is extended by the research of
Klein and Roth (1990). Klein and Roth analyse the choice between four modes of
export channel structure; independent distributors, joint ventures or other
'intermediate' mode, company-owned sales organisation or establishment of a
subsidiary. The effects of experience and psychic distance upon the choice between
these modes are analysed using transaction costs. The choice of mode is seen to be
affected by the "extent to which markets operate efficiently," as the ability to
externalise an activity is dependent upon the ability of the market to govern
transactions efficiently. Based on these findings, Klein and Roth suggest that firms may
be more likely to internalise activities in markets with high psychic distance:
"firms should be wary of recommendations that they enter new and very
unfamiliar markets with low degrees of commitment. They must also assess the
extent to which their products and/or marketing activities are highly specialised
and thus not amenable to a reliance on market enforcement of good behaviour
from outside intermediaries. When outside enforcement cannot be relied upon,
a stronger earlier commitment to the market is necessary." pg. 37
The contention of this study is that firms with high asset specificity might feel a greater
need to internalise than those with low asset specificity. Klein and Roth describe this in
terms of the level of familiarity of the firm with the host market. Psychic distance, by
their definition relates to the perception of the market by managers in the firm.
However, it relates also to the level of uncertainty in the market, particularly with
respect to its legislation on protection of intellectual property and the efficiency of its
market mechanisms.
Building upon the findings of this research, it would be expected that firms entering the
uncertain markets of Eastern Europe would perceive high levels of psychic distance.
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Moreover, the process of the transition to free market economy is at best incomplete.
At worst, the likelihood of a successful outcome may be questionable. Therefore, Klein
and Roth would suggest a high degree of hierarchical control.
However, the view that the network is an intermediate form is challenged in much
network literature. Johanson and Mattsson (1987) claim that this view ignores some of
the key characteristics of the network. They see fundamental differences between the
network and transaction cost literature. In network literature, firms are viewed as
mutually interdependent. In consequence, the investment processes and use of assets
by one firm may be influenced by its relationships. Therefore, the network cannot
simply be seen as a hybrid organisational mode which may be efficient or effective in
certain circumstances. The decisions, which a firm makes, may be favoured or
constrained by its existing network position (Johanson and Mattsson 1985, Mattsson
1989). Moreover, from this perspective, markets are not an alternative to networks,
but rather consist of networks:
"The markets are characterised by interaction between firms in relationships
where the parties have some control over each other and the organisations are
not "pure" hierarchies. To us the legal frameworks of the transactions are less
important and the boundaries of the network are unclear." pg. 12
Accordingly, Johanson and Mattsson defend the focus upon network processes or
dynamics. Jarillo (1988) dismisses this view as descriptive, anecdotal and as presenting
networks as a "metaphor." Johanson and Mattsson contend that studying the dynamic
aspects of networks may give a better understanding of "the strategies pursued by
firms in such systems." Whilst the transaction cost issues of bounded rationality,
opportunism, uncertainty and asset specificity are also significant in the markets as
56
networks view, the beliefs relating to each of these differs. In particular, the dangers of
oppoitmism are countered by its correlate trust, which the network perspective views
as essential to the development of stable relationships.
The tension between the two theories is illustrated by their contradictory views of
internationalisation. The internalisation view of internationalisation suggests that
concern to protect a firm-specific advantage will result in the decision to create an
internal market or "hierarchy." However, the network view of internationalisation
challenges the belief that the finn's assets must be internal. The ability of the firm to
develop internationally may reside in its relationships with other firms. Existing
network "positions" may influence the decision to enter a market. Moreover, they may
influence entry mode. The firm may externalise some of its activities without losing
control of its crucial intangible assets.
Another vehicle for integration between the different strands of literature is offered by
research into the nature of the host market. Research from a number of disciplines
highlights the role of country-specific variables in influencing mode of entry. Within the
economics literature, Dunning (1980) suggests that the location-specific advantages of
a market may play a role in the decision whether a firm should locate its production
operations there. The rational planning literature proposes frameworks and models for
assessment of the risks and opportunities of target countries (Perlitz 1985, Kern 1985,
Goodnow and Hansz 1972). In marketing literature, Kotler (1986) proposes the
additional variables of public relations and politics, which firms may need to manage in
order to successfully gain entry into blocked markets. Whilst Kwon and Konopa
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(1993) highlight the fact that firms may use different modes of operation to market the
same product in different countries, because of the specifcs of the host market
environment. This view reaffinns the pivotal role of the Eastern European context in
determining entry mode.
Research into China (Terpstra and Yu 1989, Schlegelmilch et al 1991, Cronin 1991,
Johnston 1991), a country also considered to be an emerging mega-market, highlights
the role of government control, lack of infrastructure and requirements for technology
transfer in influencing entry mode. Schiegeimlich et al (1991) paine to the
which the Chinese government places on shared equity joint ventures as means of
entry. Furthermore, they identif' a predominance of large, multinational entrants in the
population of firms entering China. The distinctive market environment also reduces
the value of previous international experience:
"It is worth noting that experience in other countries with similar
characteristics, (notably the political régime, level of development and/or
culture), does not appear to be particularly relevant in terms of lessening the
intensity of problems encountered." pg. 197
At first sight, research into other planned economies might appear to offer insights into
the issues faced by firms entering Eastern Europe. Whilst the countries are in the
process of transition away from the centrally-controlled system, they are still
characterised by many of the problems in the previous system. In researching entry into
North Korea, Lee (1993) stresses that psychic distance is high and that firms must take
into account the specifcs of government policy, the nature of the planned industrial
system and the social issues which have arisen from punitive central control. Many of
these issues abide in the transitionary economies of Eastern Europe.
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However, it is clear that the entry decisions of multinational firms in Eastern Europe
cannot necessarily be expected to conform to the same patterns seen in other countries.
Joint Ventures might be favoured by governments within the region as a means of
facilitating technology transfer. Psychic distance is high. This might either suggest low
commitment entry modes (Johanson and Vahlne 1977) or that intemalisation is
preferred as a means of overcoming the inefficiency of the market (Klein and Roth
1990, Jarillo 1988). On the contrary, Miles and Snow might expect the turbulent
environmental conditions to favour dynamic network organisational forms. This thesis
proposes an inductive, theory-building approach to consideration of the influences
upon entry decisions by Multinational Corporations in Ukraine, so as not to prejudge
which of the valuable, but often contradictory, propositions of the literature might
offer the most insightful explanation.
2.8 Propositions from the Literature
Proposition 1: High level of resources in the firm may reduce the significance of
individual investment decisions
This proposition is derived from the research of Forsgren (1989), who contends that
larger, more highly internationalised firms are likely to make more significant
investments on entering a market. Moreover, they are more likely to skip stages. These
findings are subsequently acknowledged by Johanson and Vahine (1990) as an
amendment to their 1977 research. Kutschker (1985) suggests that for demographic
data, objective values may be less relevant than relative data. Thus, a firm may be
influenced by its awareness of being smaller, or larger, more, or less internationalised
than other firms in its industry.
Proposition 2: Models of International Investment may differ between dj[ferent
product or service types
A further body of literature suggests that the incremental model of internationalisation
(Johanson and Vahlne 1977) may not be valid for services (Errarnilli 1990) or for
technical services (Sharma 1989). Reid (1983) concludes that the model is too
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deterministic and general and that firms may behave differently, depending on industry
sector and the specifics of the situation.
Proposition 3: Subsidiaries may play a sign jficant role in the international
investment decisions of multinational corporations
Forsgren (1989) also suggests that the decisions made by larger, more internationalised
firms may be significantly influenced by their subsidiaries. Hence investment decisions
need not come from the centre of the organisation, but may be initiated by local or
geographically-proximate subsidiaries. This contention also informs the further
proposition of this research:
Proposition 4: Investment decisions may be routed via geographically proximate
subsidiaries
Proposition 5: Experience of similar markets allows firms to generalise and reduces
perceived risk
In proposing the incremental model of internationalisation, Johanson and Vahine
(1977) build upon the views of Penrose (1959) that market knowledge must be direct
and experiential. According to this belief, psychic distance, which is high on entry into
a new international market can only be overcome by direct experience of that market.
It cannot be transferred by use of experienced staff or knowledge external to the firm.
However, after criticism of these views by Forsgren (1989), Johanson and Vahine
accept (1990) that knowledge gained in similar markets may be transferred within the
firm.
Proposition 6: High levels of environmental uncertainty increase the perceived risk
of investment in a country
Studies of market attractiveness (Kami 1976, Paul et al 1976) stress the role of
environmental uncertainty in increasing the risks of operation in a market. Transaction
cost analysis highlights uncertainty, together with the bounded rationality of managers
(Williamson 1981) as factors which increase transaction costs. Discontinuous change,
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such as that encountered in Ukraine may invalidate use of rational planning techniques
to assess the level of risk, which firms face (Edwards and Harris 1978).
Proposition 7: High levels of environmental uncertainty increase the perceived risk
of investment in a country
Thomas (1994) contends that the transition process in Eastern Europe is unparalleled.
Therefore, it cannot be assumed that theories, based on empirical evidence gathered in
stable advanced economies, will be applicable in considering investment decisions in
the region. Research into other emerging markets (Schlegelmilch et a!. 1991)
concludes that the variables, which they include in their study play only a minor role.
Therefore, it is proposed that research must be inductive, in order that it does not
prejudge the variables, which explain the entry choices of multinational corporations in
Ukraine.
Proposition 8: Factor advantages increase the attractiveness of Ukraine for
investors
In the economics literature, location-specific advantages, such as the availability of raw
materials, or low labour costs are seen to provide the impetus for entry into new
international markets (Dunning 1982, Rugman (1989).
Proposition 9: The decision to enter or expand in Ukraine may be influenced by
the actions of oligopolistic rivals
Similarly, from the economics literature, comes the contention that the actions of firms
may be defensive reactions to the entry into a market by an oligopolistic rival
(Knickerbocker 1973).
Proposition 10: The decision to enter or expand in Ukraine may be influenced by
the actions of existing customers or suppliers
The interaction and network literature supports the view that the activities of the firm
cannot be viewed atomistically. Existing relationships with suppliers and customers
(Hâkansson 1982, Turnbull and Cunningham 1981), or with other stakeholders in the
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environment, can influence the firm's actions. Johanson and Mattsson (1988) suggest
that highly internationalised firms may be concerned with building positions in global
networks and may use existing domestic and international relationships in order to do
so. Related to this contention, is the belief that knowledge is a scarce resource, which
can be exchanged within relationships. In the conditions of high market uncertainty in
Ukraine, the need for information exchange may prompt the development of new
relationships:
Proposition 11: The knowledge of a market on which decisions are built may come
from the network of relationships, which the firm has with other firms or key
stakeholders in the Ukraine.
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Chapter 3 - Methodology
3.1 Introduction
It has been suggested (Easterby-Smith et al 1991), that the choice of methodology is
influenced by the researcher's own preferences, by the nature of the research question
and by the pragmatic concern of access. As an introduction to the research
methodology for this thesis, it may be appropriate to address these issues.
The researcher's background is in the field of international marketing. The last decade
has witnessed an ongoing debate over the future of research within the marketing area.
The pre-eminence of quantitative, positivist studies has opened the discipline to the
charge of "New Marketing Myopia" (Brownlie et al 1994). In the early 1980's, Day
and Wensley (1983) suggested that the way ahead for marketing literature may be to
adopt a more strategic focus. However, Hunt (1994) contends that marketing has
made little contribution to the strategy debate in the intervening decade. Moreover,
despite the undoubted value of qualitative research methodologies for in-depth
research, marketing literature is still focused upon theory-testing rather than theory
building (Bonoma 1985, Desphande 1983). Desphande claims:
"Marketing scholars have too long ignored the meta-theoretical implications of
reliance on a single paradigm. This paradigm has been identified as that of
logical positivism. In its exclusion of a more qualitative paradigm, marketing
theory has developed certain inherent methodological biases. These biases
come from developing new theoretical contributions while using methodologies
more appropriate to theory testing than to theory generation."
Nowhere does a focus upon deductive methodology present more of a problem than in
research into Eastern Europe. The question addressed by this research is "what
influences the choice of entry mode of multinational corporations in conditions of high
market uncertainty?" As can be seen from the preceding review of the literature,
contributions to understanding of this question can be gained from the fields of
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marketing, strategy, economics, organisational behaviour and international business.
Accordingly, an inter-disciplinary approach is required. It is hoped that the findings of
this research will be of relevance within the fields of strategy and international
business, as well as to that of marketing. Given the unparalleled nature of the transition
process in Eastern Europe (Thomas 1994, Egan 1993), the chosen methodology must
not prejudge which of the theoretical contributions of these fields, if any, will be
applicable.
The reasons for the choice of the Ukraine as the empirical basis of the study are two-
fold. Firstly, Aharoni (1966) contends that entry decisions must be considered in their
context. Each market in Eastern Europe is at a different stage of transition, and the
uncertainty of its situation rests upon different concerns. Therefore, for this in-depth
study, focus upon entry into one market is preferred. This market must be
characterised by high levels of environmental uncertainty. Ukraine meets this
requirement. Moreover, at the time of its selection in early 1993, Ukraine was the
target of significant investment activity by multinational corporations. However, the
intervening period has seen a worsening economic crisis, which has raised the question
of whether it is likely to succeed in its transition to free market economy.
Secondly, Warwick Business School is a partner in an EC Technical Assistance to
Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) project with the International
Management Institute in Kiev. Given that travel to Ukraine was required by the role of
Warwick's marketing team member, Ukraine was judged to be a good market to study,
as additional time could be added onto visits for fieldwork.
This chapter considers the challenges posed by research into uncertain markets and
reviews the research design.
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3.2 Choice of Methodology
The research question is inter-disciplinary and draws upon a complex field of possible
variables. It involves the study of entry decisions in an uncertain and unprecedented
market situation. Moreover, the decisions of firms may be influenced by their
relationships with their competitors, customers, suppliers and other stakeholders in the
environment. The methodological consequences of these facets of the research
question are explored below.
3.2.1 Inter-disciplinary
Research into marketing accords most closely with the positivist world view.
Hirschmann (1986) highlights the fact that only one non-positivist, empirical study
featured in Journal of Marketing in the preceding three decades. The predominance of
the "philosophy of science" in marketing is indicated by the norms of empiricism,
causality and quantification which guide much of its research. Hirschmann attributes
these to its origins in economics.
Easterby-Smith et al (1991) give a composite list of methodological assumptions which
are linked with positivism. Whilst this list is more than Comte (1853) originally
proposed, it includes features which Easterby-Smith et al see as having become
associated with it (See Figure 3.1). Adherence to all, or part, of these assumptions
predisposes research in the field to progress in a theory-testing rather than theory-
building direction (Bonoma 1985, Desphande 1983).
Indeed, the dominance of positivism has caused considerable concern within the
marketing field. The debate is complex. For the past decade, Anderson and Hunt have
argued the merits of critical relativism (Anderson 1983), versus critical realism (Hunt
1983). A number of reservations have been expressed about the latter. The shift in the
nature of marketing towards a more socially-constructed discipline is seen to require a
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more humanistic approach (Hirschmann 1986). Moreover, emphasis upon quantitative,
rather than qualitative, research may act as a disincentive to tackling interdisciplinary
or complex questions (Anderson 1983, Easton 1993, Egan 1993, Hunt 1994).
Independence	 the observer is independent of what is being observed
Value-freedom	 the choice of what to study and how to study it can be
determined by objective criteria rather than by human beliefs
and interests
Causality	 the aim of social sciences should be to identify causal
explanations andfundamental laws that explain regularities
in human social behaviour
Hypothetico-deductivescience proceeds through a process of hypothesising
fundamental laws and then deducing what kinds of
observations will demonstrate the truth or falsity of these
hypotheses
Operationalisation	 concepts need to be operationalised in a way which enables
facts to be measured quantitatively
Reductionism	 problems as a whole are better understood f they are
reduced into the simplest possible elements
Generalisation	 in order to be able to generalise about regularities in human
and social behaviour it is necessary to select samples of
sufficient size
Figure 3.1 Source: Easterby-Smith et al 1991
This thesis does not reject the value of seeking to generalise from hypotheses, nor of
seeking to explain the antecedents of interesting phenomena. However, it tends to the
view of Bonoma (1985), that there remains a need for preliminary "theory-building" to
advance the theoretical development of the field.
The need for pluralism of philosophical views and methodological approaches has been
recognised in a number of fields of social science. Van Maanen (1983) expresses
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strong concerns over the predominance of deductive techniques in the organisational
theory field (1983):
"Questions have been raised about the extent to which our methods are guiding
our theory and concern has been expressed about the degree to which our
procedures have become so ritualised that the necessary connection between
measure and concept has vanished."
However, subsequent research in the field suggests a trend towards qualitative,
inductive methodologies (Easterby-Smith et 1991). Piore (1979) suggests that
qualitative research methodologies can add value to the economics field, traditionally
dominated by quantitative and deductive research. Day and Wensley (1983) propose
that the marketing discipline requires a more strategic stance. This, in turn, may require
a broader, inter-disciplinary approach to answering research questions.
The extant research in the field of international investment decisions spans economics,
finance, strategy, marketing and organisational behaviour. Consequently, it is
important that the chosen methodology can comprehend and build upon the
considerable body of literature which exists in these fields. Moreover, it must be able
to identify factors which play a role in investment decision-making, whatever their field
of origin. Accordingly, this thesis attempts to build upon relevant theories from a
number of fields, in order to gain a better understanding of the research question.
3.2.2 Complex
Bonoma (1985) suggests that choice of methodology should be influenced by the level
of understanding, which already exists in a field. If there is "poor" theory-development,
then "premature application of theory-testing normal science methods" is
inappropriate.
There is a significant amount of research into international investment decisions. The
majority involves study of a small subset of the variables proposed by the literature
(Dunning 1980, Johanson and Vahlne 1977). Whilst this reduces the complexity of the
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field to a manageable level, Bonoma recognises an inherent danger in such studies in
that: "the conclusions can contain no more information than is contained in the
premises". Moreover, they can tend towards giving a numerate description of
qualitatively complex phenomena (Van Maanen 1983). A major limitation of broad,
generalisable studies is that they cannot explore the richness of the data.
There is a relative dearth of literature which tries to synthesise the findings of the
diverse disciplinary perspectives. A key challenge for such studies is the complexity
and breadth of the range of variables proposed for inclusion. It is not always clear
which are dependent and which independent. Many variables appear to be inter-related.
Either composite variables or proxy measures may be required to study some of the
softer issues. Use of a generalisable, quantitative study is next to impossible. Preferred
techniques for complexity reduction, such as factor analysis, require a questionnaire so
long, that a sufficiently high response rate is unlikely. Moreover, in multinational
corporations, identifying respondents involved in the decision is difficult.
The alternative approach to handling this level of complexity is to use a methodology
which does not seek to generalise, but rather to gain an in-depth understanding of the
issues. Use of an "intensive" rather than an "extensive" methodology is suggested
(Wilson 1993). Harrigan (1983) contends that for strategy research, methodologies can
range from the "fine-grained" to "broad-grained. "The decision of which to use
should be contingent upon the complexity of the question (See Figure 3.2)
Fine-grained <----------------------------------------------------> Broad-grained
Methodologies	 Methodologies
Captures nuances, detail of context; shows improved 	 Generalizable, .tatistical significance; little knowledge of
understanding of forces underlying phenomenon in
	 interacting forces within each observalion occasional missing
each observation; no generalizability	 of important contingencies
Figure 3.2	 Source: Harrigan 1983
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The trade-off between the depth of the research methodology and the generalisability
of the findings is acknowledged. However, fine-grained research methods can provide
an understanding of complex issues which "broad-grained" approaches cannot. Van
Maanen (1983) suggests that fine-grained, qualitative techniques are best used:
°to describe, decode, translate and otherwise come to terms with the meaning,
not the frequency of certain more or less naturally-occurring phenomena."
Fine-grained, qualitative techniques seem most applicable for this research.
3.2.3 Context-Specific
Intensive research methodologies are also proposed as a way of studying strategic
issues in their context. Bonoma (1985) refers to the existence of phenomena which
"cannot usefully be studied outside the context in which they naturally occur".
Harrigan (1983) relates the concept of fine-grained methodology to study of issues in
their context. This juxtaposition accords with the contention of Aharoni (1966) and
Pettigrew (1985b) that strategic decisions cannot meaningfully be studied outside their
context. Hence, the most appropriate methodology for this research should be in-
depth, qualitative and contextual.
Additional weight is lent to this argument by the nature of the decisions to be studied
in this research. Much of the extant literature into international investment decisions
does not look at the issues in their specific country context. In this instance, there are
compelling reasons for doing so. Empirical evidence suggests that models of
international investment decisions are not universally applicable (Dichtl et al 1984).
Models might, at the limit, be generalisable for stable market situations (Johanson and
Vahlne 1990). Yet, there are a number of firm-specific issues which they do not take
into account (Aharoni 1966, Cyert and March 1963, Hickson et al 1986). Aharoni
(1966) contends that foreign investment decisions cannot be viewed as single incidents:
"We view decision-making in complex organisations as emerging from a
continuous social process, composed of many small acts, and carried out by
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different people at divergent points of time. We reject the notion that one
isolated decision can be made the focus of analysis. Instead, we suggest
concentration on the dynamic social process in which activities are carried out,
policies are formulated and solutions to specific problems emerge."
The value of studying decisions as part of a larger process within the firm, lends weight
to the argument that a qualitative, contextual approach is preferable as:
"Qualitative researchers are more likely than quantitative researchers to
confront the constraints of the everyday social world. They see this world in
action and embed their findings in it." (Denzin and Lincoln 1994)
Qualitative research may still use the hypotheses and terminology of positivism (Yin
1983). In this research, however, it is suggested that the use of hypotheses makes
untenable assumptions about the key influences upon decisions. The preferred
approach is nearer to grounded theory, as proposed by Glaser and Strauss (1967).
Grounded theory is defined by Glaser and Strauss as "the discovery of theory from
data" which can help to "forestall the opportunistic use of theories that have dubious fit
and working capacity".
This does not imply a strongly phenomenological philosophy. The field of variables,
which might be included, is so broad that some structure must be imputed. Hence, the
literature review in the preceding chapter generates a series of propositions (See
Section 2.8), which are used as the basis of a semi-structured research instrument. The
relative importance of these is discovered by analysis of the data. Thus, development of
hypotheses is the aim rather than the basis for the research. Glaser and Strauss
emphasise:
"generating a theory from data means that most hypotheses and concepts not
only come from the data, but are systematically worked out in relation to the
data in the course of the research. Generating a theory involves a process of
research."
The specifics of how grounded theory is used in practice are acknowledged to vary
(Strauss and Corbin 1994). In the sense that it suggests an inductive, iterative and
reflexive research process, it is adopted in this thesis, as a way of overcoming the
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danger of prejudging what is theoretically important in the Eastern and Central
European context.
3.2.4 Interconnected Units of Analysis
The unit of analysis for this research is the decision to enter, expand or exit from the
Ukraine. However, from both oligopolistic reaction and network theories, it can be
seen that decisions may not be independent, but may be affected by the actions of
actors outside of the firm. Moreover, in some cases, firms made more than one
decision during the period of data collection. This accords with Aharoni's view (1966)
that studies of a single decision out of its context may overlook important influences.
The issue of interconnectedness is addressed by Easton (1993), who stresses the
inherent complexity of network structure. This is an inevitable consequence of changes
in membership, developing relationships, differences in the size and power-dependence
of firms, and direct and indirect links, involving different types of exchange. Easton
concludes that, as they are embedded in network structures, individual firms cannot be
viewed as independent units for statistical analysis. Network boundaries are difficult to
determine. Units may be of different sizes. Sampling techniques rely on the
independence of the sampling unit. As the unit of analysis is not, in the strictest sense,
independent, then he contends that it is inappropriate to use theories of statistical
inference. Knoke and Kuklinski (1982) support this view:
"At present, the bases for statistical inferences from network data are poorly
understood, and we can only advise cautious use and hope that the problems
will eventually be resolved."
Regardless of whether statistical techniques are used, delimiting the boundary of the
network is a key issue for research design. In this thesis, the view of Cunningham and
Culligan (1991), that ties need to be of a certain "strength" to be relevant, is adopted.
A focal firm approach is taken, which looks at an individual firm, but studies it in
conjunction with its principle relationships.
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3.3 The Use of Case Studies
The need to study decisions in context, for interconnected units of analysis, using an
in-depth methodology inductively combines to present a compelling argument in
favour of the use of case studies for this research. Definitions of the case study range
from those, which suggest that "case" is synonymous with observation in a quantitative
study (Abbott 1993), to the majority view, which sees the case study as a means of
studying a problem in-depth and in its context. (1983) Yin defines the case study as
"an empirical enquiry that investigates a phenomenon within its real life
context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly
evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used."
He sees it as being applicable to answering "how" or "why" questions about a
contemporary event, or events, over which the investigator has little, or no, control.
Ragin (1993) identifies different types of case study. The case might be specific,
referring to a particular person or incident, or more general, referring, perhaps, to the
firm or family. The distinction between specific and general is plotted against the
objectivist or subjectivist philosophies to arrive at four ways of understanding cases
(See Figure 3.3). Ragin believes that these positions are not mutually-exclusive, but
represent a framework for understanding the aims of different types of cases.
Case Conceptions
Understanding Cases 	 Specific	 General
Empirical Units
	 1. Cases are found 2. Cases are objects
Theoretical Constructs
	 3. Cases are made	 4. Cases are conventions
Figure 3.3 Conceptual Map for answers to "What isa Case?" Source: Ragin 1993
This research focuses upon the decision by multinational corporations (MNCs) to
invest in, expand, or exit from Ukraine. It explores the influences upon these decisions
and the stakeholders, who play a role in them. If this study were positioned on the
Ragin grid, it would tend to the view that cases are empirical units. This research
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begins with a process, international decision-making, which it studies within a
conventional context, the organisation. Therefore, it fits most neatly in Cell 2.
However, the decision may involve actors outside the focal firm. For this reason, the
process may transcend the boundaries of the firm, in a way more reminiscent of Cell 4
The traditional criticisms, which are levelled at case study research, are that it is
anecdotal and lacking in rigour. Therefore, the design of case-based research must
address the problems of construct validity, external and internal validity and reliability
(See Figure 3.4).
Construct Validity	 establishing correct operational measures for the
concepts being studied
External Validity	 establishing the domain to which the study 'sfindings
can be generalised
Reliability demonstrating that the operations of a study, such as
data collection procedures, can be repeated with the
same results
Internal Validity	 establishing a causal relationship whereby certain
conditions are shown to lead to other conditions
Figure 3.4
	
Source: Yin 1983
To ensure it's rigour, this research uses the structured approach proposed by
Eisenhardt (1989), whose framework (See Figure 3.5) builds upon the work of Yin
(1983), in case study design, and Miles and Huberman (1984), in data analysis. It is
used in this chapter to highlight the key methodological issues in the research design.
3.4 Getting Started
3.4.1 Developing Theory
The research question was derived from preliminary review of the literature. Whilst
this research does not wish to exclude variables, which may be relevant to the
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question, data collection required some structure to ensure the reliability of the case
studies.
Process of Building Theory from Case Study Research
Step	 Activity	 Reason
Getting Started Definition of Research Question
	 Focuses Efforts
Possible a priori constructs	 Provides better grounding of
construct measures
Neither theory nor hypotheses	 Retains theoretical flexibility
Selecting Cases Specified Population	 Constrains extraneous variation and
sharpens external validity
Theoretical not random sampling Focuses efforts on theoretically useful
cases i.e.: those that replicate or extend
theory by ifihing conceptual categories
Crafting
Instruments and
Protocols
Entering the
Field
Multiple Data Collection Methods
Qualitative and Quantitative data
combined
Overlap Data collection and analysis,
including field notes
Strengthens Grounding of theory by
Triangulation of evidence
Synergistic View of Evidence
Speeds Analysis and reveals
helpful adjustments to data collection
Flexible and opportunistic data collection Allows investigators to take advantage
methods	 of emergent themes and unique case
features
Analysing Data Within Case Analysis 	 Gains familiarity with data and
preliininaiy theory generation
Cross-case pattern search	 Forces investigators to look beyond
using divergent techniques	 initial impressions and see evidence
through multiple lenses
Shaping	 Iterative tabulation of evidence for each	 Sharpens construct definition, validity
Hypotheses	 construct	 and measurability
Replication logic
Search for evidence of 'why' behind
relationships
Confirms, extends and sharpens theory
across cases
Builds internal validity
Enfolding	 Comparison with conflicting literature	 Build internal validity, raises theoretical
Literature	 level and sharpens construct definitions
Comparison with similar literature	 Sharpens generalisability, improves
construct definition and raises
theoretical level
Reaching	 Theoretical Saturation when possible
	 Ends process when marginal
Closure	 improvement becomes small
Source: Eisenhardt 1989 p 533	 Figure 3.5
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Location-Specific
Advantage
Criteria for investment
Consequently, a set of propositions were derived from the literature review to provide
the basis of the study (See section 2.8). The propositions are shown in conjunction
with the variables, which may provide insights into them (See Figure 3.6).
Variables	 Propositions
Firm Size	 1. High levels of resources in the firm may
reduce the significance of individual investment
decisions
Forsgren 1989; Johanson and Vahine 1990
Product/Service Type
Ownership
2. Modes of international investment may differ
between dfferent product or service types
Erraniilli 1990; Sharma and Johanson 1987
3. Subsidiaries may play a significant role in
international investment decisions in MNCs
Forsgren 1989; Andersson et al 1990
4. Investment Decisions may be routed via
geographically- proximate subsidiaries
Forsgren 1989
International Experience 5. Length of international experience may reduce
perceived risk of an investment decision
Forsgren 1989
E./C.European Experience 6. Experience of similar markets allows firms to
generalise and reduces perceived risk
Forsgren 1989; Johanson and Vahine 1990
Psychic Distance	 7. High levels of environmental uncertainty increase
the perceived risk of investment in a country
Johanson and Vahine 1977; Goodnow and Hansz 1972
Klein and Roth 1990
8. Traditional frameworks for assessing market
attractiveness cannot explain the current pattern of
investment in Ukraine
Johanson and Vahine 1977; Egan 1993, Kami 1976
Paul et al 1976
9. Factor advantages increase attractiveness of
markets for investors
Dunning 1980, 1988; Rugman 1989
10. Decision to enter or expand in Ukraine may be
influenced by the actions of oligopolistic rivals
Knickerbocker 1973, Buckley and Casson 1976
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11. Decision to enter or expand in Ukraine may be
influenced by the actions of existing customers and
suppliers Johanson and Mattsson 1988
12. The knowledge of a market on which decisions are
built 7nay come from the network of relationships
which afirm has with other firms or with key
stakeholders in the Ukraine
Johanson and Mattsson 1988
Figure 3.6
These variables were converted into a semi-structured interview format. More than
one question was used to probe each area. Demographic data were obtained for all
firms. However, respondents were allowed to place their own emphasis on the
questions relating to the influences upon their investment decision. In this way they
gave insights into the specifics of their situation and an assessment of which they
considered to be important issues. This was felt to be a more reliable means of
determining the "strategic agenda" for the decisions, than use of more formal
hypotheses and theory-testing.
Yin (1983) suggests that the process of data collection, for case study research, is not
parallel, but sequential. Data are not collected at one point in time, as with a mail
survey. Rather, each case study is built up from a series of interviews. Each successive
case is written with a knowledge of the findings of previous cases. It is a cumulative
process. As interviews were completed, the data were analysed to check whether
additional areas were consistently referred to. This might suggest the exclusions of
significant questions. The definitive list of questions is shown in Figure 3.7.
Not all questions were relevant in each case, or the respondent did not feel in a
position to answer fully. The former did not represent a significant difficulty. The
interviewee was allowed to place the emphasis, where they wished. This gave useful
insights into the importance they attached to issues. If a question was relevant to the
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Product/Service Type
Ownership
Environmental Stability
Location-Specific
Advantage
Criteria for investment
firm, but the respondent did not feel in a position to answer, this was often
compensated by the suggestion of an additional respondent.
Firm Size Turnover
Number of Employees
Industry sectors and product types of firm
Type of organisation structure
Who made the decision to invest?
International Experience Number of countries in which firm has invested
What type of operations do they have in these?
Percentage of sales overseas
Number of years of international experience
East or Central European Number of Eastern or Central European countries in
Experience	 which the firm operates
Mode of operation in these?
Chronology of entry into different countries
Pattern of investment/expansion in these
Level of investment
What are the greatest opportunities and risks?
Sources of information used to monitor changes?
What was the motivation for market entry?
What was motivation for market entry?
On what basis would investment be judged successful?
Why choose this mode of operation?
Conditions for further investment?
Is this likely?
Influence of competition What are competition doing in market?
Who entered market first?
What modes of operation do competitors have?
Influence of customers/ 	 Answered under criteria for investment.
suppliers	 If yes, how long has relationship existed?
Has this influenced entry into other markets?
Sources of Information	 What sources of information were used to assess risks
and opportunities of entering Ukrainian market?
What sources are used to monitor changes in
the environment?
How useful are embassies, trade missions etc.?
Stakeholders
Figure 3.7
Who are the key stakeholders in the market?
What are the relationships with these?
What do they perceive to be the problems and
opportunities of operation in Ukraine?
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3.5 Selection of Cases
3.5.1 Replication Logic
Yin (1983) contends that case study research should not seek to generalise on a
numerical basis, as would survey-based quantitative research. Rather, he proposes that
case study research should use "analytic generalisation" to ensure external validity.
Multiple case studies are not intended as a statistically valid sample of a population,
but to provide replications
"Which [seek] convergent evidence regarding the facts and conclusions for the
case; each case's conclusions are then considered to be the information needing
replication by other individual cases"
He distinguishes between two types of replication: theoretical replication, which
selects cases which vary against key variables and literal replication which chooses
cases which are the same on critical dimensions. In this research, the theoretical
replications were between firms in different industry sectors, and the literal replications
were from within each sector.
3.5.2 Selection of Cases by Sector
Initially, fifteen investment decisions were studied. Thirteen of the decisions were to
invest in the Ukraine, two involved the decision not to invest. During the period of
data collection, five additional decisions were made. The additional decisions varied
from that of investing further, to that of not investing further, or even withdrawing
from Ukraine. The total number of decisions studied was twenty:
Initial Decision	 Subsequent Decision
No	 Initial	 Further	 No further	 Reduction in Withdrawal
Investment Investment Investment Investment Investment
2	 13	 2	 1	 1	 1
Figure 3 8
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As in five cases, more than one unit of analysis was embedded within the same firm,
the case design corresponds to Yin's Multiple embedded design (See Figure 3.9)
Single-Case	 Multiple-Case
Design	 Design
Holistic	 Type 1	 Type 3
(Single Unit of Analysis)
Embedded	 Type 2
(Multiple Units of Analysis)
Type 4
* Preferred Case Design
Source: Yin (1983)
Figure 3.9
The choice of sectors, from which the cases were drawn, was influenced by the
pragmatic issue of sectors in which Western firms were well-represented. However,
additional criteria which determined the selection of cases were:
-	 Had invested or were considering investment in Ukraine
-	 More than one firm in the sector was represented in Ukraine, so that inter-firm
comparison was possible
-	 Access to both Western and Ukrainian members of the Decision-Making Unit
-	 Situated in the vicinity of Kiev
The original information on which firms were operating in Ukraine came from the DTI
Overseas Information Service in London. Additional information was later obtained
from the Commercial Attaché of the British Embassy in Kiev. Listings of foreign
investments in Ukraine were also received from the US, Canadian, French, Belgian and
German embassies.
Whilst a number of small entrepreneurial firms were found to be operating in Ukraine,
the decision was made to focus upon the multinational firms. There were three reasons
for this choice. Firstly, a large proportion of the investments involved multinational
firms. Secondly, both the western and Ukrainian side of the investment could be
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studied in cases of multinational firms. Finally, a number of theories are seen to be less
relevant for firms, which are already highly internationalised (Johanson and Vahine
1990, Forsgren 1989, Johanson and Mattsson 1988), therefore these were potentially
interesting cases. Multinational corporations in the following sectors were researched:
Financial Services
Household Consumables
Computing
Chemicals
Tobacco
During the period of research, the researcher's network of contacts developed, such
that one respondent might suggest another firm, which they felt to be interesting. Cases
in three additional sectors were added as a result of such contacts. These were in
telecommunications, law and drinks. Only one case was researched in each of the last
three sectors. Access could have been gained into others, however this was less of a
constraint than time. Moreover, the context changed so significantly over time that
comparability between new and old cases became difficult (See Section 3.8.2). The
cases can be split by industry as follows:
Number of Cases	 Total
Business-to-Business Service
	 6 cases
Financial Services 	 5
Law	 1
Consumer Goods Firms	 4 cases
Tobacco	 1
Drinks	 1
Household Consumables 	 2
Industrial Goods Firms	 5 cases
Computing	 1
Chemicals	 3
Telecommunications 	 1
Figure 3.10
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As respondents were assured of confidentiality, cases are not identified by name in the
main body of the analysis. However, a full list of respondent firms is provided below.
Arthur Andersen
BP
Coopers & Lybrand
Ernst & Young
GPT
IC'
ICL
Johnson Wax
Mazars Formation
Price Waterhouse
Procter & Gamble
Rothmans
Salans, Hertzfeld and Heilbronn
Seagrams
Shell
In the analysis chapters, the cases are identified alpha-numerically by industry and firm.
The law, tobacco, drinks, computing and telecommunications firms were not separated
into different industries, as they would have been uniquely identified. Moreover,
preliminary analysis showed that these cases could be compared with other industries
as literal, rather than theoretical, replications (See chapter five). Hence, the firms were
split into the following groupings:
Industry Sector
	 Letter	 Number of firms
Financial Services/Law	 A
	
1-6
Tobacco/Drinks	 B
	
1-2
Household Goods	 C
	
1-2
Chemicals	 D
	
1-3
Computing!
Telecommunications	 E
	
1-2
Figure 3.11
3.5.3 Size of Firms
The size of the firms was measured by number of employees and financial turnover.
Some data was obtained from company reports and interviews. However, to ensure the
comparability of data, a single source was used. The source of secondary data used
81
was Hoovers' Handbook of World Business (1993). This provided data for the largest
number of the cases studied. Supplementary data were drawn from Datastream On-line
service and from Stopford's Directory of Multinationals (1992). From this data, firms
can be classified by the range of size and by mean value.
Turnover
Mean Value $21 193 million
Range $2,624 million to $102,697 million
Employees
Mean Value 57, 319
Range 100 to 133,000
3.5.4 Degree of Internationalisation
The same sources were used to obtain data on the degree of internationalisation of the
firms. The variables used to assess the degree of internationalisation were the number
of countries, in which a firm had investments, and the percentage of it's sales, which
were outside the home country. The choice of data on investments, rather than
countries to which the firm exports, was based on availability of data. Data were not
always available for the total number of countries, in which firms operated. However,
often they included a list of the countries in which they had investments. Similarly,
percentage of sales, rather than assets, was used because of differences in international
accounting conventions. Whilst North American accounts give percentage of assets
overseas, UK and European accounts tend to give only total assets. The percentage of
sales data were more widely available.
Full data on size and degree of internationalisation are given in Appendix 2.
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3.6 Crafting Instruments and Protocols
3.6.1 Multiple Sources of Evidence
To ensure the reliability of the research, data were drawn from multiple sources.
Within individual case studies, interviews were held in both the Western and Ukrainian
operation, where this was feasible. Resource limitations made it impossible to
interview some respondents. In some cases, the decision was made in the US Head
Quarters, or in a European subsidiary. Six cases were studied from both ends of the
decision. Also, where possible, more than one respondent was drawn from within both
the western and Ukrainian operation. However, in some instances, there was only one
person who had been involved in the decision to enter.
Deeper understanding of the Ukrainian context, especially of the country-specific
issues facing western firms operating in the market was gained by review of market
research and press coverage and from interviews with key stakeholders. Additional
data were drawn from:
Ukrainian firms:
Lenins/caya Kuznitsa Shipyard, Ukrainian Financial Group, DLD International
Ukrainian Stakeholders:
Chernobyl Union; President 's Representative of Podol region, Kiev.
Educational Institutes in Kiev:
International Management Institute, Kiev; Kiev Polytechnical Institute; Kiev
Economic University; International Christian University, Kiev. Interviews and
working over a period of eighteen months with staff and students of IMI-Kiev;
Harvard University 's PERU (Project for Economic Reform in Ukraine.
Student projects with twelve additional firms considering investment in Ukraine.
Identities are subject to a confidentiality agreement.
Western stakeholders:
British Embassy; US Embassy; Belgian Embassy; British Council; American
Chamber of Commerce; EC TACIS Kiev and Brussels representatives; co-ordinator
of EC alimentationKiev "project; three respondents from IFC (subsidiary of World
Bank); US Peace Corps volunteers working in Kiev; partners in EC TACIS scheme;
partners in parallel EC TA CIS scheme;
These categories of respondents have also been coded, as follows:
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Code
1-3
1-2
1-5
F
G
H
Type of respondent
Ukrainian firms
Ukrainian stakeholders
Educational Institutes
in Kiev
Student Projects
Western Stakeholders
Number of
respondents
1-4
1 - 16
Whilst only one interview was held in some of these categories, collaboration with co-
workers on the EC TACIS scheme and with staff and students at Kiev's International
Management Institute provided a far fuller immersion in Ukraine as a participant
observer, teacher and colleague. Indeed, involvement in the TACIS scheme has
provided opportunities for frequent visits to Ukraine, often during historic times such
as the build-up to the March 1994 elections, and also the pleasure of hosting visits by
Ukrainian colleagues to the UK.
3.7 Entering the Field
3.7.1 Data Collection
Finding appropriate interviewees initially seemed difficult. Within a complex
organisation, it was difficult to identif' the individual, or individuals, who had been
involved in decision to enter Ukraine. The task was made easier by the possibility of
interviewing in Ukraine, where lists of subsidiary managers were available from
embassies or trade bodies. From an initial interview with the Country Manager or
representative of the firm in Ukraine, a list could be obtained of those, who had been
involved in the entry decision. Face-to-face interviews varied in length between one
and four hours. The average interview length was approximately one hour and twenty
five minutes.
Data pertaining to entry decisions were collected in July and November 1993.
However, by late 1993, it became apparent that the dramatically worsening market
conditions in Ukraine were raising problems for the comparability of data. The full
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ramifications of these worsening market conditions is explained in the next section.
One consequence, for data collection, was the addition of a further phase of interviews.
Update interviews with all previous respondents were held in March 1994. The cut-off
point for data collection was the Presidential Elections in Ukraine, in late March 1994.
3.8 Analysing Data
3.8.1 Preliminary Analysis of Data
Internal validity is defined by Yin (1983) as the process of establishing the causal links
within research. Whilst this research is exploratory, the aim is to highlight explanatory
variables for the investment decisions made by multinational corporations. These
variables were identified by a process of data analysis. Verbatim notes were taken
during interviews. Such was the sensitivity of discussing entry strategies, that a number
of firms were reluctant to allow interviews to be recorded. Taking notes resu)teà in the
loss of some detail of the responses. However, this was compensated by fuller and
more candid responses.
Interview notes were transcribed, as soon as possible after each interview. The data
were then coded under the variables used in the semi-structured research instrument.
Under each heading, data were split into direct and indirect responses to the question.
Direct responses were objective data such as length of experience, or date of entry into
the market. Indirect, or non-codable data, were additional points raised by the
respondent, which elaborated on, or qualified, the response. For each interview, an
"Other Information" category was created to capture information, which did not fit
neatly under one of the other headings.
After each interview was coded, the data were compared with that of previous
interviews. Similarities and differences were identified within each case and between
literal and theoretical replications. These allowed for identification of convergent and
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divergent patterns of behaviour. Variables were identified which appeared to explain
such similarities and differences.
3.8.2 Time Series of Data
The reality of carrying out research, in a rapidly changing context, raised challenges
both for data collection and data analysis. Such was the rapidity of change in Ukraine
in 1993, that the context surrounding a later case was very different to that in earlier
cases.
In studying the entry decisions of multinational corporations in Ukraine, the date on
which data were collected played a significant role in determining its content, in that
the responses altered with positive and negative changes in the environment. Data on
entry decisions were primarily collected in July 1993. Interviews, with respondents in
the UK and France, were carried out during the summer and autumn of 1993. The
concluding interviews on entry decisions were carried out during a visit to Ukraine in
November 1993.
In November 1993 the magnitude of the negative changes in Ukraine was so great, that
two firms, who had been speaking of criteria for expansion in July 1993, were now
speaking of possible withdrawal from the market. Hence concern arose as to the
comparability of data collected earlier and later in this period. Moreover, in November
1993, additional issues, such as criteria for withdrawal from the market were
frequently cited, which had not been on the strategic agenda in July 1993. It was
apparent that researching markets, subject to discontinuous change, required attention
to its methodology, in order to overcome problems posed by that very discontinuity.
Three main consequences arose from the contextual changes. Firstly, two additional
questions were added to the research instrument. These were
On whal basis would the firm decide to withdraw from the Ukraine?
Who would make that decision?
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Secondly, in March 1994, an additional phase of interviews was held with at least one
respondent from each firm, in order to identify any changes in the firm's responses
since the initial interview. In fact, only two of the finns interviewed in July 1993 had
changed their views to any significant extent. Therefore, cross-case analysis was still
felt to be possible.
However, as a final consequence of the changes, it was decided that no new cases
should be added to the study. Every time a new case was added, a further round of
interviews would have been required with the existing cases. Moreover, it was decided
that data should be analysed against the context of the time. Thece&ce, attenthnz wc
paid to ways in which the Ukrainian context could meaningfully be analysed (See
Section 4).
3.9 Shaping Hypotheses
Eisenhardt proposes that data analysis should involve a process of within and across-
case analysis to seek patterns. Yin (1983) suggests data analysis is an iterative process,
which can begin in parallel with data collection. Iterative tabulation of data is
suggested as a way of advancing the process of data analysis towards formulation of
hypotheses. It is suggested that these hypotheses are tested in later case studies. The
suggestions of Eisenhardt and Yin were adopted in this thesis.
In chapter four, the Ukrainian market environment is analysed to provide a profile,
which is used to explore cases in their context. Then, in chapter five, case histories are
summarised and comparisons are drawn between literal replications. Chapter six
presents the main cross-case analysis between theoretical replications. Data are
explored under a number of different headings. Objective data are cross-tabulated and
the richness of responses is used to gain additional insights. Preliminary typologies are
suggested, based upon identification of patterns of similarities and differences. In
chapter seven, the five decisions to expand, or to withdraw from Ukraine, are studied.
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In chapter eight, the findings from data analysis is set in the theoretical context. Finally,
in chapter nine, the limitations of the thesis and future research directions are
presented.
3.10 Summary of Methodology
This research is complex and inter-disciplinary in nature. There are possible inter-
relationships between the decisions of a firm and those of its competitors (Johanson
and Mattsson 1988) and arguments in favour studying decisions in context (Pettigrew
1985, Aharoni 1966). Consequently, an in-depth research methodology is believed to
be most appropriate for this exploratory research study (Harrigan 1983, Bonoma
1985). A case study methodology is preferred decisions can be studied in their context.
The study comprises twenty decisions, by multinational corporations, to enter, expand
or exit from the Ukraine. Originally, fifteen decisions were studied. However, during
the period of data collection (July 1993 - March 1994), five additional decisions were
made, to invest further, not to invest further or to retract. The study of more than one
decision within the same firm corresponds to Yin's Multiple Embedded case study
design (1983).
A semi-structured research instrument was designed, using propositions drawn from a
comprehensive review of relevant literature in the fields of corporate strategy,
marketing, organisational behaviour, economics and international business. 39 face-to-
face interviews were held with respondents from both the western and Ukrainian
operations of multinational corporations. The initial cases were drawn from three
industry sectors; financial services, chemicals and household consumables. These
sectors were selected because they were well-represented in Ukraine. More than one
firm per sector was researched to allow literal as well as theoretical replications (Yin
1983). Preliminary analysis of data suggested that industry type was a more significant
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variable than industry sector. This proposition was tested by theoretical replications in
other industrial, business-to-business services and consumer goods industries.
Respondents were allowed to give their own emphasis to the questions, giving detail
on issues, which they felt were relevant to their decisions, and omitting or explaining
the relative insignificance of other variables. Multiple sources of evidence were used.
Press coverage, market research reports, company documents and on-line databases
were used to verify information. Moreover, face-to-face interviews were held with key
stakeholders within the Ukraine to gain additional information.
Three phases of data collection took place in Ukraine. These were in July and
November 1993 and in March 1994. The comparability of case data was ensured by
additional interviewing of original cases, as new cases were added. Additionally, the
market environment in Ukraine was analysed, in order that case data could be
understood in the light of the prevailing context. Decisions were felt to be influenced
by the differences in the external conditions, which constituted their context.
Data were coded under the variables to which they referred. Under each heading, an
appendix was also used, to record verbatim quotes and other relevant information
which added richness to the study. Data were analysed over the period of data
collection to identify emerging patterns of similarities and differences. From these
patterns, explanatory variables for the decisions were identified. The findings from this
process of data analysis were then set in their theoretical context, in order to draw
conclusions relating to the original research propositions.
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Chapter 4 - The Ukrainian Context
Research into turbulent markets faces a number of challenges. Perhaps the most
significant of these is determining consistent criteria and sources of data to analyse
changes in the Ukrainian environment. The previous chapter highlights the
importance of understanding the context, in which data were collected, for
understanding its content. If differences in the context are to be taken into account,
in analysing data, then this thesis must address the question of how best to analyse
the environmental conditions in Ukraine.
The task is complicated by four main issues. Firstly, Ukraine is undergoing a period
of rapid and unpredictable change, as it moves towards a free market economy.
Secondly, the duration of this period of transition and even the likelihood of a
positive outcome is difficult to predict. Thirdly, the composition of the uncertainty
is difficult to ascertain. It is comprised of a large number of variables, which are
often inter-related and comprise both hard and soft issues. Finally, there are
difficulties in determining a reliable contextual trend. The assumption that
extrapolation of historical data will provide meaningfi.il insights into the future is
invalidated both by the unreliable historical data and the discontinuous nature of
the changes.
This chapter begins by looking at the historical development of Ukraine and the
changes wrought by the process of transition to free market economy.
Subsequently, consideration is given to the way in which the country context can
be analysed. A profile of the process of transition, from the beginning of 1991 to
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March 1994, is created, which will be used in subsequent chapters as a backdrop
for data analysis.
4.1 The Soviet Legacy
The COMECON (Commission for Mutual Economic Aid) Agreement was formed
in 1949, but did not become active until 1959. From this time onwards, it laid out a
series of five year plans decreeing which goods would be made, in what quantity,
where in the Soviet Union. In order to achieve this, specialisation of production by
country and by region, within the Soviet was encouraged (Times Guide to Eastern
Europe). Thus, Ukraine has a significant proportion of the oil refining, chemical
and nuclear power industries, whilst Hungaiy has a significant proportion of the
motor industry production facilities for buses and vans. Monopolisation was
encouraged. Some plants had up to 80% market share.
However, the centrally-planned system largely failed in terms of efficiency and
living standards. Even prior to the demise of the Soviet Union, the Socialist system
within the region was foundering (Aslund 1991, IMFIWorld Bank/OECD/EBRD
report 1990). This has been attributed to exogenous shocks such as the loss of
trade with the liberalised Central European countries in 1989, to the coal strikes of
early 1991 and to the forced shutdown of plants for environmental reasons.
However, research also highlights underlying endogenous factors. Shleifer and
Vishny (1991) cite under-investment in new technologies, problems with the state-
controlled pricing system and inefficient allocation of inputs. Frydman and
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Rapaczynski (1991) add lack of technical and managerial skills, as well as the lack
of a corporate governance system.
Shleifer and Vishny (1991) contend that the state-controlled pricing system
distorted incentives and resulted in opportunistic behaviour. Inputs, fixed at rates
lower than market price, were often diverted to the highest bidder, regardless of
the consequences for downstream production. Repressed inflation had a number of
negative consequences (Cotarelli and Blejer 1991), principally resulting in hoarding
of intermediate outputs, which would hold their value better than money.
Since the beginning of liberalisation in the region in 1989, a number of opposing
views have been put forward as to the most appropriate means of assisting East
and Central Europe in its transformation to free market economy. There is a need
for aid on the scale of the Marshall Plan, which helped Germany and Japan to
regenerate after the second world war (Sachs 1991). However, as it is not
regeneration, but building of an infrastructure from grass roots level, which is
required, it is feared that funding alone be insufficient to counter the difficulties
associated with adopting new technologies or developing entrepreneurial spirit
(UN Report 1989 - 1990). Indeed, it has been argued that:
"the outside world should give no financial aid, but should be generous in
providing technical assistance and training." Aslund 1991.
One of the key tasks of the reform process is to create a "rational structure of
corporate governance" where none had previously existed (Frydman and
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Rapaczynski 1991. However, there is considerable debate as to the most
appropriate institutional structures and models:
"The task of privatisation is to construct (...) a corporate governance structure
and institute it in an environment in which there is a pronounced lack of
available personnel and a potentially unfavourable political structure" (Frydman
and Rapaczynski 1991)
It is unclear whether a rational reconstruction of Western models in Eastern
Europe is possible. Each model is the product of history and has evolved over time.
Indeed, Frydman and Rapaczynski argue that the most advanced economies are
still evolving and they have an irreductible element of contingency, idiosyncrasy
and cultural specificity.
Given this uncertainty, it is not surprising that both the type of corporate
governance structure and the process of introduction has varied between countries.
Foreign investment, restitution of property to former owners and differing methods
of privatisation have been preferred (Eastern European Privatisation News,
September 1992). Whatever form it may take, the process of privatisation has been
heralded as the number one priority (Stark 1990, Sachs 1991, Kornai 1992,
Snelbecker 1993).
4.2 Transition to Market Economy
"It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it
was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of
incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the
spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we
had nothing before us..." Dickens A Tale of Two Cities ,1868
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In December 1991, in a popular referendum, the people of Ukraine voted to
become an independent state. The period of Soviet central planning had officially
ended. Amidst the general euphoria, the people of Ukraine looked forward to a
prosperous future as a nation-state trading in the world market. Ukraine's refusal
to sign Mikhail Gorbachev's Union Treaty had precipitated the collapse of the
USSR and the formation of the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
Ukraine had signalled its commitment to economic restructuring by being one of
the first republics to press for its own currency. It was widely heralded as the
former-Soviet Republic with the greatest potential (Deutsche Bank 1991, Europe
1991, Euromoney 1992.)
Yet, despite this initial optimism, the legacy of a repressive political system and the
web of infrastructural and trade links between Ukraine and the former Soviet
Republics has proved difficult to disentangle. The Economist survey of Ukraine
(May 7th 1994) comments:
"TJkraine floated to independence on a cloud of illusions (...) With 52 million
people, it was bigger than all the rest [of the former Soviet States] bar Russia.
It had stronger hopes of quickly establishing ties with the rest of Europe than,
say Ka.zhakstan. And it had inherited a disproportionate amount of the former
Soviet Union's industry (...) Thus one big illusion: that Ukraine is a wealthy
place. two and a half years later, a majority of Ukrainians have still not come to
terms with the fact that most of their Soviet-era dinosaurs are a liability, not a
legacy."
If transformation to a free market economy does indeed take place, it will not
happen in five years as initially predicted. More likely it will take fifteen to twenty
years (Economist May 7th 1994).
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4.2.1 Economic Reform
On independence, Ukraine produced 34% of the Soviet Union's steel, 46% of its
iron ore, 36% of its televisions and 53% of its sugar (Economist May 1994).
However, the premature severance of ties with Russia has resulted in the loss of
previous markets and a drastic decline in the economic situation. Figure 4.1 shows
the 20% reduction in industrial output from 1990 to 1993. Moreover, the launch of
the proposed new currency, the Griyivnya has been repeatedly postponed (Central
European 1993), whilst the temporary currency, the Karbovanet, has failed to hold
parity with the rouble. The financing of massive compensatory credits to striking
miners fuelled inflation. The Economist quotes an inflation rate of 72% per month,
an aggregate 5800% per annum (October 23rd 1993). The consequences of this
inflation for the cost of living are shown in Figure 4.2.
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Ukraine also faces a potential energy crisis. The oil and natural gas, upon which it
is dependent for both industrial and domestic purposes, come primarily from
Russia. These are still priced at below world price. However, the cooling of
relations between Ukraine and Russia raises doubts over the continuation of this
agreement. Already, the quantities of fuel shipped have decreased as Russia can sell
for a better price on the world market.
Comparison with other former COMECON neighbours suggests that they face
similar, if less painful experiences. The current turbulent market conditions
confronting many markets in transition may be an inevitable consequence of the
destruction of turgid Soviet structures:
"One of the several important differences between Ukraine today and Ukraine
as it was six and twelve months ago is that Ukraine is now far deeper into the
transition process than it was then. Old governmental command-control
structures and institutional relationships have disintegrated to a far greater
degree now than they had then, creating confusion and disorder (...) It may be
tempting to conclude (...) that the best way for Ukraine to improve its business
climate would be to return to the period of stability of last year. The
conclusions would be a mistake (...) A more prudent policy would be to move
forward swiftly and decisively, through the current transition period."
(Manninen and Snelbecker 1993)
4.2.2 Political Stalemate
There is also political stalemate in Ukraine. On independence, the relatively
apolitical Ukrainians opted for a gradual process of change, in electing as their
President Leonid Kravchuk, a former Communist Party member skilled in
negotiations with Russia. However, infighting between factions in the Ukrainian
parliament has resulted in political stalemate. The resignation of the Ukrainian
Prime Minister, Leonid Kuchma, on September 2 1st, 1993 was an indirect result of
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the blocking, by the communist majority, of the reforms necessary for privatisation
and foreign investment (Wasylyk 1993).
One of the key problems of the Ukrainian political situation is the complex
composition of parliament. In the elections of March 1994, candidates of sixteen
different political parties were elected (Economist May 7th, 1994). Splitting of the
vote was increased as the political parties of the candidates were not written on the
ballot papers. However, the splintering of the nationalist movement into a number
of different parties poses the most significant threat to reform. The six nationalist
parties and the six parties of the centrist block, who wish to maintain some links
with Russia, cannot reach sufficient agreement to counter the retrograde policies of
the Communists. Economist (May 7th 1994) comments:
"Four things are necessary to launch successful economic reform; a good plan,
people capable of implementing it, some financial help and the political will to
carry it through (...) The big question mark is over political will."
Whilst there was praise for the bloodless way in which Ukraine, in contrast to its
Russian neighbours, has resolved its crises to date, Economist (October 23rd 1993)
highlights the number of communist party nomenclature who retain their political
positions. The latest proposals to halt the economic slide of Ukraine (the seventh
such plan which has been attempted to date) suggest, alarmingly, that Ukraine is
reverting to Soviet-style central control. Export bans, expropriation of profits from
Western firms and state subsidising of essentials, such as fuel and food, seem to
many to represent a step in the wrong direction (American Chamber of Commerce,
Nov. 17th 1993). The election as prime Minister, in June 1994, of Vitaliy Masol,
whose removal the Ukrainian students forced after a hunger strike in 1991,
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represents the most frightening sign that the process of transition has stalled.
Indeed, it raises doubts as to whether Ukraine wishes to be independent of Russia
(Economist May 7th 1994).
4.2.3 The Social Consequences of Reform
Despite the significant problems which Ukraine faces, there is little sign of public
protest or discontent. Economist (May 7th 1994) describes the Ukrainian attitude
as an "extreme form of Slav stoicism" which is rooted in the belief that nothing
good comes from governments. Also, it highlights the lack of confidence in their
identity. The Ukrainians, it claims, "tell jokes about themselves, not some other
country". Additionally, Ukraine's periods of independence as a nation state have
been fleeting, the most recent being a matter of months in 1917 - 1918. The
Economist (May 1994) refers to its current state of independence as:
"an extremely ambitious project in nation-building, a Yugoslavia in reverse"
The 1989 census of Ukraine reports that Ukraine is comprised of Ukrainians
(73%), Russians (22%), Jewish (1%) and 4% from other Slavic groups. However,
there is little evidence of tensions. This may be because the groups are intermingled
with "no clear lines in the sand" (Snelbecker 1993), though the Ukrainians also
tend to be apolitical.
The greatest threat to the stability of Ukraine comes from near neighbour Russia.
In research commissioned by the US Information Agency (US Opinion Research
1992), Ukrainian citizens showed themselves willing to accede to Crimean
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independence. The majority of Ukrainians were also ready to dispose of their
nuclear arsenal. Governmental reluctance to do so may result from a fear of losing
their deterrent vis a vis Russia. Moreover, nuclear weapons represent a bargaining
chip with which the Ukrainian government can gain funding from the West
(Financial Times 19th November 1993.) The greatest fear of the Ukrainian people
is that of aggression of a third-party, especially Russia.
Despite the political conservatism of the Ukrainians, worsening living conditions
must be, at least, contributory to the tendency towards extremism seen at the
recent elections. There is a polarity of views, between those in favour of radical
reform and those, who would prefer to return to a Soviet-style régime.
4.3 Sources of Information
One of the key issues in analysing the Ukrainian context is the reliability of data.
Information from official sources suffers from problems of timeliness, reliability
and validation.
4.3.1 Timeliness
The rate of transition in Ukraine is such that information is often outdated before it
can be published. Legal decrees change with such frequency that it has become
current practice to publish these in the local newspapers. Western businesses,
operating in Ukraine often had local staff and legal advisors monitoring the press to
spot changes, which would affect them. The contradictory, and often draconian
99
measures, which the government imposes, may have significant impact on western
investors:
"The General Manager ofBl has watched VAT levied on his products ping-
pong from 0% to 20% and 28% and, for now, back to 0%. Legal flux is a
given in Ukraine; recent retroactive changes in foreign investment laws (...) had
'investors screaming bloody rape'." Business Central Europe, February 1994.
4.3.2 Reliability
Official data were controlled under the Soviet system. Whilst they are, in many
cases, the only data available, their reliability is doubtful. Variation between
different sources is considerable. Even those sources, which should be reliable,
such as banks and official government bodies produce incomplete, misleading or
erroneous data. For example, Gross Domestic Product figures, produced by the
Ukrainian National Bank in 1993, were not adjusted for inflation. Moreover,•the
inflation rates were not given anywhere on the report. Without these the data are
useless.
4.3.3 Validation
The previously punitive culture in Ukraine has instilled an anxiety about revealing
information, no matter how trivial. Consequently, sources are seldom revealed.
Without these and the means of calculation, many data cannot be validated.
Furthermore, there is an unwillingness to speak on the telephone, as the KGB used
to monitor calls. It is suggested that the major hotels, frequented by westerners, are
still monitored. Also culturally-specific is the unwillingness of Ukrainians to admit
to weakness. Work with Ukrainian students on projects, with Ukrainian
interpreters and colleagues has shown that the first response to a question "Do you
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know anything about...?" would invariably bring a claim of knowledge or expertise,
which might later transpire not to be the case.
4.3.4 Sources of Information
Useful, local sources of data, although they often needed cross-validation, were:
Official Ministries for specific industry sectors. These often provide statistics
such as output figures and number and location of enterprises. In many cases,
respondents felt that vital pieces of information were missing.
Former Soviet Union electronic databases Two such databases have been
identified. These are paid services and questions must be submitted centrally
via a central administrator. The original source and method of calculation may
not be revealed, therefore reducing the validity of the data.
Local Employees are often connected into local networks. They are able to
translate decrees in the press and might know how to get such market
information, as exists.
Given the limited availability of data locally, multinational corporations have a high
reliance on western sources of data. These include:
Western Press, especially Financial Times and Wall Street Journal
Business Periodicals, such as Economist, Business Central Europe, Central
European Economic Review (Wall Street Journal Publication)
Embassies. Lists of firms, who have investments in Ukraine, can be obtained
from the relevant embassies. However, the currency and accuracy of such lists
varies between embassies. Not all countries have a representation, therefore
data are missing for some nationalities. Moreover, lists are compiled by the
commercial attaché of the embassy. In some cases, the attaché does not have
the most up-to-date information. The British Commercial Attaché explained
that he was:
"to a large extent reliant on the firms to make themselves known to the
embassy. Firms are more likely to do this, if they invest in the market,
although there is no formal requirement to do so. Only those firms
which have made contact are included. Also, there is no record of firms
which export to Ukraine, but are not present in the market."
Privately-commissioned Reports, such as the Dniepro-Petrovsk feasibility
study. One respondent suggested that this type of information was useful if the
data was verified by means of interviews with key respondents. Otherwise, it
was, at most, useful as background:
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"We originally used [published] reports on the market, but they were
too general and out of date in a market which changes so rapidly." (El)
"This type of data is useful for basic information, although it is very
general, as it is not produced for a specific purpose." (El)
The stakeholders in the Ukraine, most frequently cited in interviews, were:
- Competitors
- Embassies
- Trade Councils
- International Funding Bodies, such as the EC, the World Bank
- Business Service Providers, such as accountants or lawyers
- Western Market Research Agencies
- Consuitancy Projects by students of Ukrainian Business Schools
- Consultancy by Faculty of Ukrainian Business Schools
These are summarised on the Achrol, Reve and Stern (1983) framework in Figure
4.3.
There is a small, but growing, amount of western market research into Ukraine.
Much of this results from Harvard University's Project for Economic Reform in
Ukraine (PERU) or from the market information bulletins issued by the American
Chamber of Commerce. Some insights into the Ukrainian market can be gained
from these.
Manninen and Snelbecker's survey into criteria and barriers to foreign investment
in Ukraine (1993) shows high profit potential (48%) and local demand (3 7%) as
the primary motivations for investment, although the availability of cheap materials
(30%) and low labour costs (23%) are also major attractions. However,
contradictory and confusing legislation, lack of banlcing facilities and poor
communications are seen as significant obstacles (See Figure 4.4).
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Srinivasan (1994) makes the following assessment of the Ukraine as a market for
potential investors (See Figure 4.5)
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Strengths	 Weaknesses
Size and Military Strength 	 Mind-set of Colonial Past
Strategic Location	 Borders with 7 countries
Political Pluralism	 Fragile Institutions
Population and Labour Force	 Lack of Political and Administrative Experience
Science and Technology	 Lack of Private Enterprise
Family and Social Infrastructure
Physical and Natural Resources
Industry and Industrial Infrastructure
Opportunities	 Threats
Rapid Economic Progress 	 Rise of the Extreme Right Parties in Russia
Central Role in European Affairs Ethnic Divisions
Harmonising East and West	 Macro-economic Instability
Figure 4.5
	
Source: Srinivasan 1994
The current period of discontinuous change in Ukraine makes it difficult to
extrapolate any clear picture of investment potential. Looking at the economic
indicators alone gives a bleak picture of the attractiveness of the market for
potential investors (See Figures. 4.1 and 4.2). Research suggests that investment
interest in Ukraine has declined. The findings of Deloitte, Touche Tohmatsu (12th
Financial Times, October 1992) show that the attractiveness of Ukraine to
potential investors is higher only than that of Romania (Figure 4.6).
HungaryPoland CSFR Russia Ukraine Romania
Austria	 74
	
61
	
74
	
52
	
39
	
39
Denmark
	
52
	
76
	
48
	
36
	
6
	
6
France	 48
	
40
	
52
	
36
	
36	 20
Germany	 65
	
65
	
71
	
65
	
41
	
35
Japan	 40
	
10
	
10
	
20
	
0
	
10
Nor/Swe/Fin	 33
	
55
	
33
	
78
	
28
	
11
UK
	 53	 47
	
53	 35
	
23
	
29
USA/Can	 53
	 53	 53
	
63
	
33
	
21
Figure 4.6	 FinanCial Times 12th October 1992
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This view is supported by research by the Wall Street Journal (July 9th 1993) at a
Berlin Business Symposium. Ukraine, Kazhakstan and Russia lag behind other East
and Central European countries. High perceived risks were the principle cause of
this pessimism (See Figure 4.7)
Question: "In 20 years time, which East and Central European Country do you
think will have the healthiest economy?"
Czech Republic	 32%
Former East Germany	 22%
Hungary	 11%
Poland
	
9%
Russia	 7%
Kazhakstan	 1%
Slovenia	 1%
Ukraine	 1%
Figure 4.7
	
Source: Wall Street Journal, July 9th 1993
The decline in the attractiveness of Ukraine to investors, relative to Russia,
challenges its value as a "gateway to the East," which Srinivasan (1994) and
Manninen and Snelbecker (1993) report as a major strength. The Wall Street
Journal (November 11th 1993) reinforces this view, concluding:
"Ukraine's prospects, once bright, grow dim as its economy falters, a slow
pace of reform causes inflation and scarcity of fuel."
4.4 Analysing the Ukrainian Context
Problems in finding reliable data and in extrapolating historical data, given the
dramatic changes in the Ukrainian environment, raise the question of how best the
context can be analysed. Use of objective economic data shows a market in crisis.
However, use of economic data, alone, does not reflect the positive atmosphere
which has arisen, at times, from favourable turns in legislation and political events,
from the peaceful resolution of problems and the extreme good nature of the
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Ukrainian people. Useful market research, as in the preceding section, offers
snapshots of the market from 1992 onwards. However, there is no one regularly
updated source, from the period predating liberalisation to date. Therefore, the
analysis of the context for the investment decisions in this thesis needed to address
two main problems.
Firstly, the analysis must incorporate hard and soft variables, therefore, economic
data alone were felt to be insufficient. Secondly, it required a constant stream or
stream of data for comparability, available for the period from entry of firms into
Ukraine to the completion of data collection. The issue of consistency, which
required identification of a trend, which could be compared between time periods
and against which data could be analysed, was felt to be the most important issue.
The most reliable source of data, for this purpose, appeared to be western press
coverage of Ukraine. Whilst subject to the bias of Western opinions, this offers a
stream of data, which can be analysed over time. Thus, a content analysis of press
coverage from January 1991 to March 1994 was carried out. More than one
journal was used, to reduce the bias, resulting from individual styles and differences
between US and UK vernacular.
The search terms for this content analysis were obtained after an initial frequency
count of possible positive and negative descriptors. Full details of word occurrence
are given in Appendix 1. The content analysis was based on CD-ROM versions of
the Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, the Economist and on Reuters On-line
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system. At the first frequency count, it was apparent that Reuters was
inappropriate for this purpose. It had no occurrences of any of the possible words.
This may be because original press coverage from other sources is reproduced as
summaries. Therefore, Reuters was omitted.
The words, which the frequency count shows as the most used positive and
negative descriptors of the Ukraine, are given in Figure 4.8
Positive Total Score	 Negative	 Total Score
Prospect	 202
	
Risk	 217
Opportunity	 177
	
Threat	 340
Investment	 477
	
Crisis	 343
Figure 4.8
Each of the words was searched in conjunction with "Ukraine" to establish the
number of times in which the two appeared in the same article. Each article was
counted only once, even if there were multiple uses of the word. Monthly totals
were taken for each publication. This overcame the difculties represented by
different frequency of publication.
Although the actual levels of word usage varied between journals (See Appendix
1) the trend was relatively similar between the journals (See Figures 4.9 and 4.10).
The slight differences in timing may relate to whether the publication has a
permanent correspondent (Wall Street Journal) in Ukraine, or uses syndicated
coverage (Economist and Financial Times).
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Data from the Economist is affected by the year end summaries and special
features. To minimise the impacts of differences, total figures were calculated.
From these an indication can be gained of whether the Western press coverage was
predominantly positive or predominantly negative (See Figure 4.11). The resultant
trends have the advantage of reflecting changes in all factors in the environment.
They also show the stage at which perceptions of the market shifted from
predominantly positive to predominantly negative. These trends will be built upon
in subsequent chapters to give fuller insights into the prevailing climate when data
were collected and when firms made the decision to enter the Ukraine.
4.5 Chapter Summary
Whilst objective data from press and the growing body of market research into
Ukraine provides useful insights into the market, there is no one reliable source
which tracks indicators over the period from 1991 to March 1994. Moreover, use
of economic and political indicators would omit soft factors, such as the stoicism
and good nature of the Ukrainian people.
The most appropriate source of data, for use in creating analysing the trend of
positive and negative changes in the Ukrainian environment, was found to be
Western press. It is acknowledged that this data may be subject to bias. However,
press coverage on CD-ROM versions of three journals, the Financial Times, the
Economist and the Wall Street Journal was analysed. From this, a trend of positive
and negative press coverage was developed, which is used in the analysis chapters
of this research. This provides insights into the prevailing context of the data.
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Chapter 5 - Case Histories in their Industry-level Context
5.1 Introduction
This chapter moves from consideration of the host country context to industry
level. The external market conditions in Ukraine are similar for all firms. However,
the modes of entry, which they adopt, and their experiences in the market vary.
Therefore, variables other than country context must play a role.
Data are presented for financial services, law, tobacco, drinks, household products,
chemicals, computing and telecommunications sectors. In this research, three cases
are studied in the chemical industry, five from financial services, and two from
household products. One case is drawn from each of law, drinks, tobacco,
computing and telecommunications. Preliminary analysis shows similar dynamics in
financial services and law sectors. Accordingly, these cases are analysed together
under the business-to-business services heading. Similarly, tobacco and drinks are
grouped together as high-margin consumer goods, whilst computing and
telecommunications are classified as high-technology industrial products.
Secondary data are explored to gain an understanding of competitor activity in
each industry. The patterns of investment activity in Eastern and Central Europe
are compared within each industry sector. A synopsis of each of the cases is
presented. Data for each industry type are summarised.
In analysing the patterns of investment in each industry sector, data on date, type
and size of investments have been gathered from CD-ROM searches of the Wall
Street Journal and Financial Times. Investment activity in Eastern and Central
Europe has been researched from 1989 to date. The extent of the information
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obtained is dependent on how much the firm reveals in its press statement. The
following provisos pertain:
5.1.1 Date of Investment
Press coverage of an investment may span more than a year. Press coverage of one
joint venture in the chemical industiy, from earliest talks to signing of an
agreement, spanned the period from late 1991 to mid 1993. The St Petersburg joint
venture of a firm in the mass-market consumer goods sector was first mentioned in
late 1989. The final agreement was not signed until 1991. Accordingly, data on
dates of investment are only approximate.
5.1.2 Size of Investment
Press coverage may disclose both the size of the initial investment and any
investment in modernisation agreed in the contract. Although, this information is
not available for every investment, indications can be gained of the approximate
size of investment required to set up a manufacturing plant, or subsidiary in the
different sectors.
5.1.3 Demographic Data
Demographic data relating to firm size and degree of internationalisation are drawn
from both internal company documents and from secondary sources. For the sake
of comparability, all data relate to 1991, the most recent year for which a full set of
data are available. Sources are Hoover's Handbook of World Business and
Handbook of American Business (1993) and Stopford's Directory of
Multinationals (1992).
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Al
A2
A3
A4
A7
A8
Figure 5.1
4,975 17,000
5,406 20,000
4,948 59,797
	
3,603	 12,630
	
6,011	 75,000
4,500 16,500
121	 70%
	
70 years
100	 58%
	
50 years
67
	
50%
	
47 years
110
	
64%
	
93 years
5.2 Industry A - Business-to-Business Services - Financial Services and Law
5.2.1 Competitor Analysis
The late 1980's have seen a number of mega-mergers among the global players in
the accounting and financial services sector. By late 1989, the global industry had
shaken out to a "Big 6" firms: Coopers and Lybrand, Arthur Andersen, Price
Waterhouse, Ernst and Young, KPMG and Deloitte, Ross Tohmatsu. Using the
demographic variables described in the methodology, the "Big 6" firms can be
compared by degree of internationalisation and by size as in Figure 5.1.
Firm	 Size	 Degree of Internationalisation
Sales Number of	 Number of
	
Percentage of Sales	 Length of
$ m	 Employees	 countries	 ex home country	 international
with investments	 Experience
100	 62%	 84 years
100	 57%	 105 years
Source:	 Hoover's Handbook of World Business 1993.
Hoover's Handbook of American Business 1993
Data arefor 1991
Whilst some variation in size and degree of internationalisation is apparent, the Big
Six firms can all be described as large, global players with a significant length of
international experience. Internationalisation began prior to the second world war.
In the post-war period, international growth has accelerated to the present global
scale of competition.
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5.2.2 Investment in Eastern and Central Europe
There was some investment activity in Eastern and Central Europe prior to
liberalisation. This centred mainly on Hungary. A2 had been present from 1987
onwards. A4 entered Hungary in 1988. However, the majority of activity in the
region began in 1989. Initial investment activity focused on Central, rather than
Eastern Europe. The pattern of entry into the region is shown in tabular form in
Figure 5.2. In all but one case, firms entered Hungary first. Firm A3 entered Poland
and Moscow in 1989.
Investment in the former Soviet Union tended to take place later, as liberalisation
did not take place until 1991. The progression eastwards can be seen more clearly
when shown on the map of Eastern Europe (See Figure 5.3). The countries, which
are circled, are those in which four or more of the Big Six firms had invested.
Comparison is drawn between investment in the region in 1989, 1990 and 1992.
By late 1992, all of the Big Six were represented in Hungary, Poland, the Czech
and Slovak Republics and in Moscow, Russia. The interest of financial services
firms may relate to entry into the region by international customers:
"Tempted by Kazhakstan's wealth of natural resources, accounting practice
Price Waterhouse has opened an office in the capital Alma-ata. The practice
was started to meet the growing demand for advisory services from western
multinationals, especially in the oil and gas sectors." Central European, March
1st, 1993.
"It was not until one of their biggest customers (...) sought advice for [its] new
subsidiary, that Deloitte and Touche quickly established offices in Budapest,
Prague, Warsaw and Moscow." Tozsde Kurir March 26th 1992
However, it is also strongly motivated by the availability of contracts funded by
agencies such as the European Community, or the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development. Press announcements of such contracts show
their frequency and size:
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"Ernst and Young have been selected to prepare the registration system for the
Small Investor Share Purchase Programme while Coopers and Lybrand have
been selected as the advisor for the public share placement (...) The Know-
How Fund continues to finance J. Henry Schroder Wagg and Co. Ltd, which
prepared the programme and the legal advisors, Baker and McKenzie. The
Know-How Fund for Hungary began in April 1990 with a total allocation of
£25 million over five years." MTI-Econews June 14th 1993.
"Romania's five private ownership funds (POFs) are appointing advisers to
help them adapt into western style mutual funds. In one of the first such
appointments, a team of advisers from consultants Price Waterhouse and the
UK law firm Sinclair Roche and Temperley travelled to Romania in early June
for the first leg of a 12-month contract to provide legal and financial advice."
Central European June 1St 1993.
"The Hungarian State Property Agency (SPA), with the support of USAID, is
on the verge of offering a $6 million contract to accountant Deloitte and
Touche to provide deal-making expertise to the SPA." Central European, June
1st. 1993.
Data on financial investment in Eastern Europe by these firms are difficult to
ascertain. However, numbers of staff are available for some investments. A3
entered Poland with 3 people. A2 entered Poland with 8, and A8 with 2.
In the intervening period, as they have developed specialist knowledge of the
transition to free market economy, the financial services and law sectors have
prospered. A3 expanded from 3 people in Poland on entry, to 65 people by the
following year. A2 expanded its operation in Hungary to 130 people by 1990 and
again to 170 by 1992. Similarly A8 reports a growth from 22 staff in 1989 to 120
staff in 1990. In late 1990, many of the firms added an office in Bratislava,
Slovakia to the original investment in Prague.
Investments in the CIS, especially Ukraine, Kazhakstan and expansion from
Moscow into St Petersburg begin in 1991.
"Price Waterhouse was amongst the first accountancy firms to set up in Eastern
Europe (Budapest, Berlin, Moscow, Prague and Warsaw) and its Budapest
office now has 200 staff, up from 22 in 1989, 120 in 1990 and 170 in 1991."
Figyelo, October 22nd 1992.
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A4 Hungary
A7
A8 Hungary
(July)
"1991, the first full year of business, was profitable, though a loss would not
have been surprising" Toszde Kurir, March 26th 1992.
"DLT is pleased with the state of its investment in Hungary (...) It now has 70
clients in Hungary, as well as its long-standing foreign clients (...) DLT is now
in a position where it is showing an operating profit, although it will be some
time before the initial investment is repaid." Figyelo, May 27th 1993.
1989	 1990	 1991	 1992	 1993	 1994
Al Hungary	 Czech R	 Slovema	 Ukraine
(early-mid
1990)	 Russia	 Bulgaria
A2 Hungary	 Russia	 Ukraine
Moscow	 (late 1991)
Poland
(October)	 Kazhakstan
Czech R	 Russia
(St Petersburg)
A3 Poland	 Czech R	 Bulgaria
Russia	 Slovak Republic Ukraine
	 Kazhakstan
(Moscow)	 (late 1991)
Hungary
(late 1990)
	 Latvia
(Riga)
Russia
(St Petersburg)
Czech Republic
(May)
Slovak Republic
Poland
Hungary	 Czech R
Poland
Russia
Poland
	
Russia
Czech R
Bulgaria	 Kazhakstan
Ukraine
Estoma	 Ukraine
Ukraine
Slovak Republic
Figure 5.2
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Figure 5.3
"Andersen Consulting has become the first Western Company to launch a
systematic recruiting campaign in Czech universities. At the moments
Andersens has a staff of 100 specialists in the Czech Republic." Rude Pravo,
April 29th 1993
Four of the Big Six financial services firms had invested in Ukraine, by the time of
data collection (May 1993 - March 1994). The other two entered later in 1994.
Comparison between the size of the investment in other Eastern European
countries and in Ukraine shows these to be roughly comparable. Al entered
Ukraine with 1 person, as did A2.
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5.2.3 Business-to-Business Service Cases
Case Al
In the USA, Al was not involved in the merger activity of the late 1980's.
However, in 1989, the UK subsidiary joined forces with another of the Big Eight
accounting firms. As a result of standing alone, Al went from being the largest of
the Big Eight players, to the third largest of the Big Six. It is fifth largest player in
the USA. In 1991, sales were $4,975 million and there were 17,000 employees.
The ownership structure of the firm is that of a partnership. The firm is Anglo-
American, having been formed by the transatlantic merger, in 1957, of a large US
and a large UK accounting firm.
Firm Al is highly internationalised. The first international investment activity began
70 years ago. The US part of the firm was established in 1898, and expanded into
Europe with offices in Berlin (1924), Paris (1926) and London (1929). The Berlin
office was closed in 1938, as the outbreak of the Second World War became
inevitable. The UK part of the firm was founded in 1854. International expansion
began with the opening of offices in Brussels (1921), New York (1926) and Paris
(1930). By 1991, 70% of the firms sales came from its international operations. It
had 100 offices in the USA and investments in 121 different countries.
After liberalisation, the firm's interest in Eastern Europe began with an investment
in Hungary. This was followed rapidly by expansion, in 1990, into the Czech and
Slovak Republics and in 1991 into both Slovenia and Russia. Investment in
Ukraine, via both a European Expertise Service joint venture and a wholly-owned
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subsidiary followed in June 1992. The firm entered the Bulgarian market in the
same year.
Interest in the region was stimulated by the availability of funding from the EC and
the World Bank. Existing links with these bodies, via the Brussels and Washington
subsidiaries of the firm, gave it a good basis to become their advisor, especially on
issues of privatisation. The decision to enter Ukraine was prompted by the firm's
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Practice group. The US, UK and
German members of this group influenced the decision to invest in the market.
However, the final decision was strongly linked with the firms involvement in the
EC's Technical Assistance to the CIS (TACIS) programme.
Primary considerations, when making the decision to enter Ukraine, relate both to
market potential and to logistics; was there sufficient business to make the
subsidiary viable as a profit centre and how would it operate? The firm's joint
venture partner provides Eastern European expertise. They have close links with
the Ministry of Economics. However, the regulatory links of Al are such, that they
see themselves as key providers, rather than users, of market information. They
feed information on market developments both to embassies and to international
clients.
Despite the worsening market conditions, during the period of data collection, firm
Al thrived. They gained a large, externally-funded contract and increased the
number of expatriate staff permanently based in the market. By March 1994, there
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were two expatriate representative members of the firm and eight Ukrainian staff in
the subsidiary.
Case A2
Firm A2 are also one of the Big Six accounting firms. After the merger of two of
the big eight firms in 1987, this firm now ranks as the second largest both in the
USA and in the world. In 1991, it had sales of $5,406 million and 20, 000
employees. As in the previous case, the firm has a partnership structure. One of the
merged firms was the result of a post-war alliance between a British and an
American firm. The other part was American. Therefore, the firm's nationality is
Anglo-American, but it has partners world-wide. By 1991, A2 had investments in
100 countries world-wide and fifty eight percent of its sales were outside the USA.
The firm has been involved internationally since the late 1940's.
A2 was earlier into Eastern Europe, than many of its competitors. It set up an
office in Hungary in 1987. The success of this venture, and the subsequent
liberalisation of the market, resulted in rapid expansion, during 1990, into the
Czech and Slovak Republics, into Poland and into Moscow. Investment in Ukraine
took place in late 1991. The firm set up a joint venture with two Ukrainian sleeping
partners.
As the Moscow office had been established 18 months before the Ukrainian
subsidiary, it played a significant role in the decision to enter Ukraine. The original
decision to enter was made in London. However, the market was prospected from
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Moscow. The decision to enter the Ukraine was made after the successful entry of
a major international client, Tambrands. There are links between the two firms in a
number of markets around the world. The Kiev Office was opened during a Public
Relations event involving British firms investing in Ukraine. This was called
"British Days in Kiev". During this, the Kiev office of A2 was opened by Margaret
Thatcher.
The Ukrainian and other Eastern European subsidiaries are viewed by the UK
office as representing a relatively low level of risk. They require only a small
financial investment. Most of the assets are portable and could be withdrawn from
the market if necessary. The major issues, in operation in Ukraine, are those of
gaining reliable information and uncertainty, as to the rate at which international
firms will enter the market. Whilst business is sought with Ukrainian firms, it is
recognised that, in the short-term at least, the firm is heavily reliant on international
firms and contracts from the regulatory sector.
The investment in Ukraine was guaranteed by the British subsidiary of A2 for one
year. However, during this time, the operation expanded such that it was too large
to be supported by the British subsidiary alone. Further investment was made by
A2 internationally. The subsidiary is accountable, in the first line, to the CIS
Practice Group. There are many links between the main office of the practice
group, in Moscow, and the Kiev Office. The manager of the Ukrainian subsidiary
previously worked for the firm in Moscow. Indeed, staff are brought into Kiev
from Moscow, if skills are not available locally.
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There are currently fifteen employees. Three of these are British, American and
Irish expatriates. The remaining 12 are Ukrainian nationals. The mix of nationalities
is seen as positive, it improves the firm's ability to deal with international
customers. However, the British manager suggested that it would be "years before
a Ukrainian ran the subsidiary." This relates to the type of industiy. Guaranteeing
consistent service quality, between markets, is of primary importance.
There is competition between the large firms in the industry, but also a certain
amount of community spirit. The manager of A2's Ukrainian subsidiary maintained
that some information is shared between firms. Also, the firm would not wish to
expand by poaching international clients from other firms. In the UK subsidiary,
more emphasis was placed on expansion by gaining regulatory contracts, than on
international customers. The process of bidding and winning these contracts was
seen as a contest between the major firms and smaller competitors, of different
nationalities. One week Spanish co-ordinating firms might be favoured, the next
Greek or French. The EC felt that it must achieve a balance between the different
nationalities. Also, it could not award all contracts to the Big Six firms.
Despite the worsening climate, A2 also went from strength to strength during the
period of data collection. Their expansion was not based upon the entry into
Ukraine of more international clients, but rather upon gaining a large regulatory
sector contract.
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CaseA3
The third case in this sector is also one of the Big Six accounting firms. The fourth
largest of the six world-wide, A3 is the largest player in the US market with sales
of $4,948 million and 59,797 employees. It was not involved in the merger activity
of the late 1980's. The firm was founded in 1913 in the USA. It expanded rapidly
within the domestic market. However, it did not become involved in international
expansion until the period between 1947 and 1963. During this time, it opened
eighteen more offices in the USA and expanded, first into Mexico, and then into 25
other countries. In 1991, A3 had three hundred and seven offices in sixty seven
countries. Fifty percent of its sales were international.
A3 differs from its competitors, in that it began its Eastern European investments
in Poland, rather than Hungary. Late in 1989, it was also the first entrant into
Moscow. This was prior to the break-up of the Soviet Union. It was followed into
Russia, in 1990, by firm A2, and by the remaining four of the Big Six in 1991. In
1990, A2 expanded into the Czech and Slovak Republics and into Hungary.
Entry into Ukraine came in late 1991. Indeed, three of the Big Six, Al, A2 and A3
claimed to be the first entrant into Kiev. In fact, all of the firms set up their
operations at a similar stage. The market was prospected, for A3, by three staff
from the Moscow Office, which had grown, in the interim period, to be a sizeable
subsidiary with 120 staff. The decision to enter was taken because of clients setting
up operations in Ukraine. The Kiev office was set up to provide service coverage.
80% of A3's clients are foreign investors in the market, whilst 20% are Ukrainian.
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The firm operates, in Ukraine, through a wholly-owned subsidiary. There are
currently sixteen employees. Five of these are expatriates. The managing partner is
Canadian, the Head of Audit and Business Services American, the Audit Managers
are British and Australian and the Head of Tax is Dutch. There are eleven
Ukrainian employees. Five work in tax and six in audit. The firm is the first to have
begun graduate recruitment in Ukraine. Good young students are sought from new
business schools, which are setting up in Kiev.
Younger Ukrainians were seen to have greater potential, as they are less governed
by the rule-based culture and may be more willing to change. However cultural
problems have been encountered en route. There is a need for approval of actions,
even if this involves insignificant decisions. Ukrainian staff also have different
expectations as regard timescale. They might expect negotiations on a Joint
Venture to last for six months rather than the average of one month, with no
greater return. Moreover, there are cultural differences in etiquette. If there are
problems, Ukrainian staff may scream and yell, which is not well regarded by
international clients.
Any decision to expand in the market would be taken by the partners "globally."
This would be based on the level of international business, which is available. The
success of the firm is seen to be strongly dependent on having "good connections."
A maj or part of the firm's business involves facilitating meetings between western
investors and possible Ukrainian joint venture partners. However, difficulties are
experienced because of the growing levels of corruption in the market. Once,
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import and export deals might require a bottle of vodka to a corrupt official. Now
requests for $10,000, to be deposited in a Swiss bank account, were reported by a
number of A3's clients.
Market information is important for A3's operation in the market and plays a
significant role in the quality of the service, which it provides to its customers. This
information is gained from foreign press publications and from translation, by
Ukrainian staff, of the legal decrees in the press. The firm gains much of its
information via word of mouth and from its international connections. The value of
the statistical data, available from secondary sources is limited. It requires
verification through interviews and is hampered by non-reporting and by the speed
of change.
The only real contact with other firms in the sector is via the American Chamber of
Commerce. The Chamber organises both informative and social events, at which
expatriate staff may encounter each other. The manager of A3 saw financial
services as a global industry with strong rivalry between the large players. A3 was
aware of the actions of its competitors. Approximate dates of entry, numbers of
employees and mode of operation could be provided for the Eastern European
markets. Five of the Big Six were operating in Ukraine. One firm, A7 was bringing
in staff from other proximate countries. A8 had only two or three staff The
remaining two were larger. A3 saw itself as the first entrant and largest player. This
view was contradicted by Al.
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Case A4
At the time of data collection, A4 was the only one of the Big Six finns not
operating in the Ukraine. A4 is the smallest of the Big Six firms, largely because it
was not involved in any of the mega-mergers. The firm was originally British. It
was founded in London in 1860, although it now has partners around the world.
International expansion began when a permanent representation was set up in New
York and Chicago in the 1890's. By the 1930's, the firm had 57 offices and 2,500
employees globally. In 1991, A4 had sales of $3,603 million and 12,630 employees
world-wide. There are investments in 110 countries and 64% of sales were outside
of the USA.
Firm A4 is active in Eastern Europe. It was an early entrant into the region. After
merging with a Swiss firm, in 1989 A4 entered Hungary. This was followed in
1990 by rapid expansion into Moscow, into the Czech and Slovak Republics and
into Poland. The firm also has investments in Bulgaria and Kazhakstan, which it
entered in 1992. The Eastern European investments appear to be prospering. The
Budapest office now has 250 stafl Moscow has over 100 people, and there are
140 staff in the Prague office.
The manager of the Eastern European Services division, in London, suggested that
any decision to enter Ukraine would be dependent upon the level of business
available. The organisation is "territorialised," therefore a decision to enter Ukraine
would most likely be made in Berlin, the nearest large office. At the end of data
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collection, members of the US subsidiary were operating in Ukraine on a project
basis. The firm still has not fully entered Ukraine.
Case A5
Firm A5 is a smaller player in the accounting sector. It has only 1300 employees,
compared to the smallest of the Big Six, A4, which has 12,630 employees.
It has a strong domestic base in France and partners in 25 countries world-wide.
The firm operates in 5 Eastern European markets: Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Poland, Russia and Ukraine. It also operates in the eastern provinces of reunified
Germany.
A5 entered Ukraine in 1992, when it gained an EC TACIS contract. However, it
did not go into Kiev, where the larger players were setting up, but into Dniepro-
Petrovsk. One respondent suggested that this was because the large players would
bid for every contract in the capital city. However, in 1993, there was seen to be
sufficient business for AS to set up an office in Kiev. This decision was primarily
influenced by the winning of a major EC contract, which required the provision of
logistical support for visiting faculty. The Kiev subsidiary has only one permanent
expatriate and one Ukrainian employee. During data collection, another large
contract was gained, with another recipient organisation in Kiev.
CaseA6
A6 is a law firm. However, it has similarities to the previous cases, as it is also
concerned with providing reliable information to its international customers.
130
There are a number of foreign-owned law firms now operating in Ukraine. Many of
these are small. One of the highest profile firms, Alex Frishberg and partners,
began when the eponymous partner had his suggestion of entry into Ukraine
refused by the large US law firm, which then employed him. He left and founded
his own organisation in Ukraine.
Firm A6, are one of the larger law firms in Ukraine. Nonetheless, with 100
employees in seven major markets, they are both smaller and less internationalised
than the other business-to-business service firms studied. The firm was founded in
1978 in Paris. Prior to this, partners of the firm had gained significant experience of
former Soviet Union, where they had operated since the 1960's.
There are two major foci of the firm's business activities. One of these is
European, and particularly French, legal matters. A6 has subsidiaries in London,
and New York. The second, and fastest growing area, is that of trade, investment
and finance in Central and Eastern Europe. The firm now has subsidiaries in
Moscow, Warsaw, St Petersburg and Kiev. Additionally, there are co-operative
agreements with legal counsel in the Czech and Slovak Republics, Kazhakstan,
Bulgaria, the Baltic States, Romania and Belarus. There are thirty five lawyers in
the CIS practice group,
Thus, whilst the firm is smaller than some of the others studied, it has an extensive
representation in Eastern and Central Europe. The firm began its operations in the
region because of the actions of its international customers. Entry into Ukraine was
131
largely influenced by assisting Tambrands, one of its largest international
customers, in setting up its pioneering 1988 joint venture agreement in Ukraine.
The Kiev office was opened in 1992, after the associate who runs the office
returned from spending time working with lawyers in the London office. By 1993,
the firm's Moscow office, with 30 full-time staff was one of the largest of any
international law firm. In July of that year, the firm expanded into St Petersburg,
where it now has three permanent staff The Warsaw office has expanded to six
staff In Ukraine, there are three permanent members of staff; one of whom is a US
citizen of Ukrainian extraction and a representative at counsel.
5.2.4 Summary of Business-to-Business Services cases
a) Demographic Data
This research studies four of the Big Six accountancy firms. These firms are
described henceforth as Al - A4. Two other business-to-business service firms
were studied. These were considerably less internationally-diversified and
substantially smaller than the Big Six. AS is also a financial services firm. It has
1300 employees, compared with the 12,630 employees of the smallest Big 6 firm
(A4). It operates in 25 countries, compared with the next smallest of 67 (A3).
One law firm (A6) was added to the study, as a theoretical replication. As the data
for this firm were similar to those of the financial services firms, they have been
grouped together under the heading of business-to-business services. A6 operates
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in 7 countries, so is still multinational. However, with only 100 employees, it is
considerably smaller than the other cases.
Sector
Financial Services
Law
Figure 5.4
Firm	 Size	 Degree of internationalisation
Sales No. of	 Percentage of Number of
$ mill. Employees	 Sales Overseas Countries invested
Al	 4,975 17,000	 70	 121
A2	 5,406 20,000	 58	 100
A3	 4,948 59,797	 50	 67
A4	 3,603 12,630	 64	 110
AS	 *	 1300	 *	 25
A6	 *	 100	 *	 7
* Data unavailable
All of the business-to-business firms were partnerships. Firms Al to A4, all large
global players, have partners in offices world-wide, though not necessarily in every
country in which they have an invested. The smaller firms, A5 and A6, tend to have
partners centred in the country of origin. Within its East and Central European
Practice group, firm A6 has fifteen partners, two of associate status, mainly located
in London and Paris. There are now four Eastern European partners. A5 has many
of its partners in France. Given the split ownership structure, it is difficult to
determine the nationality of the firms.
b) Entry into Ukraine
Respondents gave, as a criteria for their interest in Ukraine, the wish to explore the
market's potential. However, it is not clear that this, alone, would have provided
sufficient motivation to enter. Many of the firms operate in a number of East and
Central European countries. Therefore, they are relatively experienced operators in
markets in transition.
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Firm	 Criteria for	 Date of Type of
	 Number of	 Criteria for
Entry	 Entiy Operation	 Employees	 Expansion
Al	 External Funds Late Joint Venture 9
	
More
1991	 Ukrainian or
International Clients
A2	 Client-serving Late
	
Joint Venture	 15	 Larger Client
1991	 Base/External
Funding
A3	 Client-serving/ Late
	
Wholly-owned 16	 More International
External Funds 1991 Subsidiary 	 Clients
A4	 No Entiy	 -	 -	 Entry of International
Clients-
AS	 Market Niche! 1992 Wholly-owned 2 	 External Funding/
External Funding	 Subsidiary	 More International
Clients
A6	 Market Niche 1992 Wholly-owned 3
	 More international
Subsidiary	 Clients
Figure 5.5
In many instances, the business-to-business firms obtained funding from external
bodies, such as governments and aid agencies. They were also co-ordinators and
advisors to these external bodies, with whom they work on a number of contracts
within the region. Furthermore, the actions of international customers provided a
strong impetus to enter Ukraine. Firms were concerned to provide consistent
service quality to international customers. If an major international customer
entered an Eastern European market, this was viewed as a good reason to enter.
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5.3 Industry B - High-margin Consumer Goods - Tobacco and Drinks
5.3.1 Competitor Analysis
The tobacco industry has three dominant global players, R J Reynolds Nabisco,
Philip Morris and BAT, and a number of smaller competitors such as Rothmans of
the UK, Reetsma of Germany and Seita of France. Key drivers in this industry are
availability of tobacco and low labour costs for manufacturing.
Firm	 Size	 Degree of Internationalisation
Sales Number of
	
Number of
	
Percentage of Sales	 Length of
$ m	 Employees	 countries	 ex home country	 international
with investments	 Experience
Bi	 1,581 22,190	 17	 74%	 23 years
B3	 14,989 56,000	 19	 18%	 50 years
B4	 48,064 166,000	 10	 33%	 93 years
B5	 10,823 110,823	 55	 58%	 90 years
Figure 5.6	 Source: Hoover's Handbook of World Business 1993
Hoover's Handbook of American Business, 1993
Stopford, J M Directozy of Multinationals 1992.
The size and degree of internationalisation of firms in the tobacco industry is
shown in Figure 5.6. The size of the largest international competitors, is
considerably greater, both in terms of employees and sales than the financial
services firms. Those firms with manufacturing operations tend to have
significantly larger numbers of employees than the service cases. A significant
proportion of these may be in the production function. The degree of
internationalisation also differs from the previous sector. Firms are comparable in
the percentage of their business, which is overseas. However, they have fewer and
larger investments.
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5.3.2 Investment in Eastern and Central Europe
The pattern of investment activity in the tobacco industry is shown in Figures 5.7
and 5.8.. Three of the firms began their Eastern European operations in either
Poland or Hungary. Firm B4 had long-standing links with Russia and focused on
Russia, as well as Central Europe, when investing in the region. The progression
from Central into Eastern Europe was largely governed by the date on which the
industry was privatised in each country. However, firms also tend to use large,
manufacturing investments as hubs, from which they serve the surrounding
markets.
In Hungary, the three main production facilities were privatised in the course of
1991. By the end of 1991, two large plants, Pecs and Egri had gone to BAT and
Philip Morris respectively, and a third, Debrecen went to R J Reynolds in January
1992. In the same year, a smaller Hungarian plant, Satoraljaujhely began producing
cigarettes under licence for SEITA, the French producer of Gauloises and Gitanes.
The share which each of these firms had of the Hungarian market in 1991 was
BAT (46%), Philip Morris, SEITA and Austria Tabac (22%), R J Reynolds (32%).
(Central European 01/02/92).
The privatisation of the Czech tobacco industry was announced somewhat later in
September 1991. Competition was equally fierce and the process of selecting the
preferred bid complex. A preliminary tender for the largest target, Tabak, the
Czech manufacturing enterprise with five factories around the country, attracted
bids from both Philip Morris and R J Reynolds (BBC Monitoring Service Eastern
Europe 16/04/92). The Czech Government then announced a public competition,
in which:
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1989	 1990	 1991	 1992	 1993	 1994
Bi Export	 Poland	 Ukraine
04/93
Russia
04/93
B3	 Poland	 Russia
Hungaiy	 Ukraine
B4 Russia	 Russia	 Russia
Since mid	 (Volga)	 (St Petersburg)
1970's
Production	 Russia	 Hunga!y	 Czech R
under	 26/10/9 1
licence	 Yugoslavia	 Lithuama
B5 Hungaxy	 Poland	 Ukraine
involvement	 01/01	 26/03/93
for over
20 years	 Hungaxy	 Russia
Figure 5.7
Figure 5.8
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Three or more firms with high levels or investment
	 lre firms 'th high kvels 0f investment
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"any company which submitted a proposal by 20th January 1992 could take
part. Competing plans were also submitted by BAT, Rothmans, the Seita
company of France and Reetsma of Germany. The conditions for bidding for
A. S Tabak included a commitment to maintain the enterprise as a single unit
and a pledge not to lay off any workers of the company for the next five years.
Nomura, an English consulting agency, is to evaluate the offers and the final
decision will be made by a special commission of the Czech Ministry of
Privatisation." (BBC Monitoring Service Eastern Europe 16/04/92).
The final decision, to sell the factory to Philip Morris for $104 million plus $140
million in modernisation over the next year, was fiercely contested by its
oligopolistic rivals, as it gave Philip Morris monopolistic control over the Czech
market. Reetsma subsequently reached a successful agreement with Slovak
International Tabak (CTK Business News, 2 1/04/92).
The Polish market has three main producers, Cracow (33 billion cigarettes),
Radom (30 billion) and Poznan(22 billion). These three plants accounted for 90%
of total sales in Poland (Gazeta Bankowa 26/04/92). Smaller producers, in Lublin,
Lodz and Augustow produce around 5 billion cigarettes per annum. Until mid
1992, four production licences had been granted by the agriculture ministry. The
volume of imports was also controlled, by the Ministry of Foreign Economic
Relations (Reczpospolita 15/07/92).
The control of access to this large potential market heightened western rivalry. On
the announcement of the transformation, in May 1992, of Poznan, Augustow and
Lublin into Joint Stock companies in May 1992 (Gazeta Bankowa 24/05/92)
western firms were already establishing potential links. Philip Morris had produced
under licence in Krakow since 1973 and were interested in investing in a
controlling interest in the firm (Gazeta Bankowa 03/05/92). BAT were in
negotiation with Augustow and Reetsma with Poznan.
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Hence, it appears that in the tobacco industry, the dynamics of investment are
influenced by a different set of factors, than those in the financial services markets.
The date of entry and target country are not only influenced by the timing of
privatisation, but the limited availability of investment targets, which leads
oligopolistic rivals to "jockey" for the best positions as each market opens up. The
rivalry was encapsulated by Bi's description of having "lost out" to rivals in bids in
Czechoslovakia and being determined not to do so in the markets of the former
Soviet Union. It is also prevalent in press coverage, which speaks of Polish firms
"flirting" with potential investors (Gazeta Bankowa 24/05/92) of "winners" in the
tendering process, of the "Big Rush" when new privatisation targets are
announced. Thus, Central European (01/08/93) stresses that:
"the world's top cigarette companies are queuing up to acquire control of
Almaty Tobacco Kombinat (ATK), the only cigarette producer in the central
Asian republic of Kazhakstan, which is being sold in the country's first hard
currency privatisation transaction. Kazhakstan is the ninth country in central
and Eastern Europe to try to attract foreign investment into its tobacco
industry. Western companies already control the cigarette industries of
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia; foreign investments have also been
made in Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Russia and Ukraine. The size of
Kazkhakstan's cigarette market and ATK's monopoly status makes the
company all the more attractive to potential investors (...) ATK will be
privatised by competitive tender, with the winner to be picked by a 12-member
tender committee that includes representatives from the company and the
government." (Central European 01/08/93)
5.3.3 Cases of High-Margin Consumer Goods Firms
CaseBi
This firm is one of the smaller players in the tobacco industry. With sales of $1,581
million, in 1991, and 22,190 employees, Bi is an order of magnitude smaller than
the largest firm in the sector, which had sales of $48,064 and 166,000 employees
in the same period. Bi is a producer of cigarettes and of luxury products, such as
jewellery, watches, leather goods and perfumes. The firm was founded in the UK
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in 1890, making handmade cigarettes. However, it is now multinational in
ownership. In 1986, Bi set up a Joint Venture in Canada, with the tobacco
industry's largest player. It has a 60% stake in this operation. The holding
company is now 60% Swiss-owned. The firm has 50 factories in 17 countries
world-wide. International sales, represent 74% of the total.
B 1 exported to Eastern Europe, prior to liberalisation, but everything was
channelled centrally via Moscow. After liberalisation, the firm were interested in
exploring the potential of the region. However, research required much more basic
information, than would usually be required. The firm had to begin by looking at
maps and gathering demographic data, in order to determine which markets were
sufficiently large to be of interest. Bi saw Eastern Europe as being a "virgin"
market, which together with China and Vietnam, was one of the last remaining
areas for global competitors to contest. Initial interest in Eastern Europe was
prompted by large, unsolicited orders from Poland. As this market, was one of
those which appeared important, B 1 set up a local office. It then began looking at
the next tier of markets. In both the Czech Republic and in Hungary, Bi was
outbid by larger rivals. Therefore, it moved its focus of attention to the Former
Soviet Union.
B I established a Joint Venture to set up a greenfield manufacturing site in St
Petersburg. Whilst the market was seen to be unstable, gaining even a small market
share would compensate for the risks, which B 1 accepted were high. It was more
concerned with assessing the size of the opportunity, to see if these risks were
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justified. The next choice of market in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) was
between Ukraine, Kazhakstan and Uzbekistan. These were seen as possible first
steps toward entry into the larger, but more turbulent Russian market. In the case
of B 1, the aim was to set up a local production facility, because products were too
expensive, if imported. Lower commitment options, such as a representative office,
were only contemplated as an interim solution, if it were felt that further market
information was required before making this commitment.
Bi decided that there was aprimafacie case for entry into the Ukraine. The
market was large, and widely heralded as having better potential for reform than
Russia or the Southern Republics. It had originally served Ukraine by exporting
products manufactured in the UK. However, the production costs of these were
higher than the selling price of locally produced products. The decision to invest in
the market was made in December 1992. A member of staff came out from the UK
to prospect the market in January 1993 and, in April 1993, Bi entered the market
via a representative office. This was intended only as the first step. The subsidiary
consisted of one expatriate member of stafl with a home office set up in a hotel
bedroom.
Throughout the summer of 1993, B 1 attempted to gather information on market
size and possible joint venture partners. Two of the larger tobacco firms (B3 and
B5) were in the process of signing manufacturing agreements. However, B 1 felt
that it needed to be more cautious, given its smaller size. The market information,
which could be gathered from secondary sources was found to be contradictory.
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Legislation surrounding investments was confusing. Moreover, the market
conditions in Ukraine worsened considerable during this period. A primary
research survey of the market revealed that, whilst consumers were keen to buy
"status brands", they had low levels of disposable income. Therefore, they would
only buy small quantities of the western brand when a visible "badge of capitalism"
was required. They were likely to buy local products, for every day use.
In the late summer of 1993, Bi decided against setting up a manufacturing
operation in Ukraine. The Southern Republics, and Russia itself, now appeared to
have greater stability and potential than Ukraine.
Case B2
B2 is a firm in the drinks industry. It is a Canadian-owned Multinational, based in
Quebec. However, its sales in this market represent only 3% of the total. 45% of
sales come from the USA and the remaining 52% from other international markets.
Founded in 1928, the firm operated, at an early stage, in the USA, as well as
Canada. Following the acquisition of two small distilleries in the USA in 1933, B2
acquired a distillery in Scotland in 1935, and another in 1949. Investments in
France in 1954 and 1960, Jamaica 1953, Italy 1960 and Germany in the 1960's
were all guided by the availability of products with strong national reputations -
rum in Jamaica, whisky in Scotland, champagne in France and wine in Italy.
After diversification into a number of other areas, during the 1960's and 1970's,
the firm has grown to its 1991 size, with sales of $6,127 million and 17,700
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employees world-wide. B2 has investments in 31 countries. The Eastern European
division of B2 is situated in London.
In press coverage of the company's expansion into Eastern Europe, it is explained
that investment began in the Central European countries which "are adapting fast
to western commercial business methods." Subsidiaries were established in
Hungary and Czechoslovakia in September of 1992. Whilst these markets were
relatively small, they were seen as the first bridgehead in Eastern European
expansion. B2 expanded into Poland in early 1993. Entry into Ukraine was the next
step, in July 1993. This operation was described as "a wholly-owned marketing,
sales and distribution operation in Ukraine" and took the form of a prestigious
retail store in Kiev. In addition, B2 set up a manufacturing Joint Venture to
capitalise upon local skills in vodka distilling.
Investment in Ukraine was seen as another step towards eventual investment in the
Russian market. At the end of 1993, a subsidiary had been established in Moscow.
As yet, no large investment has been made in the market. The attraction of the
move eastwards was seen by B2 to be that of market size. Thus, the firm began
with market sizes of 10 million in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, progressed to 30
million people in Poland and 52 million in Ukraine. It's aim is the Russian market,
which has a population of 150 million. However, there is a trade-off between size
and stability, the markets have become progressively less stable, as the firm has
progressed eastwards.
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B2 believes that the potential of Eastern Europe will not be filly recognised until
the next millennium. As market conditions worsened, B2 was considering its
future. In March 1994, an announcement as to whether the firm would continue
with its retail store, or retract to a sales and marketing subsidiary was expected
imminently.
5.3.4 Summary Data for High-margin Consumer Goods
a) Demographic Data
The firms studied in this research include one case from each of the tobacco and
drinks industries. Both firms are large multinational players. One firm is British and
the other Canadian. However, the Canadian firm has 45% of it's sales in the United
States, whilst the British Firm is 68% owned by a Swiss Multinational.
Sector
Tobacco/Drinks
Firm Size
Sales No. of
$ mill. Employees
Bi	 1,581 22,190
B2	 6, 127 17,700
Degree of internationalisation
Percentage of Number of
Sales Overseas Countries invested
74	 17
53	 31
Figure 5.9
b) Entry into Ukraine
In addition to the risks of investment, western firms in the tobacco industry must
consider themselves "winners" even to strike a deal with their potential partner.
The stakes involved in investment in the tobacco industry are much higher than
those in financial services. The size of investment in the tobacco industry is
considerably larger. Investment in manufacturing facilities in Eastern Europe has a
mean value of $46.5 million. The mean additional investment, in modernisation of
production facilities, is $74.2 million. The range and mean of investments are
summarised in Figure 5.10 below.
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Sector	 Financial Implications of Investment
Range	 Mean
High-margin	 $5 million -
	
$46.5 million initial
Consumer Goods	 $104 million	 plus $74.2 million
Tobacco/Drinks	 modernisation.
Total $120.7 million
Figure 5.10
The drinks industiy has characteristics similar to the tobacco industry. The large
available market in Ukraine is the major criteria for entry. There is a similar
concern over the premium price of products. Whilst it is clear that western
products are seen to be 'badges' of high status, it is not clear what percentage of
the population can afford to buy them.
"Imports are seen as high status: expensive, but high quality. They are 'badges
of capitalism.' Local branded products are selling for less than our cost of
production. We would have to produce in the market to compete with other
western brands. Otherwise, we may not even gain a share of the percentage of
that market, which can afford to buy status brands." (Bi)
Western brands may be an occasional rather than a frequent purchase. Distribution
is via similar channels. Currently western brands of cigarettes and alcohol are sold
in dollar shops and privately owned kiosks. There is still some distribution through
the state-owned retail system. Consequently, cases from these two industry sectors
are grouped together under the heading of high-margin consumer goods.
Firm	 Criteria for	 Date of Type of	 Number of	 Criteria for
Entry	 Entry Operation	 Employees	 Expansion
B 1
	
Market Potential April Representative 1
	 Improvement in
1993 Office	 Ukrainian Economy
B2	 Market Potential Dec.	 Retail Store	 10	 Success of
1992 and Joint Venture	 Current Ventures
Figure 5.11
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5.4 Mass-market Consumer goods - Household Products
5.4.1 Competitor Analysis
The nature of the rivahy and investment structure in the household products sector
is similar to that of the tobacco industry. There are two household products and
personal care giants, Unilever and Procter and Gamble. In each of these product
areas, they compete with a different subset of firms. Colgate Palmolive and
Johnson and Johnson are the largest rivals in personal care. Johnson Wax and
Henkel are significant players in the household products market. Key drivers in this
industry are market potential and low labour costs for manufacturing. The size and
degree of internationalisation of the firms is shown in Figure 5.12.
Firm	 Size	 Degree of Internationalisation
Sales Number of
	 Number of	 Total % of Sales	 Length of
$ m	 Employees	 countries	 number ex home	 international
with investme.Ws invest. cozrnb3/
	 Exp8,14we8
Cl	 3,400 13,400	 47	 73	 75%	 50 years
C2	 27,026 94,000	 47
	
62	 45%
	
80 years
C3	 40,767 298,000	 69
	
214	 38%
	
94 years
C4	 24,900 24,800	 40
	
232	 64%
	
65 years
C5	 9,172 41,475	 55
	
97	 69%
	
81 years
Figure 5.12	 Source: Hoover's Handbook of World Business 1993;
Hoover's Handbook of American Business, 1993.
Stopford Directory of Multinationals. Data are for 1991
5.4.2 Investment in East and Central Europe
Initial investment via a sales and marketing subsidiary might covers all sectors of
the firm. However, subsequent investments might be made for each Strategic
Business Unit (SBU).
Hence, firms in this sector might make multiple investments in a country in the
same time period. The pattern of investment by country is summarised in Figure
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5.13. This is shown on the map of Eastern Europe in Figure 5.14. Whilst there was
little investment in the region, prior to liberalisation, the number of investments
increased rapidly from 1989 to 1991. The trend is similar to that seen in the
tobacco industry. Date of entry was governed by the date on which production
facilities in East and Central Europe were privatised. Initial investment interest was
centred upon Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, where a similar bidding
process was employed.
A number of the firms had already had long-standing trade with the region prior to
liberalisation. C3 had owned a manufacturing subsidiary in Hungary, but was
forced to withdraw from the market in 1948. Re-entry into the market commenced
with production under licence in 1971 and a new subsidiary was set up, which
began manufacturing in the market, again, in 1992 (Heti Vilaggazdasag 12/06/93).
Other firms had exported to the Soviet Union via the centrally-controlled channel
in Moscow. However, Cl was a true pioneer. It began negotiations for its
manufacturing Joint Venture in the Soviet Union in 1988, prior to liberalisation of
the region. Larger rivals did not enter the market until at least a year after
liberalisation of Central Europe.
In household and personal care products, firms began the process of entry into the
region an average two years later than finns in financial services. A contributory
factor for this relative tardiness may be the size of investment required. Interest in
the region was reported in the press from 1989 onwards. The process of identifying
targets, bidding and negotiating investment deals may have taken the intervening
period of time.
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1989	 1990	 1991	 1992	 1993
Cl	 Ukraine
C2	 First reported	 Poland	 Russia	 Greenfield
Negotiations in	 (Distributor)	 (Detergents)	 (Nappies)
Russia	 Poland
JV Russia	 Ukraine
(Moscow)	 Sales and Marketing
September	 Subsidiaiy
JVs Hungary
Paper/Personal
100% Acquisition
(manufacturing)
Czech republic
C3	 Production under	 JVDaiiy
license (daiiy)	 Czech
Licensed	 Czech Republic	 Republic
production
of margarine	 Poland
	
Russia	 Hungary
1971
	
Jv
	
Sales and
	
Acquisition
detergents	 Marketing	 ice-cream
Manufacturing (Moscow)	 100%
1981
Licensed
	
N M'turing
	 Poland
manufacture teas	 (detergent)	 IV 70%
Hungary	 Hungary
	 Margarine
manufacture
Hungary JV
Distributor
Ice cream
Hungary
Sales and
Marketing
Subsidiary
N Vegetable Oil
Hungary
Hungary
N 80%
Manufacture
detergents
3 factories
N Ice-cream
Hungary
C4	 Export	 IV Poland	 N early 1992
Manufacturing Manufacturing
Reported	 Personal care/
Interest	 Household
in	 JVRomania
Hungary	 Manufacturing
Sales and Marketing
Hungary
Figure 5.13
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Figure 5.14
The mean size of a manufacturing subsidiary was £35 million. As in the tobacco
industry, there additional cost is involved in modernising plants. The investment in
modernisation, agreed in the initial contract, is $15.7 million. The only given figure
for investment in a Joint Venture with a distributor gives an investment cost of $15
million. It must be noted that firms may make multiple investments in the same
time period. Thus, actual investment in East and Central Europe for C3 in 1991 is
given as $120 million. C2 invested $59 million in the region in 1991. Multiple
investments may be made in the same country. C3 made two reported investments
in Poland in 1993 for a total of $56.5 million. Data relating to mean investment size
are summarised in Figure 5.15 below.
Sector	 Financial Implications of Investment
Mean
Low-margin	 £35 million initial investment plus
Consumer Goods	 $15.7 million modemisation.
Household Products	 Total $50.7 million
Possible multiple investments
Figure 5.15
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When considering the investment activity of household product firms in Ukraine, it
must be noted that some firms which appear to be late entrants may already have
made large investments in neighbouring countries. These serve as manufacturing
"hubs" for the surrounding region. Thus, if the investments in the region are
plotted by level of commitment, differing strategies can be seen for serving the
region (See Figure 5.14). Cl reports that its manufacturing facility in Ukraine is
intended to serve the other former-Soviet states. C2 and C3 both serve the
Ukrainian market with products manufactured in Poland or Hungary.
Accordingly, the importance of analysing the total portfolio of investments, which
the firm has made in the region, becomes apparent. This seems to support
Aharoni's contention (1966) that investment decisions are individual episodes in a
broader pattern of investment activity (See Section 2.3).
5.4.3 Case Histories of mass-market consumer goods firms
Case Cl
Cl is a family-owned American Multinational Corporation in the household
cleaners and personal care market. Founded in 1886, the company is in its fifth
generation of family ownership and went public in 1987. The family retained its
ownership interest and voting control. By 1991 the firm had sales of $3,400 and
13,400 employees. Cl is traditionally a firm which adopts a pioneering approach to
international expansion. In the 193 0's, it was the first US chemical company to
invest in South America. 75% of the firm's sales are now gained from its
international operations. It has investments in 47 countries and distributors in an
additional twenty.
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In the early 1980's there were only three regions in which Cl was not present;
India, Pakistan and the USSR. The firm began to look at ways of entering the
Soviet.Union, a key target for expansion. However, Cl has a policy of investing in
a controlling interest in its subsidiaries and Soviet law prevented them from owning
more than 50% of any joint venture. In 1988, the law on joint ventures changed.
The limit on percentage of foreign investment was relaxed. Prior to the
liberalisation of Eastern Europe and three years before the break-up of the Soviet
Union, Cl began the process of finding a suitable joint venture partner. All
negotiations had to be channelled via the Ministry for the Chemical industry, in
Moscow. After meetings with a number of chemical plants, throughout the
European part of the Soviet Union, a suitable partner was identified in Kiev,
Ukraine in 1989. This was a state-owned producer of waxes and soaps, owned by
the Ukrainian Chemical Association, a consortium of six chemical factories. The
final agreement was signed in 1990.
Cl now has an 80% stake in a manufacturing joint venture. Its input consists of the
investment necessary to update production facilities, marketing and managerial
expertise. The local partner brought local knowledge, premises and stafl as well as
a base level of production facilities. The plant has 330 employees, 200 of whom are
in production. There are three expatriates, who hold the principle management
positions, but hope to train Ukrainian staff in western business techniques.
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The firm's strategy in entering Ukraine was simple: "to be there before the others
and develop a volume/cost competitive advantage in order to build up strong
barriers to late entrants." The implementation of this strategy involves:
- setting up a local production unit using local inputs in order to achieve low
production costs
- to be able to compete in the local currency
- to develop market share in order to gain economies of scale
- to set up a network of partners for distribution and logistics
- to make products available in as large a geographic area as possible
- to build up strong brands, based on extensive distribution, affordable prices and
high quality relative to local competition
- develop human resources in order to build tomorrow's management staff
Cl operates in local currency and attempts to price its products between those of
indigenous suppliers and western imports. However, rampant inflation rates meant,
at one stage, that they had to change their prices every two weeks.
The fortunes of the firm in Ukraine have been equally turbulent. When it entered
the market, Cl was hard pushed to keep up with local demand levels:
"Priced at roughly 30% of their western counterparts, [their products] were
'gobbled up' by 'a market screaming for new products.' Business Central
Europe, February 1994.
It was then distributing through the old state-owned distribution system
of "baza" (wholesalers) and "gastronom" (retail grocery stores). However, since
April 1993, the factory has run at only 50 % of its capacity. This is not because of
a decline in demand. The problems, which Cl is now facing, result from the
transition process.
The structure of the former state economic system has gradually disappeared and
no stable private sector has appeared to take it's place. Supply between
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wholesalers and retailers has now almost been severed. Little privatisation has
taken place. In the absence of any proper distribution channels, a type of parasitic
trader has developed. These traders take commission for arranging a deal, but there
is no added value in terms of distribution. Furthermore, legislative measures change
rapidly and can be draconian. The VAT levied upon the firm's products has
fluctuated from 0% to 20% then 28% and now back to zero. Taxes can be up to
90% of revenue, not profit. One foreign investor in the market says that the
conditions are so hostile that "it is like operating in the wild west." Bribery,
corruption and organised crime are widespread.
In February 1994, the General Manager of Cl was uncertain as to the firm's future
in Ukraine. He concluded:
"There was a time when we thought Ukraine was the country with the best
prospects in the Soviet Union. [Now] our arguments to the Board of Directors
are much more subjective. I have no idea what will happen in Ukraine next
year... We took a risk here, and its one Cl can afford. The question is:
can we survive until Ukraine goes back up, and are we building up a
competitive advantage in the meantime?"
Case C2
C2, a US-owned Multinational Corporation came into existence in 1837. It is a
producer of household cleaners, personal care products, food, beverages and
chemicals. Expansion abroad started in Canada (1915), the UK (1930) and the
Philippines (1935). International expansion did not begin in earnest until 1945. The
firm focused upon expansion into Europe. In 1991, C2 had sales of $27, 026
million and 94,000 employees. The firm had investments in 47 countries world-
wide. 45% of its sales came from outside the USA.
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The first reported activity of C2 in Eastern Europe was in November 1989, when it
began negotiations in Russia. The first investments in the region did not take place
until 1991, when the firm entered Poland via a distributor, set up a joint ventures in
Moscow and Hungary and acquired a Czech manufacturing facility. In 1992, C2
invested in a detergents manufacturing plant in Russia. In 1993, they began work,
on a greenfleld site in Poland, to build a production facility for nappies. The firm
has often made more than one investment in a country. These may be serial, in that
they involve a higher level of investment, or parallel, in that they involve a different
part of the company's product portfolio.
Investment in Ukraine took place in Autumn 1992. This took the form of a wholly-
owned sales and marketing subsidiary. Currently, the firm has not begun to trade in
Ukraine, but is prospecting for potential business. It is also seeking to build a
network of distributors in Ukraine. In the early stages of market investigation, a
manager from the USA ran C2. Responsibility has now passed over to a Ukrainian
national, who previously worked for a multinational firm in the chemical sector.
C2 is hampered by the lack of reliable statistics, but have learned from experiences
in the Russian market. It is difficult to study the market "scientifically".
Understanding the psychology of the Ukrainian consumers is more important. It is
accepted that a manufacturing investment would involve upgrading the production
technology. There have been some quality problems in Russia during this process.
Alternatively, products could be sourced from Russia or Poland, but they would
incur import taxes. Moreover, C2 would be unlikely to gain a licence to sell in hard
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currency. There are strict conditions. Coupon sales are subject to 28% VAT. If
imported products were sold at equivalent coupon prices they would be even more
expensive than in western markets. C2 would only be able to gain a small
proportion of the market.
C2's Ukrainian operation is answerable to the Frankfurt office. It also has a strong
link with the CIS group, based in Moscow.
5.4.4 Summary of Data for Mass-market Consumer Goods
a) Demographic Data
Both of the cases in the household goods market are large, divisionalised
multinational corporations. However, there is considerable variation in their size
and scope. This does not mean that Cl should not be thought of as large and
diversified, but rather that C2, ranked number 38 in the Fortune Top 50 firms in
1991, is one of the "mega-multinationals" (Humes 1993). Both of the firms have a
matrix structure. They are divided both by product and by geographic region. Both
are US owned, with a relatively high proportion of overseas sales. Each has a
European Head Office, for Cl this is in London, whilst for C2 it is Frankfurt.
Sector	 Firm	 Size	 Degree of internationalisation
Sales No. of	 Percentage of Number of
$ mill. Employees - Sales Overseas Countries invested
Household Cl	 3,400 13,400	 75	 47
Goods	 C2	 27,026 94,000	 45	 47
Figure 5.17
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b) Entry into Ukraine
A distinction was seen between high margin firms (B 1 and B2) and low margin, or
mass market, firms (Cl and C2). The latter were more concerned about the price
disparity of their products and local variants. Hence:
"Cl price in Karbovanets (local currency). Their prices are high by local,
though not by western, standards. They price on margin, conservatively, so as
to survive. Inflation causes a problem. We have to change our prices every two
weeks. We set up a local production unit to have low production costs and so
that we can sell in the local currency. Our products are still expensive. There
are no local equivalent products. Consumers use what they have and tend to
use one product for everything. Shampoo is used for hair and fine fabrics (...)
But because of the prices, Ukrainian housewives have unreasonably high
expectations of products with a western brand. For instance, they expect a
liquid detergent used with cold water to be as effective as a powder used with
hot water." (Cl)
The problem with achieving an acceptable margin if the firm does not produce in
- the market are even greater:
"We are not currently doing business, but are prospecting for potential
business. A major problem is that we would have to operate in hard currency.
Licences are available to operate in coupons, but these must be granted by the
government and the requirements are strict. The high rate of duty upon our
products (28%) means that we cannot even charge the equivalent to coupon
prices. As a result, we would be limited to doing a small amount of business
through dollar stores, rather than serving the whole market." (C2)
In the Ukrainian market, where disposable incomes are low, some products will be
seen as expensive, which would be mass market goods in advanced economies.
Thus, even shampoos and detergents are luxuries. Different products for specific
purposes have not previously been available in the market. A western firm, which
operates in a consumer goods market, -has two choices, If they are prepared to
invest in manufacturing facilities in the market, they may succeed in penetrating the
market. If they do not wish to make this investment, then they must adopt a
skimming strategy.
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Firm	 Criteria for	 Date of Type of
	 Number of	 Criteria for
Entry	 Entry Operation	 Employees	 Expansion
Cl	 Market Potential 1988 Joint Venture 	 330	 Success of-
Manufacturing	 Current Venture
C2	 Market Potential 1992 Representative 10
	 Assessment of
Office	 Market Potential
Figure 5.18
5.5 Industry D - Industrial Products - Chemical Industry
5.5.1 Competitor Analysis
In the chemical industry, firms may focus upon one, or a number of stages, in the
production process. There are a number of large rivals in oil and gas exploration.
The global players include Shell, Exxon and BP. Whilst firms may be global in
scope, they may have a strong base in oil distribution within their home country,
examples include BP of Britain, Elf-Aquitain and Total, of France, and Italian
Agip. The business of oil exploration is, however, focused on supply-side factors.
The opening of East and Central Europe offers access to new resources.
Significant attention has been paid to the availability of oil and gas in Siberia,
Romania, Kazhakstan and Azerbaijan. Although there are also natural resources in
other countries within the region.
The multinational firms involved in oil exploration may, also, have diversified
vertically into manufacture of petro-chemicals. Examples include BP and Shell. In
this market, they compete against other firms, who may be their own customers, or
those of their competitors. In the latter category are firms such as ICI and Rhône-
Poulenc. These firms are not interested in availability of natural resources, but in
market size.
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Firm	 Size	 Degree of Internationalisation
Sales Number of	 Number of	 Total % of Sales	 Length of
$ m	 Employees	 countries	 number ex home	 international
invested	 invest, country	 Experience
Dl	 102,697 133,000	 119	 252	 49%	 l24years
D2	 23,353 123,600	 16
	
23	 71%	 65 years
D3	 57,725 111,900	 17
	
36	 65%
	
86 years
D4	 16,612 89,051	 40	 147	 77%
	
75 years
Figure 5.19	 Source: Hoover's Handbook of World Business 1993;
Hoover's Handbook of American Business, 1993.
Stopford Directory of Multinationals
Data are for 1991
The international activities of firms in oil exploration and refining tend to be
geographically concentrated because of resource availability. However, market
potential is a key driver for the chemical production side of the business.
The size of the largest international firms is greater than those in household goods
and tobacco. Fortune 's Top 50 firms for 1991 puts Dl in second place and D3
ninth. The largest tobacco firm is ranked number 14, whilst the largest household
goods firm stands at 20. However, the number of international markets, in which
the chemical firms have investments, tends to be somewhat lower than for tobacco
and household products firms. D3 has investments in 19 countries and D2 in 16
countries. Internationalisation often coincided with founding of the company,
which was tied up with oil reserves outside the home country.
Sector	 -	 Financial Implications of Investment
Range	 Mean
Industrial	 Exploration $40 - $50 million 	 $45 million
Chemicals	 Pipelines	 $400 - $500 million	 $450 million
Figure 5.20
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5.5.2 Investments in Eastern and Central Europe
The patterns of investment of these different types of firms might not be directly
comparable. Thus the data are analysed in two distinct groups:
a) Firms involved in oil exploration and chemical manufacture
b) Firms only involved in chemical manufacture
1989	 1990	 1991	 1992	 1993 1994
a) Firms involved in oil exploration and chemical production
Dl	 Russia JV	 Romania
Manufacturing	 Exploration
(Modest size)	 Deal
Russia
S/M Office	 Ukraine	 Ukraine
100%	 Representative	 JV
Office	 exploration
D3	 Russia	 Czech	 Czech minority
Sales Office Pipeline	 JV refining
and pipelines
July
b) Firms involved in chemical manufacturing
D2 1978 Moscow
	
Ukraine	 Ukraine
JV	 Representative
Agro-	 Office
chemicals
D4 1970 Moscow Poland	 Ukraine	 Czech R
2 JVs	 RepresentativeJV 52%
Office
Agro-chemicals
Hungary
2 JVs
Figure 5.21
The patterns of investment for each group are shown in Figures 5.22 and 5.23.
Those firms involved in exploration are influenced by markets with available oil.
Those in chemical production are influenced by market size and stability, as in the
previous sectors.
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Firms involved in oil exploration and chemical manufacture
119901	 1991I	 ''i19921
Firms onsy involved in chemical manufacture
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Firms tended to enter via low commitment modes of operation. Further investment
followed an average of two years later. This incremental approach seems to relate
to the size of investment.
5.5.3 Case Histories of Industrial Products firms
Case Dl
Firm Dl was founded in 1907 as a result of an Anglo-Dutch merger. The firm is
involved both in oil and gas exploration and in chemical manufacturing. Dl quickly
became involved in international activities. Oil production began in Borneo in
1910, Mexico (1913), Venezuela (1914). The firm acquired interests in Romania
(1906), Russia (1910), Egypt (1911), Trinidad (1913) and California (1915). The
Eastern European investments were lost during the first world war. Further
expansion took place in the 1920's and 1930's. The first production of chemicals
began in the Netherlands in 1928 and in the USA in 1929.
By 1991, Dl had sales of $102, 697 million and 133,000 employees around the
world. It had two hundred and fifty two investments in 119 countries and 49% of
sales were outside Europe. A distribution network of petroleum stations had
existed in Hungary since the 1950's. However, investment activity in Eastern
Europe recommenced more fully in 1990, when Dl became involved in a
manufacturing joint venture in Russia. This was described by the firm as being of
"modest size". It was accompanied by the setting up of a wholly-owned sales and
marketing office in Moscow.
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In 1992, Dl signed an exploration deal in Romania. It was also in this year that the
firm set up a representative office in Ukraine. The objectives of this office were to
assess the market potential for speciality chemicals. The subsidiary had been
approached several times as a potential joint venture partner. This had to be
handled sensitively. Whilst this might be an option in the longer term, this would
require a significant investment in the market. Therefore it would need more
information.
Difficulties were experienced in making an accurate assessment of market
potential. The capacity figures for production by the main Ukrainian plants varied,
depending upon the source. Therefore, all information had to be cross-validated.
Moreover, important pieces of information were missing. Dl could not establish
who converts ethylene to polythene, although they know that this happens. Market
research in Ukraine was described by Dl as tracing "chains of information", such
as who produces a product, in what quantities, and where does it go next? Often
there are vital links which cannot be established.
One trigger, which might prompt Dl to make an investment in Ukraine in the
short-term, was the entry of a large international customer. Otherwise, they would
continue to seek better market information. The firm was answerable to it's
shareholders, therefore it could not afford to take unnecessary risks.
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In March 1994, Dl were still present as a representative office. The market
conditions were described as "shades of grey and black." Later in 1994, after the
end of data collection, Dl invested in a joint oil exploration venture in Ukraine.
Case D2
In 1992, D2 was the fourth largest chemical company in the world. The firm is a
British multinational. It was formed in 1926, as a result of the combination of four
British companies. The first international involvement of D2 came through a 1929
patents and process agreement with a large American chemical firm. In 1931 and
1932, co-operative alliances were formed with a German partner. By 1991, D2 had
sales of $23,353 million and 123,600 employees. 73% of the finn's sales were in
international markets.
Investment activity in Eastern Europe began as early as 1978, when D2 set up an
office in Moscow to co-ordinate activities in the region. On liberalisation, the firm
began operating in the individual countries. In 1991, the firm set up a joint venture
agreement in Ukraine. This was in the area of agro-chemicals. The following year,
the firm also set up a sales and marketing subsidiary in the country to explore the
market potential for other product categories. The interest in this, rather than other
Eastern European markets, arose from its rich agricultural soils and large market
size.
The worsening market conditions and legislative fluctuations have presented a
number of problems for D2. There is a lack of reliable statistics to assess market
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potential. Problems have been encountered in gaining payment. Pesticides are often
sold against a letter of credit. However, this causes cash flow problems.
Furthermore, Kravchuk reacted to the economic crisis by banning the export of
agricultural produce, causing significant losses for D2.
Case D3
D3 are also involved both in oil and gas exploration and in chemical production. It
is a British Multinational Corporation, founded in 1909. The aim of its formation
was to carry out international oil exploration. Until the Second World War, the
firm was involved primarily in supplying oil, extracted in the Middle East. In the
early 1950's, however, the firm began to expand internationally. New sources of
oil were established in Nigeria. A network of refineries and distributors was set up
within Europe. After gaining oil supplies from Alaska, the firm entered the US
market in 1969. By 1991, D3 had sales of $57,725 million and 111,900 employees.
It had 36 investments in 17 countries, which accounted for 65% of its sales.
D3's first investment in Eastern Europe came in 1990, when it set up a Russian
sales office. In 1991, work began on an oil pipeline in the Czech Republic. In 1993,
this was followed by investment in a minority stake in a refining joint venture and
in pipelines. D3 does not currently operate in the Ukraine. In November 1993, the
firm was considering entry with the speciality chemicals side of its business. It was
also interested in the availability of gas in Crimea. An estimate was given that D3
would be in the lubricant market in Ukraine by January 1994. However, in
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February of 1994, the firm still had not entered the market. At this stage D3 had
decided that Ukraine represented too great a risk.
The explanation for this was as follows. Assessment of a new market opportunity
happens at several levels. Firstly, there is a scientific assessment of the extent and
availability of natural resources. At this level, Ukraine has potential. Secondly,
there is assessment of the market opportunity. Ukraine is attractive because of its
large market size. However, the likely returns on any investment are hampered in
the short-term by the uncertainty of the market transition. At present, the implosion
of the economy overrides the attractiveness of the market. Both Kazhakstan and
Azerbaijan seem to have a greater short-term potential. Pending the outcome of the
elections in Ukraine, in late March 1994, and signs of recovery in the economy, D3
decided to defer their investment decision.
5.5.3 Summary of Data for Industrial Products
The three cases in the chemical industry are all in Fortune's Top 50 Multinational
firms for 1991. They are ranked at numbers 2, 9 and 49. All are British, or joint
British and European in ownership and have a global scope of operation. However,
such is the size of an investment in this industry, that they have operations in less
countries, than do the consumer goods firms.
Sector	 Firm Size
Sales No. of
$ mill. Employees
Chemicals	 Dl	 102,697 133,000
D2	 23,353 123,600
D3	 57,725 111,900
Figure 5.24
Degree of mtemationalisation
Percentage of Number of
Sales Overseas Countries invested
49	 119
71	 16
65	 17
167
b) Entry into Ukraine
In industrial product markets, the firm may enter Ukraine either because it wishes
to benefit from raw materials in the market, or else to tap the market potential. In
this research, three chemical firms were studied. In the cases ofDl and D3, the
firm wished to both of these with different divisions of its business. D2 was
motivated by market size and factor availability.
The low labour costs associated with producing in Ukraine are attractive to firms,
who wish to serve the market. However, as the quality and efficiency of Ukrainian
manufacturing plants is low, production involves not only up-front investment, but
transfer of technology and managerial skills. Raw materials such as gas, coal and
metals are currently available at less than market price. These may be of interest
either as exports, for use in other countries, or else for cc ersicc ia&? secozz.caz-y
goods within the Ukraine. Export and import are subject to the vagaries of
changing legislation. Currently, the export of goods is considerably restricted by
legislation. However, it may be possible in the future to transfer goods effectively
in and out of Ukraine.
Firm	 Criteria for	 Date of Type of	 Number of	 Criteria for
Entiy	 Entiy Operation	 Employees	 Expansion
Dl	 Market Potential 1992 Representative 4	 Assessment of -
Office	 Market Potential!
Entry of International
Customer
D2	 Market Potential 1991 Representative 3
	 Success of
Office and	 Current Ventures
Joint Venture
D3	 No Entry	
-	 Improvement in
Ukrainian Economy
Figure 5.25
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5.6 High-Tech Industrial Products - Computer and Telecommunications
5.6.1 Competitor Analysis
The computer industry is global to the extent that most of the "boxes" are now
made in locations with relatively cheap labour, such as in South-East Asia. Whilst
East and Central Europe may ultimately be of interest for production, currently
there is insufficiently advanced production technology. Consequently, the markets
of East and Central Europe are being contested by computer firms for their sales
potential. These sales tend to come from modemisation of the retrograde infra-
structure. This represents a significant new market opportunity for a computer
industry, which has seen a levelling of sales growth going from the buoyant 1980's
into the 1990's. There are a number of large, global players in the computer
industry. The firms analysed in Figure 5.26 are those, which are most active in
Eastern and Central Europe.
Firm	 Size	 Degree of Internationalisation
Sales Number of	 Number of	 Total % of Sales	 Length of
$ m	 Employees	 countries	 number ex home	 international
invested	 invest, country	 Experience
El	 2,624 24,258	 39	 85	 *	 60 years
E3	 13, 911 121,000	 31
	
58	 60%
	
39 years
E4	 64,792 344,533	 42
	
61	 62%
	
75 years
E5	 14,494 89,000
	 32
	
64	 56%
	
55 years
Figure 5.26
	 Source: Hoover's Handbook of World Business 1993;
Hoover's Handbook of American Business, 1993
Stopford Directory of Multinationals. Data are for 1991
* Data Unavailable
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5.6.2 Investment in East and Central Europe
El, E4 and E5 had significant experience in exporting to the region prior to
liberalisation. This was controlled centrally via Moscow. However, the firms also
had export representatives in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Since
liberalisation, expansion in the region has been rapid (See Figures 5.27 and 5.28).
Firms have increased their level of investment rapidly, especially in Hungary,
Poland and the Czech Republic. This rapid growth rate may relate to a high volume
of sales gained through contracts both with Western aid agencies and host country
governments. Investment behaviour in the computer industry appears, in many
respects, similar to that of financial services.
Large contracts are frequently reported in the press:
"A tender issued by the Customs and Excise Guard for computerisation of the
customs administration under the PHARE aid programme has been won by A3
of Hungary. The contract is worth a total of about $6 million." (BBC
Monitoring Service, Eastern Europe 12/08/93)
"Computer giant E4 and the Polish Cabinet Office (URM) have signed a wide-
ranging agreement, according to which E4 will computerise the state
administrative apparatus." (Rzeczpospolita 27/07/93)
"E5 has won orders to computerise several Polish state and government
institutions, including the Central Office of Statistics (GUS), a $1.5 million
contract in the first stage; the Sejm $1 million, the National bank of Poland $ 1
million in the first stage; the Forestry Authority (ZLP) $14 million." (PAP
Business News from Poland, 28/06/93)
Sales are largely dependent upon the award of such large, infrastructural contracts.
Some of these are host market ftinded, but a number rely, at least in part, on
western aid agencies. Sales growth has been rapid leading to more rapid expansion
than originally foreseen:
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Ukraine
Distributor
Bulgaria
Romania
Hungary
since 1936
Parent
in Czech
for
20 years
1989	 1990	 1991	 1992	 1993 1994
El 20 years	 Hungary	 Hungary	 Hungary
experience	 JV	 100%	 (Pecs)
in USSR	 Budapest	 Debrecen
September	 Russia
Operation	 JV 60%
in Hungary	 Manufacturing
1964
Kazhakstan
Poland	 Poland
Exports	 Sales and
for over	 Marketing
20 years
Czech Republic
Sales and
Marketing
E3
	
Hungary	 Hungary	 Ukraine	 Hungary
JV51%-	 100%	 100%	 PHARE
63%	 bought out
	
$6 million
April	 2 partners	 Poland	 contract
20/01/92
Czech	 Russia
Export	 Sales and
07/03/9 1	 Marketing 100%
Czech Republic
23/01/92
E4 Moscow	 Poland	 Hungary	 Lithuania
over 20 years	 October	 JV
100%
Ukraine
01/04/93
Czech R
	 Russia	 Czech expansion
25/01/91	 100%	 + 4 cities
5 offices	 Sales and	 21/05/93
Marketing
Russia	 Bulgaria JV
Sales and Marketing	 01/04/93
100%
ES Hungary	 Hungary	 Hungary	 Hungary
1987	 Ltd Company 100%
Czech R	 Poland 100%
Export 1971	 S/M
Export rep 1975
Poland
Distributor
Figure 5.27
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Three or more firms with high levels of invent
	 o!l three firms with high levels of iwestment
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Figure 5.28
It is said of E4:
"Current annual sales in the five reforming countries Bulgaria, Czech, Hungary,
Poland, Romania and former Yugoslavia are around $300 million" Reuters
03/06/92
E5 set up a representation in Hungary in 1987. In 1990, revenue grew by 73% and
a further investment was made in a Limited Company. This was set up as a
minority Joint Venture in April 1991. A further increase in revenue in 1991, to give
sales of $15.7 million, resulted in the decision to take 100% ownership of the
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subsidiary in August 1992. The reason given for the purchase is that sales had
grown more rapidly than envisaged:
"At the time of creation of the JV, E5 was offered a five-year option to buy
out Controll's stake. A company spokesman told Econews that it is proof of
the success of the company that the buy-out took place much earlier than
planned." (MTI Econews, 24/07/92).
The history of the development is explained as follows:
"E5 first set up an office in Budapest in 1987, but following political changes
in 1990 decided to increase its presence. The result was a joint venture with
Controll (...) established in March 1991 with equity of 50 million forints, of
which E5 owned 35%. In its first year, the JV increased E5 sales by 73%,
partly because HP brought out a lot of new products in that year, and partly
because the JV became the focus of all the tax benefits open to a foreign-
owned company (...) Sales up to October 31st will register a further 45 - 50 %
rise, so that 1994's sales targets have already been achieved. E5 recently
exercised its right to buy out Controll because - as a result of the rapid
expansion in sales - the IV had reached the point where major financing was
required." (Heti Vilaggazdasnag 03/10/92)
Similar growth has been experienced by other computer firms in the Central
European markets, resulting in rapid expansion. However, in addition to sales
growth, an additional impetus may be the relatively low cost of investment. The
equity stake of E5, in taking 100% ownership of its subsidiary, was $700,000. The
cost of a 45% stake in a Joint Venture in Hungary for another firm in the sector
was $113,000. The maximum reported investment in this sector was $2 million by
E3 in a Joint Venture in Hungary. This could be offset by gaining a single contract.
Sector	 Financial implications of investment
Range	 Mean
High-technology	 $113,000 - $2 million 	 $937,600
Industrial
Computing/Telecommunications
Figure 5.29
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5.6.3 Case Histories of High-technology firms
Case El
Firm El is a British-based multinational producer and distributor of computers. It
has over 60 years of international experience. 80% ofEl was acquired by a
Japanese firm in 1990, the remaining 20% is Canadian owned. With sales of $2,624
million and 24, 258 employees in 1991, El is the largest software and computing
services firm in Britain. It has 85 investments in 39 countries. Furthermore, there
are a large number of associated investments through its Japanese parent.
In Eastern Europe, El has a broad portfolio of investments. It has a direct trading
subsidiary in Russia, which distributes the company's products. It also has a joint
venture to assemble computers. There are wholly-owned subsidiaries in Poland, the
Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania.
El had links with three of these markets before liberalisation. It has twenty years of
experience in the USSR. It has had a distributor in Hungary since 'i964 anàas
exported to Poland for more than 20 years. The years since liberalisation have
brought an increase in the level of investment activity of the firm in Eastern
Europe. In 1990, it invested in a Joint venture in Hungary, additional offices were
established in Debrecen in 1991 and in Pecs in 1992. Sales and Marketing
subsidiaries were established in Poland and the Czech Republic in 1990.
Investments in Bulgaria and Romania followed in 1991. In Kazhakstan, El has a
licence agreement for the production of PCs and mid range systems.
175
In Ukraine, El established links with an independent distributor in 1992. This
choice of entry mode is seen to provide the benefits of local knowledge and to buy
time, whilst the firm assesses the market potential. It is foreseen that a joint venture
agreement might be entered into in Ukraine, dependent upon market potential.
Clearly, there is an opportunity in Ukraine. The temptation is to rush in, but the
costs of setting up the operation are too great. El would expect the investment to
pay back within two to three years.
El has links with local education providers in Kiev. There are high levels of
information technology skills in Ukraine. Information gained through these
channels is seen to be much more valuable than the secondary data which can be
accessed from outside of the market. Such reports are helpful at a basic level, but
they are general and become out of data very rapidly.
Within Eastern Europe, El has links with regulatory bodies such as the EC.
Contracts from these regulatory bodies are one possible source of revenue. Gaining
a major contract, or else finding an attractive joint venture partner would be seen
as good reasons for making an investment in Ukraine. In March 1994, El were still
considering the possibilities for expansion. The prospects seem good.
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Case E2
Firm E2 was formed by the merger of the telecommunications interests of two
large British firms in 1988. In 1989, one of the multinationals took a 60% stake,
after a bid by the German electronics firm, which now holds the remaining 40% of
the company. Hence the majority of E2 is owned by a large British Multinational
electronics corporation, established in 1968. The parent company expanded into
Europe and the USA in the late 1960's. By 1991, it had sales of $13,479 and
118,529 employees. 44% of sales were outside the UK.
E2 has 22 investments within the UK and is looking to develop its own
international portfolio. One respondent suggested a risk-averse climate, when it
comes to international expansion. However, the decline of its cash cow in the UK
dictates rapid entry into markets, which are less technologically developed. The
firm has a successful joint venture in Moscow. Ukraine was seen as the next
development. The firm had been studying the potential of Ukraine for two years
before winning a contract to supply the Ukrainian government with equipment to
modernise the telecommunications infrastructure. An export representative went
out to Ukraine in 1993. Since then, he has been assessing market potential.
In March 1994, the representative in Ukraine was about to leave the country, en
route to a new posting in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan and Kazhakstan were now
considered to be of greater interest than Ukraine. E2 were withdrawing in the face
of worsening market conditions. There was business to be gained. However
political instability, bribery and corruption were such that the parent company felt
that the risks of operation in Ukraine were too great at present. Larger competitors
remain. They are looking at longer-term potential.
5.6.4 Summary of Data for High-technology Cases
a) Demographic Data
One firm from each of the computing and telecommunications industries were
studied. Both of the industries involve high-technology products with a significant
requirement for after sales support. In the global industries, in which they operate,
both of the firms count as small players. However, they are still large multinational
firms. One of the firms is British owned. The other is 80% Japanese owned.
Therefore, again nationality is difficult to determine.
Sector	 Firm	 Size	 Degree of internationalisation
Sales No. of	 Percentage of Number of
$ mill. Employees	 Sales Overseas Countries invested
Computing!	 El	 2,624 24,258	 *	 39
Telecommunications E2
	 13,479 118,529	 44	 14
Figure 5.30	 * Data Unavailable
b) Entry into Ukraine
As shown in the investment announcements relating to Eastern Europe, the
computer firms are significantly influenced by the availability of large government
contracts. In this respect, a similarity can be seen between the computer and
telecommunications industries. In this study, these are grouped together, as they
both involve high-technology industrial products. High-technology industrial
products are subject to a different set of issues to the chemical industry. Often,
they require a high level of service support, and this influences entry mode choices.
Also, as such products are involved in improving the infrastructure of Ukraine,
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these firms, like business-to-business services are likely recipients of government-
funded contracts.
Firm	 Criteria for	 Date of Type of	 Number of	 Criteria for
Entry	 Entiy Operation	 Employees	 Expansion
El	 Market Potential 1992 Distributor
Office
4	 Assessment of -
Market Potentiall
Entry of International
Customer/ External
Funding
E2	 External	 1993 Export	 1	 Assessment of
Funding	 Representative	 Market Potential
Figure 5.31
5.7 Chapter Summary
The key drivers of expansion into East and Central Europe are studied for firms in
the financial services, tobacco, household products, chemicals and computing
industries. The size and motivation for investments is explored, using the firms'
press announcements of investments. These were drawn from a Reuters press
search. The criteria for entry into Eastern Europe are explored for each of the
sectors. Comparisons are drawn between the level of investment, which is required
by each. It is seen that financial services finns may have external funding or a
guaranteed level of business with existing customers. Similarly, firms in the
computing industry are often recipients of contracts for redevelopment of the
infrastructure. The level of investment involved in market entry, in both of these
industries is significantly lower than that required in the consumer sectors studied.
It is also significantly lower than the investments made by chemicals firms.
Investment in the region is seen to have moved progressively further east since
liberalisation. Study of the overall portfolio of investment shows that, in industries,
where low levels of investment are required, there is a tendency to have offices in
each of the countries. This pattern applies to business-to-business services and to
high-technology industrial products. It may also relate to the need for on-site
support, or to concern over quality standards.
For consumer goods firms, manufacturing within the region is important for cost
reasons. Given the size of investment involved in setting up a manufacturing plant,
firms may not invest in eveiy country. Instead they operate from regional "hubs."
Chemical firms are influenced by the availability of oil and gas. The size of
investment required by the exploration side of their business requires the highest
level of financial investment seen.
Case histories of the firms studied in this thesis are presented under the headings of
business-to-business services, high-margin and mass-market consumer goods, high-
and low-technology industrial products. Data are summarised in tabular form.
180
Chapter 6 - Cross-industry Analysis of Entry Decisions
This chapter analyses entry decision data across industry sectors. It employs a
process of pattern-matching by iterative tabulation of data (Miles and Huberman
1984). The richness of the data is explored more fully using verbatim quotations
from case respondents and secondary sources. Entry decisions are analysed as to
the criteria for entry, acceptance of risk and level of commitment. Typologies of
decision-making behaviour are identified. Four groups are distinguished, who have
made different choices relating to these key variables.
6.1 Criteria for Investment
In thirteen cases, firms had decided to make an initial investment in Ukraine. The
criteria for this investment can be categorised as follows:
Market Size	 )
Factor Advantages 	 )	 Market Potential
Geographic Location	 )
External Funding Opportunities
Service to International Customers
Competitor Activity
Literature proposes a variety of frameworks for analysis of the "triggers" to entry.
They can be classified as proactive or reactive (Olson and Wiedersheim-Paul
1978):
Reactive	 Proactive
Unsolicited Order	 Geographic Location
Entry of International Customer Factor Advantages
Actions of Competitor 	 Market Potential
Government Contract
Figure 6.1
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Another way of looking at the criteria for entry into Ukraine, is to identify their
origin in the environment surrounding the firm. They may come from either the
primary or secondary task environments (Achrol, Reve and Stern 1983). By this
classification, market size, geographic location and factor advantages are influences
in the secondary or macro-environment, whilst customer, competitor and
regulatory influences, come from the primary or micro-environment of the firm
(See Figure 6.2).
6.1.1 Market Potential
Eight of the firms (Bi, B2, Cl, C2, Dl, D2, D3 and El) were attracted to Ukraine
by market opportunities offered by liberalisation. This includes all of the consumer
goods and chemical firms and one high technology firm. Only one firm, (Cl) in the
household goods sector, was already involved in joint venture negotiations before
liberalisation. Negotiations began in 1988 and the joint venture continued, despite
the demise of the Soviet Union, in late 1991.
A number of firms had previously dealt with the Soviet Union. One chemical firm
explained that they had had:
"a Moscow Office for 15 years. This served the entire Soviet Union, as
everything was done centrally." (D2)
Similarly, a consumer goods firm had previously exported to the Soviet Union
from the UK:
"We previously dealt with the area, but everything was handled centrally in the
Soviet Union. Consequently, there was little knowledge of how the system
worked and none about the different countries which now exist" (B 1):
Market potential was comprised of the size of the available market in Ukraine,
geographic location as a gateway to Russia and factor advantages.
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a) Market Size
A population of 52 million people, who are "short of absolutely everything" (Cl),
represents a significant opportunity to firms in mature industries. On liberalisation,
the potential of Eastern Europe was widely heralded in press coverage. A Financial
Times study of retailers entering the area (October 12th, 1992) stated:
"The prospect of converting 400 million eager consumers into loyal shoppers
is encouraging many retailers to invest in the region"
Ukraine, in particular attracted attention (Deutsche Bank 1991, Europe 1991,
Euromoney 1992). Basic demographic research showed it to be a "large available
market". As such, it was of particular interest to firms in consumer goods
industries. The tobacco market in Ukraine, for example, is both large and growing
(See Figure 6.3):
Market Size
CSFR	 31 billion
Hungary	 20 - 25 billion
Poland	 90 - 95 billion
Russia	 300 billion
Ukraine	 40 billion
Source: Reuters 24/09/9 1
	
Figure 6.3
However, the actual market potential is difficult to establish. For cigarettes, as for
many other products, data obtained from official sources varies dramatically. The
Trident Consulting Group's figures for cigarette production give 69.3 billion units
in 1991. An additional 600 million cigarettes were imported from Moldova. Thus,
their calculation of market size differs from Reuters by 29.9 billion units!
In the drinks industry, firm Bi says of its experiences in Central Europe:
"It has very much been a case of 'do it yourself'. For example, no official
records exist of wine and spirits retailers (...) so our people literally had to map
out their markets themselves." Official Press Release
Similarly, in the chemical industry, case D2 explains:
"Some figures, such as output are available. However, trying to track down
market size is complicated by the problem of 'inter-dependent links', If one
vital piece of information is missing, such as what products are being converted
into or where they are sold, then the chain is broken" (D2)
However, for some firms, given the available markets in Eastern European
countries, even skimming the market is potentially interesting:
"Even 1% market share of 300 billion cigarettes is worth having" (Bi)
However, capitalising upon the size of the market is fraught with problems. An
entrant prior to the demise of the Soviet Union, Cl have suffered a reversal of
fortunes:
"At first, Cl could not keep up with local demand for its lines of household
cleaners, polishes and detergents. Priced at roughly 30% of their Western
counterparts, they were gobbled up by a market 'screaming for new products'.
But since last April, the factory runs at 50% capacity. Consumer demand hasn't
flagged says their General Manager; the problem now is distribution."
Business Central Europe February 1994.
As the previous system breaks down, market size alone is insufficient to guarantee
success.
b) Factor Advantages
Ukraine has a number of factor advantages. It has rich agricultural soils, metals,
coal, oil, natural gas and low cost, relatively highly skilled labour (Manninen and
Snelbecker 1993). This led to the development of a strong industrial base. The
system of specialisation in the former Soviet Union meant that this was not
necessarily based on factor advantages, or disadvantages, as in free market
economies (Porter 1990). It might be in areas designated by the centrally-planned
system. Hence, Ukraine has a significant oil refining capacity (65 million tonnes),
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although it has relatively little oil. It also has a large proportion of the nuclear
power generation and chemical industries. Firm D3, in the chemical industry,
explained that one stage of assessing market potential is to look at the "scientific
case". On this basis:
"there is sufficient oil and gas in Ukraine to make it interesting to a
multinational firm."
Ukraine is also attractive to some firms because strong local demand has developed
skills in a particular sector (Porter 1990). There is a large demand for vodka and
skills in distilling it:
"The portfolio [of products launched] in Ukraine will be similar to that of (...)
affiliates in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland - with one difference, a local
vodka. Vodka is the major distilled spirit category in Ukraine and the "granary
of Europe," as it has been called, has considerable expertise in the production
of vodka." (Press release, December 1992 B2)
This demand is derived from the factor advantage of good agricultural soils, which
made Ukraine the largest producer of grain and of 53% of the sugar in the Soviet
Union.
The value, which firms perceive in these factor advantages is clear. Manninen and
Snelbecker's research (1993) shows cheap materials (32.1%) and low wage levels
(24.5%) as the third and fourth highest motivations for entry into Ukraine (See
Figure 4.4).
However, the Economist (May 7th, 1994) urges caution to those investors, who
believe that the industrial past of Ukraine confers value:
"Thus one big illusion: that Ukraine is a wealthy place. Two and a half years
[after independence], a majority of Ukrainians still have not come to terms with
the fact that most of their Soviet era dinosaurs are a liability, not a legacy".
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c) Geographic Location
Geographic location also contributes to the market potential of Ukraine. On the
break-up of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was considered to have the greatest
potential for reform to a free market economy, as it was:
"bigger than all the rest [of the former Soviet States] bar Russia. It had
stronger hopes of quickly establishing ties with the rest of Europe than, say,
Kazhakstan. And it had inherited a disproportionate amount of the former
Soviet Union's industry" Economist, May 7th 1994.
Ukrainian independence took place at the end of 1991, whilst liberalisation in the
Central European countries of Hungary, Czech and Slovak Republics and Poland
had occurred late in 1989. Therefore, many of the firms had already established
positions in Central Europe before considering the prospects in Ukraine. As
Ukraine was seen to have better prospects for reform than Russia and the Southern
republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Kazhakstan, it represented a "gateway to the
East."
"Using the experience gained in the Ukraine market, B2 will then expand its
operations in Russia, a market three times the size with a population of three
million."
6.1.2 Government and aid agency funding
Two firms in the financial services sector (Al and A5) gained foreign aid contracts,
during the period of data collection. Another financial services firms (Al) was
strongly motivated to enter the market by its developing relationship with the EC.
The decision to enter Ukraine was influenced by the company's involvement with
the EC's Technical Assistance to Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS)
project. This connection is centred around a direct relationship between the
company's Brussels subsidiary and the EC. Moreover, it also has links with the
World Bank, via its Washington Office. These relationships with Western aid
agencies are the main criteria for its entry into, and establishment of subsidiaries in,
a number of Eastern European markets.
A complex round of bids to funding bodies, such as the EC, may result in contracts
being awarded for markets, in which the co-ordinating firm does not currently have
a representation. In one instance, a consortium of firms had their bid accepted by
the EC. However, this was matched with an institution in Ukraine, rather than in
Russia, which had been the original bid. In another case, the development of a
multinational consortium, which had worked together successfully on a contract in
Ukraine, resulted in applications for other grants. The choice of target market for
the bids was influenced by which markets were receiving funding at the time. This
transfer of bids across markets may not even be restricted to bids within East and
Central Europe, but also led, in the case of E5, to an application for contracts in
Vietnam and China.
External contracts may specif' minimum levels of investment, as they require the
provision of certain facilities by the co-ordinating firm.
Firm E2 were also attracted to Ukraine by government funding. However, in this
case, the contract was from the Ukrainian government for modernisation of the
existing infrastructure:
"We had an agreement with the government to modernise their [system] and
have supplied them with [products] worth $54 million."
6.1.3 Service to International Customers:
Another source of influence was the entry into the market of a major international
customer. This was the primary motivation for three Business-to-Business Services
firms (A2, A3 and A6). By Erramilli's definition (1989), the business-to-business
services firms, who deliver consultancy and financial services, are "hard service"
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providers. The service which they provide can increasingly be separated from its
provider, especially with improvements in technology. In that sense, it would be
possible to export the service, or supply it from a subsidiary in a geographically-
proximate market. However, the quality of service delivery is an issue, to all of the
firms in service industries. High levels of competition mean that provision of a
consistent level of service to international customers was a universal concern.
The initial interest in eastern Europe was variously attributed to the actions of
major customers:
"To serve major customers" (A2)
"because of a number of requests from clients" (A3)
"Business is centred mainly on international clients. A2 must offer world-wide
service in order to develop relationships with these clients across markets (...)
we followed major clients (...) into the market, with whom we have long-
standing relationships in many markets."
"In 1988, the Firm assisted one of its multinational clients in the establishment
of one of the first joint ventures in Ukraine, in the personal hygiene area. The
Firm opened its Kiev office in 1992, when Oleg Batyuk returned to Kiev after a
year of working with members of the Firm in London." (A6)
However, it is also related to the actions of other industrial firms. Alongside the
motive of market potential, one chemical firm stated that they would increase their
level of investment in Ukraine:
"if one of their major customers, currently operating in Czech Republic and
Hungary, were to enter Ukraine" (D 1)
6.1.4 Competitor Activity:
All of the firms spoke of their entry into the market in terms of the actions of their
competitors. They wished to gain first-mover advantage over their competitors, to
gain their share of available government funding, or to gain the best of the natural
resources. This was considered particularly important by consumer goods firms.
One early entrant into Ukraine described their aims as follows:
ion
"to be there before the others and develop an volume/cost competitive
advantage in order to build up strong barriers to late entrants (...) to invest in
the development of a strong presence now, in the hope that late entrants will
have to spend more to build a defensible position, when the market becomes
attractive." (Cl)
Another (Bi) suggested that the Ukraine was "one of the last virgin territories to
be contested."
This preoccupation with the actions of oligopolistic rivals was not restricted to the
Ukraine, but related to other investments within Eastern Europe. The rivalry has
been intensified, in some industries, by the system of bidding for firms in newly-
privatised industries. Thus, one firm suggested that they were keen to invest in the
Ukraine because they had "lost out" in bids for investment targets in the Czech
republic and Poland. This competition for investment opportunities has escalated
such that one firm had reported a rival for investigation by Monopolies and
Mergers Commission. Investment in Ukraine cannot be considered in isolation
from the portfolio of investments which the firm had made. Nor can the decisions
of each firm be seen in isolation for those of its competitors. The investments in
Ukraine were seen as the "next move in a global chess game" (Cl) or as "jockeying
for position" by global rivals (C2) (See Chapter 5).
6.1.5 Primary and Secondary Motivation
In many cases, there was more than one motivation for entry into Ukraine, which
can be divided into primary and secondary aim. One of the financial services firms,
for example, entered the market to provide a service to existing customers, but had
the secondary aim of growing in the market through external funding (A2). A
household products firm entered the market for its size and geographic location,
but also wished to take advantage of low labour costs (C 1). It manufactures
products in Ukraine at a price that allows it to penetrate the market. Importing
goods from plants in other countries would be impossible, in any case, as:
ion
"it would have been too expensive because of high import taxes."
Having more than one criteria may also relate to the activities of different divisions
of a business. Thus, for one of the chemical firms (D2), rich agricultural soils offer
a good market for agro-chemicals, whilst the large market size creates potential for
speciality chemicals and pharmaceuticals. Gas and oil in Ukraine are of interest to
another chemical firm (D3), whilst market size is of interest for its speciality
chemicals and lubricants division.
The criteria for the entry decision of the thirteen firms, which have invested in
Ukraine are summarised in Figure 6.4. There are two firms which have not invested
in Ukraine. These are A4 and D3. The reasons for this differ. A4 is in the same
industry as a number of firms, which have invested in Ukraine. It has investments in
other East and Central European countries. However, at the time of data
collection, it was not contemplating investment in Ukraine. Operations in other
markets in the region have:
"mainly opened up to service western Multinational Corporations. The size of
the office is determined locally, dependent upon the level of business." (A4)
Currently, there is not a sufficient level of business to justify a separate operation.
However, D3 is actively considering investment in Ukraine. In November 1993, it
was not present in the market, but it was in the process of assessing market
attractiveness. An investment was scheduled for January 1994.
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6.1.6 Focus of the Firm
A dichotomy can be seen between those firms, whose primary intention is to serve
the Ukrainian market, and those who are mainly concerned with developing of
relationships in their home, or a third party market. This division is shown in Figure
6.5.
Note that Chemicals and Computing have been placed between the home and host
market focus. Chemical firms (Dl, D2, D3) had different foci for oil exploration
and chemical production. Oil and gas exploration involve capitalising upon the
factor advantages of Ukraine outside the market. This is essentially a home market
focus. Speciality chemicals and pharmaceuticals are primarily concerned with
serving the Ukraine. Therefore they are host market focused. A middle location has
been used to express this combination.
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Similarly, in the short-term, the computing firm felt that they might have to realise
the market potential of Ukraine by gaining business with international customers or
through regulatory contracts. Both are home-market focused. Longer-term, the
aim was to develop business with Ukrainian customers. This would be a host
market focus, so it, too, has been plotted in a middle position. Telecommunications
has also been given a middle location. External funding was important in entry.
This came from the Ukrainian government, however contracts from western
sources were also sought.
Host	
*
Drinks
Household Consumables
Tobacco
Focus
	 Chemicals
Telecommunications
Computing	 *
Business-to-Business
Home
	 Services	
*
Consumer	 Industrial
Industry Sector
Figure 6.5
6.2 Risk and Opportunity
6.2.1 Definition of Risk
The levels of uncertainty in Ukraine pose significant risks for potential investors.
Knight (1921) draws a distinction between uncertainty and risk. Uncertainty is
immeasurable and may comprise hard and soft factors. Risk is the measurable
consequence of uncertainty. In this study, respondents variously described risk as
including:
"the investment in people and facilities" (A2)
"the risk to the good reputation of the company, if the firm withdraws from the
market" (B2)
"the costs of market development" (Cl)
"the investment in plant and infrastructure" (D3)
Thus, the broad definition of risk which has been used for this research is:
"all that the firm stands to lose through adverse changes in an uncertain
market environment"
6.2.2 Acceptance of Risk and Sector
It was firstly established that the level of risk involved in investment in Ukraine
differs significantly between sectors. One accountancy firm expressed this as
follows:
"There is very little risk involved in investment in Ukraine. Most of our assets
are portable - in people and technology. If we had to withdraw from the
market, we could withdraw our people and even our portable computers. The
most we stand to lose is a set of audit manuals." (A2)
Whilst the situation in the oil and petrochemical industry was seen very differently:
"You have to understand that the risk, for us, of investment in Ukraine would
be considerable. Oil refining plants are very expensive. If the climate were to
worsen to the extent that we had to leave, our investment in plant and pipelines
would be lost." (D3)
Moreover, in some sectors, risk is not only financial but may include detrimental
effects on brand or company image. One consumer goods firm (B2) chose to
overcome the problems of distribution in Ukraine by opening a high profile retail
store in their strategy to enter Eastern Europe:
"The first stage is to obtain a highly visible presence with a (...) store on what
will become the "Fifth Avenue of Kiev" The contract was signed this month
and our plan is for the store to act as a merchandising vehicle for B2 and its
international brands. We are spreading the word about B2, what the company
stands for, and the heritage of our brands. In this prestigious Kiev location, the
B2 store will be elegant, but, importantly, inviting to the consumer. It will be
our showpiece."(Press release by B2 December 1992).
Clearly, the risk of failure in this venture is greater than simply a financial loss.
Withdrawing from such a highly publicised investment would have a significant
reputational effect.
In some sectors, there are means, whereby the firm can minimise the risk of its
investment, whilst in others there are none. Business-to-business service firms are
often suppliers of the large western consumer and industrial goods firms who
operate in the market. Thus, they incur relatively low risk, as they have a
guaranteed level of business on entry. The availability of external funding, from
government or regulatory agencies, may provide another means of ensuring a
minimum level of business. Indeed, gaining a large contract may provide the
impetus for entry into the market. Moreover, additional contracts may cause step
changes in the numbers of stafl or level of investment, in the market.
However, in consumer goods or chemical industries, no such means of minimising
risk are available. Moreover, the level of risk, which an investment entails, is
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significantly higher. The differing foci identified in Section 6.1.6 can be seen as
representing different levels of risk to the firm (See Figure 6.6). The lowest level of
risk is accepted by the business-to-business service firms, because of their links
with industrial customers or the regulatory sector. Firms El and E2 have accepted
a moderate level of risk as they are dealing, at least in part, in the uncertain
Ukrainian market.
The high-technology firms and firms B 1, Dl and C2 all entered Ukraine with low
commitment modes of operation. However, these are still felt to represent a greater
risk, than those accepted by the business-to-business service firms. Therefore they
are placed in a middle location on acceptance of risk. The three firms which have
accepted the highest levels of risk are Cl, B2 and D2, which entered Ukraine with
high levels of investment.
1 OI
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Figure 6.6
6.2.3 The Effect of Size and Degree of Internationalisation on Acceptance of
Risk
Although all of the cases involve firms which could be classified as multinational
corporations, there is still a considerable variation in their size, as is shown below
in Figure 6.7 (See Appendix 2 for full details).
Size	 Degree of Internationalisation
Turnover	 Sales ex home Country (%)
Mean Value £21,193 m	 Mean Value 60%
Range £2,624 m - £102,690 m
	 Range 44% - 75%
Employees	 Coun fries with investments
Mean Number 57,,319	 Mean Value 53
Range 100 to 133,000	 Range7-121
Figure 6.7
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Size
The size of the firm was not often referred to. For most firms, data were taken
from secondary sources, such as company reports and handbooks. Some
respondents from subsidiaries could not give size or internationalisation data.
However, the size of the firm, relative to its competitors, was mentioned in
association with its acceptance of risk. Size was considered to be particularly
significant by finns, which were smaller than their competitors, as they saw this as
a reason why their firms were less able to accept the risk of large investments.
Firm B 1 stressed that it needs to be more "cautious" in the investment decisions
which it makes, because its three rivals are:
"four times as big on turnover, assets and profits. Therefore they can afford to
take the risk of a longer-term investment.
AS explained their choice of location in terms of size:
"we deliberately entered Donetsk, rather than Kiev, when we entered Ukraine,
because we knew that the Big Six would all go into Kiev"
Conversely, larger firms may feel themselves more able to gain first-mover
advantage:
"We took a risk here, and it's one Cl can afford. The question is: can we
survive until Ukraine goes back up, and are we building a competitive
advantage in the meantime?" Business Central Europe, February 1994
However, size, alone, does not appear to be the only influence upon perception of
risk. One of the high technology firms studied explained:
"E2 is a large company. It could have had business in Ukraine for $5 million
and made a return of $15 million within the year. But it would have needed to
make the investment up-front and the risks were considered to be too high. The
market is just too financially unstable."
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This concern with relative size supports Kutschke's view (1985) that firm-specific
variables, such as size and degree of internationalisation, should be used as relative
rather actual values.
Degree of Intern ationalisation
Definitions of the multinational corporations differ. Daniels and Radebaugh (1992)
give the following definition:
"The Multinational Enterprise, or MNE, has a world-wide approach to foreign
markets and production and an integrated global philosophy encompassing both
domestic and overseas operations. Because of the difficulty of ensuring
whether a firm has a 'world-wide approach', narrower operational definitions
emerge. For example, some might say that a firm must have production
facilities in some minimum number of countries, or be of a certain size in order
to qualify as an MINE." (pg. 13)
As some of the cases involve service rather than manufacturing firms, the relevant
parts of this definition would seem to be those of "world-wide" approach and
global philosophy.
The number of markets in which firms have investments ranges from 7 to 121. The
percentage of sales outside the home market ranges from 44% to 75%. Literature
suggests that highly internationalised firms will tend to make larger investments, or
to enter the market via direct investment (Forsgren 1989, Johanson and Mattsson
1988). All of the firms in the study are multinational, with a minimum of seven
international investments (A6). The high level of internationalisation was frequently
referred to in interviews:
"B 1 is a global player in a global industry. CIS, China, Vietnam and Korea are
the last "virgin" markets left for us to contest."
"In the early '80's' there were three main places in which Cl was not yet
present: India, Pakistan and the USSR."
199
Those firms which were present in almost all world markets tended to see this a
reason why they should enter Ukraine. However, geographic coverage seems
closely related to the type of industry, size of firm and to other strategic variables.
Sector	 Firm	 Number of East/Central European
Investments
Financial	 Al	 7
Services/Law	 A2	 8
	
A3	 10
	
A4	 6*
	
A5	 5
	
A6	 4
Consumer	 B 1	 3
	
(High-Margin) B2
	 5
Consumer	 Cl	 1
(Low-margin)	 C2	 7
Chemicals	 Dl	 4*
	
D2	 3
	
D3	 3
	
High-Technology El
	 8
	
E2	 4
Figure 6.8	 * excludes investment made after data collectIon
More significant, perhaps, is the level of East and Central European experience of
the firms. This may allow them to generalise between similar markets (Forsgren
1989, Johanson and Vahlne 1990). The number of investments in the region are
summarised in Figure 6.8 above. Note that the Czech and Slovak Republics are
counted separately.
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Again, there is a significant variation the number of countries, in which firms have
investments. Broadly speaking, firms in business-to-business and high technology
sectors where investment involves lower financial stakes and less risk tend to have
invested in more markets. However, there are differences within sectors, which
may relate to differences in size or strategic choices. Although A5 and A6 are
smaller players and less internationalised than the other firms in the study, they
have a comparable number of investments in the region.
6.2.4 Assessment of Risk
There may be some connection between the level of risk, accepted by the firm, and
their process of assessing market attractiveness. Firms who followed customers, or
where entry was triggered by gaining government contracts, tended to be relatively
little concerned with assessing market potential. In fact, the specifics of the market
were often viewed as almost incidental to the decision.
However, those firms, in the consumer goods and chemical industries, looking to
penetrate the Ukrainian market took a more rigorous approach. Often, the market
was "prospected" from a geographically proximate country. Firm E2 were already
working in Moscow and looked at Kiev, both from there and from the UK, for two
years, before making the decision to enter. The Ukrainian market was "prospected"
for A3 by three staff from the Moscow office. Similarly, A2 researched the
potential of opening another office in Kiev, from an existing office in Moscow.
•fl 1
There was general agreement that operation in Ukraine involved high risks. Dl
expressed the current situation in Ukraine as "shades of grey and black". The
General Manager of Cl concludes: "I have no idea what will happen in Ukraine
next year." The representative ofBl describes Ukraine as "the new Wild West".
A6 feel discomfort at advising new foreign arrivals on negotiating Ukraine's "legal
fog":
"[we] welcome their patronage, but privately [feel] 'caught between them and
a wall'. Business Central Europe, February 1994.
In the same article, Business Central Europe cite several verdicts that Ukraine is a
bad risk as an investment target. The Economic Intelligence Unit, it says, quotes:
"6,800% annual inflation, the return of central planning and possible political
violence to justify a risk rating of 100, the worst mark it gives.
Whilst, Morgan Stanley simply answers the question of whether to invest in
Ukraine with "Don't Dream of It"
Even between firms aiming to penetrate the Ukrainian market, attitudes to this high
level of risk vary. One of the firms (D3) uses a formal two-stage process to assess
attractiveness. If the basic scientific, resource-level case is proven, then the market
opportunity is assessed by balancing the level of risk against the likely returns.
Return on Investment (ROl) is a measure which was referred to by a number of the
firms as a means of assessing the attractiveness of an investment.
Bi stressed that they would calculate:
"the costs of financial set-up and establishing a sales force and measure this
against the potential profit on sales".
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A.2 said that they would use "some form of profit measurement". Whilst A3 and El
said that they use ROT to assess the attractiveness of an investment.
However, financial measures of the risk of an investment are not always used.
Cl decided to enter the Soviet Union, as early as 1988, because it was one of three
geographic areas in which the firm was not yet represented. Until then it had been
prevented from entering by its policy of majority control over investments, as only
a 50% equity stake was allowed in Soviet joint ventures. When this restriction was
relaxed, Cl entered the market in order to gain first-mover advantage over
competitors. In the early years of its operation, the levels of risk of operation in the
market shifted radically. At the end of 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved. Cl also
split with its first Joint Venture partner. However, the long-term goal of building
market share has sustained it through these difficulties.
Similarly, B2 decided to enter Ukraine, whose situation they liken to that of South
America 40 to 50 years ago, with a number of high profile investments. However
they see this as being part of a process of "developing, testing and refining
propositions for the whole region". The ultimate goal is Russia.
Interestingly, there was relatively little use of formal planning methods to assess the
level of risk. A number of firms said that they had "reviewed the usual market
research reports" in initial consideration of the market (A2, El, Bi). However, the
typical view is that risk is high. The critical question was seen to be that of whether
the opportunity is sufficient that the Ukraine is still interesting.
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6.2.5 Assessment of Opportunity
The focus upon opportunity was explained by the Market Research manager ofBl
as follows:
"we know there is high risk in operating in Ukraine. Beyond the basic
secondary research reports we have not explored the precise nature of this in
detail. We are more concerned with the size of the opportunity. We need to
know if this is large enough to justify the risk."
Similarly, El were attracted by the magnitude of the opportunities in East and
Central Europe:
"The rapidly changing situation in Central Europe provides new challenges -
and opportunities - for El. Gone are the restrictions on what can be exported,
who can buy goods, and who can sell. No longer is the western [technology]
restricted to a few, centrally controlled, organisations. The market is opening
up and quickly." El Company Newsletter (1991).
B 1 described the process of assessing market attractiveness as follows:
"On liberalisation, Eastern Europe was a 'blank sheet' We even had to get
maps to find out geographic location and population sizes (...) Basic desk
research from the DTI, EIU and other published sources showed that the
market size of Ukraine was attractive. Desk research from the FT and DTI
helped to establish the nature of the industry in the market. How many factories
and what the output figures were. Assessing the market potential was much
more important than the level of risk. We know that the risks are high, the
question is whether there is sufficient of an opportunity to justify the level of
risk?"
Secondary data was useful, but not produced specifically for the purpose in
question. Data such as the 1989 census of the Soviet Union was used to provide
demographic background. At the next stage, primary surveying was carried out by
the Marketing Information Centre in Moscow. Sampling was not proportionate,
but based on the main centres of population. The question related to the brands
used, preferences and loyalty. Group discussions were used. The key question
related to price of the Western brand vis a vis local alternatives and the percentage
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of the market which was likely to buy the brand. In fact, local brands were found to
be selling for less than B l's cost of production.
According to Cl, primary data collection was complicated by cultural factors. The
finn encountered two main problems during primary data collection:
"Firstly, Soviet people are not accustomed to such market research and
housewives were quite suspicious and reluctant to take place in such research.
A gentle approach, the appeal of a cup of tea and a few biscuits eventually
allowed researchers to convince enough housewives to carry out 8 group
discussions. A second problem was the availability of a good, Russian-speaking
discussion leader, because of the lack of specialists in marketing research.
Someone had to be trained, in the field, by Cl staff."
C2 used questionnaires and focus groups to gain an understanding of the
preferences of consumers in Ukraine. However, their manager believes that the
market cannot be studied "scientifically". There is such a state of "flux" that
regular statistics are unreliable. Understanding the psychology of human behaviour
is much more important than trying to "separate the factors" constituting risk or
opportunity. Indeed, she went on to conclude that this traditional form of assessing
market attractiveness is neither possible, nor relevant, in the Ukrainian situation.
6.3 Level of Commitment
6.3.1 Classification of Commitment
Differences in the criteria for entry into the market and the level of risk, which this
poses for the firm, were also seen to influence their level of commitment to the
market. This thesis distinguishes between investment, which it sees as the initial
financial investment required, and commitment, which is defined as "the total
investment which the firm has to make in facilities, training of staff and market
development". The focus, in this study, is upon commitment.
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By this definition a distributor is included as the lowest level of commitment to the
market, because of the training costs involved, although it does not require an
equity stake. Export operations have been excluded from this study, as they do not
involve commitment to the market. For practical purposes, wholly-owned
manufacturing subsidiaries are also excluded. Although these are legally
permissible, none of the firms in the sample had invested in this mode of operation.
The range of organisational modes available in the Ukraine and the level of
commitment which these involve is shown in Figure 6.9 below.
Distributor Representative. Whoiiy-owned Joint Venture
	 Wholly-owned
Office	 Services	 Manufacturing	 Manufacturing
Subsidiaiy	 Operation	 Operation
Low	 Commitment	 >	 High
Figure 6.9
A number of different frameworks are proposed for assessing commitment. These
differ in the order of the stages. Anderson and Gatignon (1986) classify firms as to
their level of control. By this framework, knowledge agreements and minority
investments as one of many partners require least control. A wholly-owned
subsidiary ranks highest. Johanson and Vahlne (1977) classify modes by
commitment, rather than control. Export ranks lowest, knowledge agreements
occupy a middle ranking and foreign direct investment requires highest
commitment. Erramilli and Rao (1990) offer the most comprehensive assessment of
the level of commitment involved in modes of international operation (See Figure
6.10). They place knowledge agreements below export and distributors. However,
this distinction matters little in this study, as no cases of knowledge agreement
were found. In this study, the Erramilli and Rao framework is preferred, as it
makes a distinction between manufacturing and service operations. Moreover, it
differentiates between acquisitions and greenfield developments.
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When the investment options in Ukraine are classified according to this model, the
rankings are as shown in Figure 6.11. However, anomalies become apparent.
Wholly-owned service subsidiaries, such as those of business-to-business service
firms, are ranked higher than manufacturing joint ventures. However, the latter
involve much higher commitment.
Foreign Market Resources Required Market Specificity Level of
Entry Mode
	
for Commitment	 of Investment	 Involvement
High
	
9 (highest)
High
	
8
J-figh	 7
High
	
6
High
	
5
Moderate	 4
Low	 3
Low	 2
1. Wholly-owned subsidiaiy Very High
(Greenfield)
2. Wholly-owned subsidiary High
(Acquired)
3. Majority Joint Venture	 Moderate to High
4. 50-50 Joint Venture	 Moderate
5. Minority Joint Venture	 Moderate
6. Export Subsidiary	 Moderate
7. Direct to Customer	 Low to Moderate
Exports
8. AgentlDistributor	 Low
Exports
9. Licensing/Franchising	 Very Low	 Very Low	 1 (Lowest)
Figure 6.10
Distrib.	 Rep. Wholly-owned	 Joint Venture	 Wholly-owned
Agent	 Office Sales/Marketing	 Manufacturing	 Manufacturing
Subsidiary	 Operation	 Operation
(Greenfleld)	 (Acquisition)	 (Acquisition)
2	 4	 9	 7	 8*
Low	 Level of Involvement	 >	 High
Figure 6.11	 * Erramilli and Rao scale
Therefore, a revised scale of commitment in Ukraine is developed, based upon the
Erramilli and Rao model. A distinction is drawn between service and
manufacturing subsidiaries. The law and financial service firms in this study require
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High to Very High
Moderate
far smaller financial investments and, consequently, less commitment (See Figure
6.16). One exception is the retail facility of B2. This involves premises and high
"reputational commitment." Therefore this, too, is designated a different category,
high on the scale of commitment (See Figure 6.12).
This revised categorisation is used to map and analyse the entry decisions in this
study (See Figure 6.13). It is noticeable that in some sectors, firms have opted for
broadly comparable levels of commitment. Business-to-Business Service firms felt
a need to be present in the market to ensure service quality, although some chose a
local partner, whilst others have wholly-owned subsidiaries. However, in other
sectors, firms have made very different choices.
Foreign Market Resources Required Market Specificity Level of
Entry Mode	 for Commitment	 of Investment	 Involvement•
1. Majority Joint Venture	 Very High	 High	 9 (highest)
Manufacturing
High
	
8
Moderate	 6
Moderate	 6
Moderate	 5
Moderate	 5
Low	 3
Low	 2
2. Wholly-owned Retail
Subsidiaiy
3. Wholly-owned services
subsidiaiy
4. Wholly-owned subsidiaiy Moderate
(Sales/Marketing)
6. Joint Venture	 Moderate
(Services)
7. Joint Venture	 Moderate
Sales/Marketing)
7. Representative Office	 Low to Moderate
8. Direct to Customer	 Low
Exports
9. AgentfDistnbutor	 Low	 Low	 1 (lowest)
Exports
Figure 6.12
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The level of commitment chosen by consumer goods firms varies, depending on
whether they are still assessing the potential of the market, or have committed to it.
It seems that firms in the mass market consumer goods are forced into high levels
of commitment, if they wish to penetrate the market. If firms do not manufacture in
the Ukraine, the cost of their production is higher than the sales price of local
alternative products (B 1).
Industry Sector Firm	 Type of Operation	 Level of
Commitment
Sector A	 Al	 Services	 5
Business-to	 (Joint Venture)
Business Services A2	 5
A3	 Services	 6
(Wholly-owned Subsidiaxy)
A4	 No investment	 0
A5	 Services	 6
A6	 (Wholly-owned Subsidiary) 6
Sector B	 B 1	 Representative Office
	 3
High Margin	 B2	 Retail	 8
Consumer Goods
	 (Wholly-owned Subsidiary)
and Majority Stake in
Manufacturing JV
	 9
Sector C
	
Cl	 Majority Stake in	 9
Mass Market	 Manufacturing JV
Consumer Goods C2	 Sales/Marketing	 6
(Wholly-owned Subsidiary)
Sector D
	
Dl	 Representative Office
	
3
Industrial	 D2	 Representative Office	 3
Sales/Marketing	 5
(Majority Joint Venture)
D3	 No investment	 0
Sector E
	
El	 Distributor
High technology E2	 Export Representative	 2
Industrial
Figure 6.13
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Figure 6.14 shows the mean investment size required in each of the sectors.
Sector	 Financial Investment required for "High Commitment"
Range	 Mean
Business-to-Business Services
(assumption as per
computing)
High-margin	 $5 million -
Consumer Goods	 $104 million
Tobacco/Drinks
$937,600
$46.5 million initial
plus $74.2 million
modernisation.
Total $120.7 million
Low-margin	 £35 million initial
Consumer Goods	 plus $15.7 million
Household Products	 modernisation.
Total $50.7 million
Possible multiple
investments
Industrial Exploration $40 - $50 million
	 $45 million
Chemicals Pipelines	 $400 - $500 million	 $450 million
High-technology	 $113,000 - $2 million	 $937,600
Industrial
Computing/Telecommunications
Figure 6.14
6.3.2 Size of Ukrainian Subsidiaries
Details of the size of financial investment in Ukraine could not be gained from all
firms, therefore this is not a valid basis for comparison. However, data were
available as to the number of employees in each firm's Ukrainian subsidiary. This
gives a further insight into the level of commitment of each of these types of
subsidiary. (See Figure 6.15).
This provides only a rough approximation. However, it can clearly be seen that
there is an order of magnitude of difference between the commitment of firms with
manufacturing operations and those with service subsidiaries or representative
offices. Cl has 330 staff, 220 of whom are in production and only 3, the General
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Manager, Finance Director and Marketing Director are expatriate. However, seven
of the firms have four or less employees in the market (A6, AS, Bi, Dl, E2 and
C2). This clearly constitutes a far lesser level of commitment.
Industry Sector Firm Type of Operation
	 Number of Number of
Employees	 Expatriates
Sector A	 Al	 Services	 9	 1
Business-to	 (Joint Venture)
Business Services A2	 "	 15	 3
A3	 Services	 16	 5
(Wholly-owned Subsidiary)
A4 No investment	 0
A5	 Services	 2	 1
A6	 (Wholly-owned Subsidiary) 3 	 1
Sector B	 B 1	 Representative Office
	 1	 1
High Margin	 B2 Retail	 5	 1
Consumer Goods
	 (Wholly-owned Subsidiary)
•	 and Majority Stake in
Manufacturing JV	 10
Sector C
	
Cl	 Majority Stake in	 330	 3
Mass Market	 Manufacturing JV
Consumer Goods C2	 Sales/Marketing	 3	 0
(Wholly-owned Subsidiary)
Sector D	 Dl	 Representative Office
	
4	 2
Industrial	 D2	 Sales and Marketing	 3
(Wholly-owned subsidiary)
and
(Majority Joint Venture) 	 4
D3	 No investment	 0
Sector E	 El	 Distributor	 4
High technology E2 Representative Office
Industrial
Figure 6.15
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6.3.3 Portfolios of Investment
As shown in chapter five, the entry decisions of the multinational firms studied can
best be understood as part of a broader pattern of investment by the firm (Aharoni
1966). In explaining their investment actions in Ukraine, a number of firms referred
to their firm's overall portfolio of investments in the region. Firm Bi missed out on
opportunities in Czech Republic and Hungary to rivals. Therefore it was keen to
assess the potential of Ukraine before competitors. This would appear to fit with
oligopolistic reaction theory.
Moreover, a key criteria for investment in Ukraine was its geographic location (See
Section 6.1.3) as it is considered to be geographically well-placed for access to
Russia and the Southern Republics. Firm Cl manufactures in Ukraine with a view
to serving the whole of the former Soviet Union. Firms were making decisions on
relative attractiveness of Eastern European countries, in terms of size and stability.
Often, Ukraine and the former Soviet Republics were initially served from
operations in Poland, Hungary or Czech Republic. However, as the process of
transition has continued, and with the break-up of the former Soviet Union, the
locus of operation in East and Central Europe has moved progressively further
east.
"Using the experience gained in the Ukraine market, B2 will then expand its
operations in Russia, a market three times the size with a population of three
million."
Hence it appears that additional insights can be gained into investment decision-
making in Ukraine by analysing the pattern of investment which the firm has in the
region as a whole. The commitment of the firms, by country and in total, are show
in Figure 6.16.
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Case Czech	 Slovak Hungaiy Poland	 Russia	 Ukraine Kazh.
	 Bahics Bulgaria Romania Toai
Republic Republic
A16	 6	 6	 6	 6	 6	 6	 42
A25	 5	 5	 5	 5	 5	 5	 35
A36	 6	 6	 6	 6	 6	 6	 6	 6	 54
A46	 6	 6	 6	 6	 6	 6	 42
A56	 6	 6	 6	 24
A6	 6	 6	 6	 18
Bi	 9	 9	 3	 21
B26	 6	 6	 6	 9	 33
Cl	 9	 9
C29	 9	 10*	 15* 6	 49
Dl	 15*	 6	 9	 30
D2	 8	 8
D3	 0
E16	 6	 6	 6	 6	 1
E2	 5	 6	 6
Figure 6.16	 * More than one investment
From this, it can be seen that finns, which do not have high commitment to
Ukraine may have high commitment to other markets in the region. Especially in
sectors, where there is resource dependency, such as oil exploration, or where
significant financial outlay is required, firms may invest in a hub and spoke pattern,
rather than in each market (See chapter five). The system of bidding for investment
targets may influence the choice of regional hub.
In business-to-business services and high-technology industrial product sectors the
investment choices are fundamentally different. The lower cost of investment and
shorter-term returns may make it possible to establish subsidiaries in more Eastern
and Central European countries. The investments are less critical to the
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organisation, and have tended to be made sooner after liberalisation. Early
successes may have heightened the impetus for investment in the former-Soviet
states.
A worrying trend for Ukraine is that, whilst it was originally viewed as the former-
Soviet state with the greatest potential for successftil reform, its growing economic
and political crisis may threaten its attractiveness to investors. In several cases, an
investment in Russia or Republics such as Kazhakstan or Azerbaijan is now seen to
be preferable (See Chapter 7)
6.4 Typologies of Investment Behaviour
6.4.1 Summary of Explanatory Variables for Entry Decisions
From the preceding analysis, the following variables can be determined as playing a
role in the decision to enter Ukraine. The variables can be split into those, which
have a positive influence, in that they may prompt a firm to enter, and those which
have a negative effect, in that they may cause the firm to have reservations about
entering.
Independent Variables
	
PositivefNegative Impact Dependent Variable
DECISION TO ENTER
UKRAIIE
Location-specific Advantages	 Positive
Environmental Stability	 Negative
Influence of Competitors 	 Positive
Influence of Customers/suppliers	 Positive
Influence of other Stakeholders	 Positive
Figure 6.17
Only the influence of competitors played a role for all of the firms. Location-
specific and environmental concerns were opposite sides of the coin for all of the
consumer and industrial product firms. It was important to decide whether the
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location-specific advantages outweighed concern over the high levels of
environmental uncertainty. These variables were more important for firms focusing
on the Ukraine, than those building on home market relationships. However, they
were less significant to business-to-business services firms.
The sector, in which the firm operates may pose a set of challenges, which
influence the level of commitment which firms choose. The nature of these may
mean either a positive or negative influence. Thus, firm Cl requires a minimum
level of control over any operation. Business-to-business service firms were
concerned to have sufficient control to ensure quality standards. However, a
number of additional variables may influence level of commitment. These are:
Independent Variable	 Positive/Negative Impact Dependent Variable
Degree of Internationalisation	 Positive	 LEVEL OF COMMITMENT
Sector	 Positive/Negative
Size of Firm	 Positive
Environmental Conditions 	 Negative
Cost and Availability of Information Positive/Negative
Figure 6.18
It is clear that the level of commitment, which firms choose on entry, cannot be
fully explained by demographic variables, such as length of international experience
or the size of firm. The degree of internationalisation may increase the likelihood
that they firm will be an early entrant into an uncertain market. In some cases (Cl,
B2) explicit reference was made to the limited number of markets remaining, in
which the firm did not have a presence. Earlier experiences in other East and
Central European markets also have a direct impact on the decisions which are
made. It may even be argued that the investment decisions of a multinational
corporation should not be studied in isolation, but as episodes in an ongoing
investment process.
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The size of the firm also has partial explanatory power for its level of commitment.
Being smaller than competitors may lead to lower levels of commitment. Larger
firms may be more inclined to make long-term commitment. High levels of
uncertainty increase risk and will tend to reduce the level of commitment.
Of those firms wishing to serve the Ukrainian market, a rough division can be made
by their level of commitment. Firms who have adopted "low commitment" modes
of operation have often done so to gain fuller information as to the potential of a
further investment. Reliable market information is difficult to gain from outside the
market. Those who have decided for "high commitment" modes of operation do
so, because they see first-mover advantage as outweighing the risks. As different
commitment choices can be seen within sectors, the choice appears to arise from
differences in competitive strategy, rather than from differences between sectors.
Cost and availability of information may be either positive or negative. Firms,
which would need high levels of investment in entering Ukraine, such as those in
consumer goods or chemical industries might be deterred by the lack of reliable
market information. One means of gathering this is to enter the market, via a low
commitment mode of operation. However, other firms see the lack of information
as an incentive to enter a joint venture agreement with a local partner, who may
have better access to information.
Porter (1985) recognises that firms may adopt different competitive strategies
within an industry. He identifies differentiation, cost leadership and focus as
"generic strategies" . Miles and Snow (1986) distinguish between "Prospectors",
who are innovators, "Analysers", who refine upon the ideas of others, and
"Defenders", who are essentially followers. These different strategies are held by
Miles and Snow to be associated with different environments and to be associated
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with different organisational forms. Thus, it is contended that "dynamic networks"
are more likely to be used by firms operating in turbulent conditions, as:
"new organisational forms arise to cope with new environmental conditions".
Building upon the Miles and Snow typologies, all of the firms which are currently
operating in Ukraine are "Prospectors". They are early entrants into a high-risk
market. This may be because the study involves highly internationalised firms in
highly internationalised industries (Johanson and Mattsson 1988). However, in this
study, the explanatory variables for entry choices appear to be those of sector,
criteria for entry, acceptance of risk and level of commitment. These are seen to be
key variables as they seem to reveal the clearest patterns of similarity and
difference. Based upon these variables, the cases can be divided into four distinct
groups.
Criteria for	 Industry	 Case Level of
Entry	 Sector	 Commitment
Client-serving	 Financial	 A2	 5
Services/Law A3	 6
A6 6
Available Market
Skimming	 High-margin B 1	 3
B2 6
Penetration	 Low-margin Cl	 9
C2 6
Market Potential Chemicals Dl 3
(Industrial)	 D2	 3
D3 0
Regulatory	 Financial	 Al 5
Contracts	 Services	 A5	 6
High-Tech. E2	 1
Figure 6.19
6.4.2 Typologies of Decision-making Behaviour
A fairly consistent type of investment behaviour can be seen by those firms who
enter the market to serve international customers. The difference is only in the
degree of control, which firms exercise over their operation. A2 has entered a Joint
Venture with two Ukrainian "sleeping partners." Whilst A3 and A6 have opted for
full control over their operation, as they believe this ensured service quality.
These finns are classified as "Client-followers."
Similarly, the group which focuses upon external contracts differ from those
following customers, only, in that there is a different trigger for entry. This is not
service quality, but winning a contract of sufficiently large size. E2, which has one
export representative in the market, originally entered because of a large
government contract. At the time of data collection, their representative was
assessing the market potential and seeking other such contracts. Al and A5 have
invested in the market to provide support facilities for aid agency contracts.
However, they have the minimum size of representation. This group are referred to
as "Externally-funded."
The remaining firms were all predominantly motivated by the market potential of
Ukraine. These firms come from high and low margin consumer goods and, also,
from high and low technology industrial product sectors. The division between
those which chose high and low levels of commitment runs across industry sectors,
as they have a choice between high and low risk entry modes.
However, some sectors have a fuller range of investment options for capitalising
upon market potential than others. Hence, a chemical firm wishing to penetrate the
Ukrainian market may develop business in the Ukrainian market, or else gain
business from the entry of a major western customer. Whilst, a consumer goods
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firm may need to manufacture in the market and to find ways of understanding the
way in which the Ukrainian market works, in order to be successful.
Firms can be plotted by their level of"cornrnitrnent" or total investment in the
market, and by their primary focus (See Figure 6.20).
A4	 D3
-
Host	 HomeFocus
Figure 6.20
All of the firms, whose primary focus is upon building home market relationships
cluster at low to moderate levels of commitment. However, firms with a host
market focus can be divided into those who have chosen a low to moderate level of
commitment and those who have a high level of commitment. Those, which have
opted for high commitment have been designated "pioneers." Those hovering on
the periphery of the market whilst further assessing market potential, are referred
to as "option-takers." The latter group are nearest to the incremental process of
internationalisation, suggested by Johanson and Vahlne (1977).
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Thus four different groups of international investment decision-making behaviour
have been identified from this case analysis:
Client-followers
Externally-funded
Option-Takers
Pioneers
These are defined below.
Client-followers
These firms (A2, A3 and A5) seem to be most influenced by their industrial
customers. They are highly internationalised firms, who aim to provide a global
service to these customers, who would expect comparable service quality in
Ukraine to any other market. The Client-Follower enters Ukraine using the level of
investment, which they consider necessary to provide this service quality. Whilst
the initial impetus to enter may come from the actions of international customers,
the Client-Follower may also aim to build their business in Ukraine. This may
involve externally-funded contracts, additional international business, or business
with local firms.
Evternally-funded
The terms and conditions of aid contracts from bodies such as the EC, US AID,
World Bank often specify a certain number of capabilities, which co-ordinating
firms must have. Certain of these, such as provision of support services for visiting
academics, may require a permanent representation in the country. The number of
employees would, in the first instance, be governed by the size of the contract.
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Once a representation is established, additional business may be sought either from
additional contracts, or from developing business within the Ukraine.
Option-takers
These firms are influenced by the market potential of the Ukraine. This may be
based on the size of the available market, its geographic location or upon factor
advantages. However, either because of they are smaller than oligopolistic rivals,
or more cautious in the face of uncertain conditions, these firms wish to learn more
about the market. They are designated "option-takers" because they have chosen a
low commitment mode of operation to establish a presence as an option on a
favourable outcome of transition.
Pioneers
These firms are also influenced by the potential of Ukraine. They are highly
influenced by the actions or possible actions of their competitors. The primary aim
is to establish defensible market share, before competitors enter the market. This
may involve buying the best investment targets, gaining exposure for brand and
company names, or building the most effective distribution network. It may require
buying or building a manufacturing operation in Ukraine (Cl, B2) or else other
forms of high commitment speculation. B2 have a high profile retail store, as well
as a manufacturing Joint Venture. Indeed, two of the three pioneers studied had
made multiple investments in the market. This multiple approach to investment had
been adopted by cases D2 and B2.
These typologies are summarised in Figure 6.21:
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Group	 Primary	 Reactive!	 Level of	 Attitude to
Motivation Proactive	 Commitment Risk
Pioneer	 First-mover Proactive 	 High	 Acceptable in
Advantage	 longer-term
Client-	 Customer	 Reactive	 Medium	 Offset by
Follower	 Service	 guaranteed
business
Externally-	 Gaining	 Reactive	 Low	 Offset by
funded
	
Regulatory	 regulatory
Sector	 funding
Contract
Option-taker	 Market	 Proactive	 Low	 Minimise
Potential	 by incremental
investment
process
Figure 6.21
6.4.3 Analysis of the Investment Decision-making Behaviour of the Groups
The micro-environment, in which the firm operates, is split into vertical
environment (inputs and outputs) and lateral environment (influence groups and
competitors). The primary motivation to operate in Ukraine comes from different
parts of the task environment surrounding the firm for each group. This can be
mapped on Achrol, Reve and Stern's diagram of the task environment surrounding
the firm (1983) (See Figure 6.22).
Client-Followers are influenced by their industrial customers (output environment).
These industrial customers may be the Pioneers. The Externally-funded firms are
influenced by links with funding bodies in the lateral, regulatory environment.
Subsequent business is sought after the initial investment in the market. This may
be via links in the regulatory environment or else with pioneers in the market.
Pioneers are influenced by market potential (output environment). They are also
222
INPUT /
ENVIRON1ENT
INPUT	 /
ENVIRONIENT
-7
MACRO ENVIRONMENT
SCONDARY TAS
EIWIRONMENT
REG	 ORY\1-
MACRO ENVIRONMENT
SCONDARY TAS
E!VIRONMENT
MAJOR INFLUENCES ON STRATEGIC INVESTMENTS
ll UKRAINE
CLIENT FOLLOWERS	 OPTION-TAXER
MACRO ENVIRONMENT
	
MACRO ENVIRONMENT
SCONDARY TAS
	
INPUT	 /
	
SCONDARY TAS
	
INPUT	 /
E1VIRONMENT
	
ENVIRONENT
	
EVIRONMENT
	
ENVIRON1ENT
-7
	
-;1/
I
1/
/
NJ
OUTPUT
ENVIRONME
1/
/1
/ OUTPUT
ENVIRONMENI'
EER
	
XTERNALLY-FUNDED
• U I ___________
1/	
NJ
	
NJ
/	 OUTPUT	 /	 OUTPUT
ENVIRONME
	
ENVIRONME
BASED ON FIG. 1 "ENVIRONMENT OF MARKETING CHANNEL DYADS"
ACHROL, REVE AND STERN JOURNAL OF MARKETING 1983
	 Figure 6.22
223
S.
S.
Al A2
motivated by the actions of their rivals (competitive environment). Option-takers
are similarly concerned about the actions of their oligopolistic rivals. However,
they adopt a more cautious approach to investment.
For two of these groups, Client-Followers and Externally-funded firms, there are
clear options for rninirnising the risk of operation in the market. This forms a
platform of guaranteed return on the investment which is made. Additional
business above this level is a bonus. Option-takers and Pioneers are distinguishable
primarily by the differing attitudes which they have taken to the risks of operation
in Ukraine. The groups can be plotted as to their level of commitment and the risk
which they perceive in Ukraine as in Figure 6.23.
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A4	 D3
Low	 Risk	 High
Figure 6.23
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6.5 Chapter Summary
From cross-industry analysis of entry decisions, the following variables are seen to
play a role in the decision by multinational firms to enter Ukraine.
Independent Variables	 PositivefNegative Impact Dependent Variable
DECISION TO ENTER
UKRAINE
Location-specific Advantages
	 Positive
Environmental Stability	 Negative
Influence of Competitors
	 Positive
Influence of Customers/suppliers	 Positive
Influence of other Stakeholders	 Positive
Analysis shows that firms make different choices as to the level of risk, which they
are prepared to accept and as to the level of commitment, which is required for
entry. This may be related to the industry sector of the firm. In business-to-business
services and high-technology products firms might minimise the risks of market
entry by gaining external funding or through relationships with existing customers.
However, these options are not open to consumer goods firms. In industrial
products, relationships with existing customers might be expected to offer an
option. However, these are not available to the chemicals firms studied, because
they are the earliest entrants into Ukraine.
Even within industry sectors, firms make different risk and commitment choices.
Within the consumer goods and chemicals sectors, firms are divided between those
which opt for high and low commitment modes of operation. Three firms (D2, B2
and Cl) have made high commitment decisions, whilst four others have opted for
low commitment (Dl, D3, Bi and C2).
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The influences upon the level of commitment which is chosen. These can be
summarised as:
Independent Variable	 Positive/Negative 	 Dependent Variable
Length of International Experience 	 Positive	 LEVEL OF COMMITMENT
Sector	 Positive/Negative
Size of Firm
	 Positive
Environmental Conditions
	 Negative
Cost and Availability of Information Positive/Negative
Cost and availability of information may be either positive or negative. Firms,
which would need high levels of investment in entering Ukraine, such as those in
consumer goods or chemical industries might be deterred by the Jack of reliable
market information. One means of gathering this is to enter the market, via a low
commitment mode of operation. However, other firms see the lack of information
as an incentive to enter a joint venture agreement with a local partner, who may
have better access to information.
Pattern-matching identifies criteria for entry, level of commitment and acceptance
of risk as key explanatory variables. Difference and similarities on these
dimensions, allow firms to be divided into four groups: Pioneers, Option-takers,
Externally-funded and Client-followers. The key features of the entry choices of
each of these groups are explored.
Chapter 7 - Expansion or Exit?
7.1 Introduction
As highlighted in the methodology section of this research, the rapidly changing market
environment in Ukraine has implications for data analysis. The date on which data were
collected influences its content. In July 1993, when data collection began, firms were
more positive about entry and expansion in Ukraine, than later in the year, as
conditions worsened. Indeed, six of the firms made an additional investment decision
during the period of data collection.
Subsequent Decision
No	 Further	 No further Reduction in Withdrawal
Investment	 Investment	 Investment	 Investment
1	 2	 1	 1
Figure 7.1
During the first two phases of interviews, discussion centred on the decision to enter
Ukraine and the criteria on which a further investment would be made. Despite the
worsening environmental conditions, assessment of market potential still tended to be
positive:
"The market potential in the chemical industry looks good" (Dl- July 1993)
"It is likely that a Joint Venture agreement would be reached within 2 to 3
years" (El- May 1993)
"We will be in the lubricants market in Ukraine by January 1994." (D3 -
November 1993)
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However, by December 1993, a growing number of firms mentioned concern at the
worsening climate. They spoke increasingly of the basis on which they would defer the
decision to invest, or would even reduce their involvement in Ukraine.
"We have had a tough time with the changes in legislation. Some of these hit
us badly. Particularly the law which prohibited export of agricultural produce.
There is also a problem with payments for different categories of products, and
with cash flow." (D2)
"There is so much political instability that you can sign an agreement with
someone one week, who will not be there next week. Then they say that the
previous agreement was invalid and ask for a bribe. Success is possible if you
are prepared to pay the right people." (E2 - March 1994)
"It is shades of grey and black at present" (Dl - March 1994)
Two other firms contemplating retraction were Pioneers, B2 and Cl. The latter
explained their uncertainty as follows:
"[The General Manager of Cl is] in 'continuous discussion' with his American
board over how - and whether - to soldier on with its plant in Kiev, now
working at half capacity (...) The question is: can we survive until Ukraine goes
back up, and are we building a competitive advantage in the meantime?"
The firms which made additional decisions came from all of the sectors studied. In two
cases, they involved the decision to invest further in Ukraine. However, in four cases
they involved a negative decision. The extreme differences, between the experiences of
the firms in this turbulent market, raises the question of what underpins these
subsequent decisions. This chapter analyses the data relating to the six additional
decisions which were made. It looks for factors, which explain such differing fortunes.
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7.2 Data on Expansion and Exit Decisions
The six additional decisions are summarised in Figure 7.2. These decisions often
represented a rapid reversal of previous opinions. The most extreme case was that of
D3, who, in November 1993, were speaking of a definite entry into Ukraine, but, two
months later, reported no imminent intention to enter. B 1 also reached a negative
conclusion within six months of entry.
Firm Sector	 Entxy	 Date of Subsequent	 Date of	 Criteria
Mode	 Entry Decision	 Decision
Al	 Business-to	 Joint Venture	 1992 Expansion	 January	 External
Business	 1994	 Contract
A2	 Business-to	 Joint Venture	 1992 Expansion	 March	 External
Business	 1994	 Contract
Bi	 High-margin	 Representative April No further	 November	 Russia
Consumer	 Office	 1993 Investment	 1993	 more
attractive
D3	 Industrial	 Possible	 Nov. No	 January	 Market
Products	 Entry	 1993 Entry	 1994	 too unstable
B2	 High-margin	 Joint Venture Dec. Retract to
	
March	 Failure of
Consumer	 and retail	 1992 Representative 1994
	 ventures
Office
E2	 High-Tech.	 Export	 1993 Withdraw	 March	 Failure of
products	 Representative	 from Ukraine 1994	 ventures
Figure 7.2
The timing of these subsequent decisions and the prevailing market conditions are
shown in Figure 7.3. It is clear that the conditions had become increasingly negative
towards the end of 1993. Pessimism over the prospects of successful transition to free
market economy in Ukraine gained ground in the run up to the Presidential elections in
March 1994. However, some firms expanded during the same time period as others
decided to retract or exit. The following cross-case analysis highlights some of the
variables, which may play a role in these divergent experiences.
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7.2 Date of Entry into Ukraine
The date, on which the firm decided to enter the market, may be significant in
understanding the entry decision it made. Figure 7.4 shows the date of entry for the
thirteen firms, which invested in Ukraine.
Only Cl was present in the market prior to libera.lisation. However, four others entered
during the process of liberalisation. On the independence of Ukraine, five of the firms
were already present in Ukraine. The early entry of these firms may relate to their
criteria for entry and level of commitment. Three of the entrants were either externally-
funded or client-following business-to-business service firms. They were all
confronting relatively low levels of risk in entering the market. Entry was prompted
either by gaining a contract (Al), or else by the entry of customer, who was one of the
pioneer firms (A2, A3). Entry often coincided with the high levels of publicity and
optimism surrounding the market, in the period after liberalisation. Firm A2 stated:
"The real incentive was the entry into Ukraine of a major client, with whom we
have a long- standing international relationship. We actually entered the market
at the end of 1991, during a PR event called the "British Days of Kiev". Our
office was opened by Margaret Thatcher - we have the photos to prove it!"
The next set of firms entered Ukraine during 1992. In some instances this was the
culmination of an investment process, which had been ongoing since liberalisation.
Firm A6 stated:
"The firm opened its Kiev office in 1992, when Oleg Batyuk returned to Kiev
after a year of working with members of the Firm in London."
A5 had been watching its larger competitors enter the market over a period of a year,
before opening its office. Whilst E2 has been present in Kiev since mid 1993.
However, it had spent two years studying the market from the UK, prior to entry. B 1
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says its decision to enter the market was made in late 1992. The last entry decision
studied, was that of B2 in December 1993. However this decision had been discussed
since early 1992. B2 quote:
"18 months of detailed analysis of the enormous potential and the tremendous
problems which have to be overcome [in East and Central Europe]"
before it rolled out its investments, in September 1993 in Hungary and Czech
Republic, and December 1993 in Ukraine. Thus, all of these entry decisions were
made, or initiated, at a time when the prospects for the development of Ukraine looked
favourable.
7.3 Criteria for Expansion
When data collection in Ukraine began, in July 1993, thirteen firms had already
invested. One (D3) was about to enter. One other, A4 had no plans to enter the
market. Of the thirteen firms who were in the market, three (B2, Cl and D2) already
had high levels of commitment to the market. Ten others were present either in wholly-
owned subsidiaries involving small number of stafl representative offices or via
distributors. The latter firms were either consciously contemplating a higher level of
investment in Ukraine (B 1, C2, Dl, D3 and El) or else were receptive to the
possibility. Accordingly, all could give the criteria, upon which they would invest
further. These included:
"Within a 2 to 3 year timescale, if a sufficient level of international business
were available in the market, then A3 might decide to invest further. This
would be decided by the partners, globally, and would involve calculation of
the ROT of any such investment."
"Dl is answerable to its shareholders. Whilst it is often approached by
Ukrainian firms keen to set up a Joint Venture, any investment can only be
made after a full assessment of market potential. Whilst the costs of investment
will undoubtedly rise, Dl has a risk averse culture, and so would need both a
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calculation of the size of investment necessary and the number and nature of
potential customers before making this decision."
"Progress will be assessed on a year to year basis. Currently, the objective is
largely to provide the necessary cover for the client base. This would be
reassessed in the medium-term (3 - 5 years) on a profit basis." (A2)
Another respondent from the 13K side of A2's operation saw this more pragmatically:
"A2 are looking for funding opportunities in the area. If a large enough
contract were available, then an investment or further investment would be
made in the target country."
Al saw it as a multi-pronged question. There are different parts of the business, any of
which may develop and cause a further investment to be made:
"The firm already has a Joint Venture in the externally-funded part of its
operation. It also has a representative office, which aims to explore the business
potential, both Western and Ukrainian for the business as a whole. Either one
of these areas may develop. A further investment is most likely through the
strong links with the EC and World Bank. Al is closely involved as an advisor
of these."
Whilst El concludes:
"Currently, we have not got enough knowledge of the market to make the
decision on further investment. Clearly business opportunities exist. However
there are also high levels of risk. The decision whether to expand will be made
in 1994. This will require further assessment of the market opportunity. This
would be in terms of size and how much investment. It is tempting to rush in.
However, the investment would be assessed on its ROl. It would be expected
to pay back within 2 to 3 years. The balance would be tipped either by an
attractive partner, or by a government contract." (El)
B 1 said that a joint venture in manufacturing looked likely. There was a recognition
that early entry would be cheaper. However the firm is a cautious 'follower'. It would
need to see 'green shoots of recovery' before it made the decision to enter the market.
The criteria for further investment can be summarised as follows:
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Typology	 Criteria for Expansion	 Timescale
Client Followers	 Service Provision	 Medium-term
External Funding
Externally-funded	 Additional Contract	 Short-term
Market Potential
	
Medium-term
Option-taker	 Positive Assessment of
	 Short-term
Market Potential
Pioneer	 Next target expansion into
	 Short- to
Russia	 Medium-term
7.4 Centre versus Periphery Influences
Eight of the cases in this study were researched both from the Ukrainian and Western
side of the decision (A2, A4, A5, A6, Bi, D3, El, E2). In these cases, the decision to
enter Ukraine was originally reached by Head Office in the United Kingdom or in
France. Thus, it was possible to interview at least one person in Head Office, who had
been involved in the investment decision, as well as a respondent in Ukraine. In two
cases (A4 and D3), there was no representation in Ukraine.
The remainder of the investment decisions involve a more complex decision-making
unit. In the case of C2, the decision to enter Ukraine had been initiated by the
European operation, based in Frankfurt. However, the decision had to be ratified by
Head Office in the United States. Again, in the case of Cl, the Ukrainian subsidiary is
in accountable to the European Head Office in London, although the Corporate Head
Office is in the USA. However, it is of interest that, as conditions worsened the
General Manager ofCl reported that he was:
"in continuous discussion with his American Board report over how - and
whether - to soldier on with its plant in Kiev" (Business Central Europe,
February 1994).
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Clearly, the magnitude of the decision is reflected in the level at which it must be taken
in the organisation.
In the case of Al, relationships with both the Brussels and Washington subsidiaries of
the firm influenced the decision to enter the market. However, the entry decision was
made in London. Both A2 and A3 prospected the Ukrainian market from existing
subsidiaries in Moscow. A2 had made the decision to enter Ukraine from its UK office.
However, funding was only available from this source for one year. After this time, the
firm had expanded such, that additional funds were required from the global
management of the firm.
The export representative of firm E2 disagreed with his Head Office's view that there
was insufficient potential in Ukraine to remain in the market. However, he also
acknowledged that you had to be in the market to understand how it really operated:
"It sounds a lot worse than it is." Similarly, the manager ofDl went to some lengths to
stress that his views were his own. These might not correspond with those of Head
Office:
"They come out to visit once in a while, but understand little of the realities of
operation in Ukraine."
In summary, it appears that geographically-proximate subsidiaries may influence entry
into the Ukraine. They may also play a role in day to day operations. However, their
sphere of influence does not extend to making strategic decisions, such as those of
whether to remain or make a further investment in the market. These may be
influenced by the periphery, but it appears that the centre still plays a dominant role. In
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two cases, the view was expressed that a better decision would be made if there were
greater involvement of the Ukrainian subsidiary.
7.5 Home or Host Market Relationships
There were universal concerns over the state of economic collapse and political
stalemate in Ukraine. However, some issues, which may have influenced expansion and
exit decisions were sector specific. An area of concern, for those firms seeking to
penetrate the Ukrainian market, was the difficulty of understanding how the market
had previously operated and the nature and consequences of its current collapse.
Consumer firms were especially troubled by the breakdown of the distribution system.
Chemical firms were concerned at potential raw material shortages.
In chapter six, firms were divided into those which were reliant on relationships in their
home or a third-party market and those which sought to develop relationships in the
Ukraine. Externally-funded and Client-following firms were primarily influenced by
home market relationships. Whilst Option-takers and Pioneers were concerned with
building relationships in the host market of Ukraine (See Section 6.1.6). The following
section looks at two cases, in which firms focusing on host market relationships
encountered issues critical to their success.
7.5.1 Host Market Relationships
A recent conference presentation on the nature of the networks in the Ukraine under
the Soviet system met with two comments. Firstly, that the Ukraine cannot strictly be
called a market, as all exchange was centrally-controlled. By Williamson's definition
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(1975), it was a hierarchy, rather than a market. Secondly, that in such a hierarchy,
networks, the hybrid organisational form, could not have existed (Snehota 1994).
Under the Soviet régime, relationships were, indeed, controlled by the government.
The manufacturing firm, the wholesale or retail intermediary and the final customer
may have had no knowledge of each other. All transactions were instigated and
mediated by the government. Mattsson (1993) describes this as "arm's length
transactions between faceless buyers and sellers" (See Figure 7.6).
GOSPLAN, the State Planning Committee, managed the entire distribution system
from supply of raw materials to physical transportation of final products. Producer
prices were fixed by the authorities for long periods. Retail prices were kept stable,
especially for staples, this being a matter of social policy. Prices were insulated from
the world market by means of taxes and subsidies (IMF/World Bank/OECDIEBRD
Joint Study 1990).
Traditional View compared with Markets in Transition
Exchange	 Exchange
Government	 Producer __________
_ __ Wholesaler
Exchange
__________ Customer
Government	 Producer	
-------.- Wholesaler	 Customer
Exch9fr#
Figure 7.6
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The existence of the "grey" market suggests that transactions did occur without
government intervention (Salmi 1993) and, indeed, that they were nearer to free
market behaviour. However, it is suggested that these were one off and motivated by
opportunism (Shleifer and Vishny 1991). Transactions were most probably informal
and with a different "highest bidder" on each occasion. This system did not encourage
the development of on-going inter-firm exchange relationships based on trust.
However, it is beyond question that, in a system where barter is commonplace, there
was a strong sense of "fair exchange" between individual actors. Breger (1992) advises
Western investors as follows:
"It seems impossible to carry out the most basic business functions without
enlisting the help of useful Ukrainian contacts. The old system of reciprocating
favours cannot be avoided, therefore it is important to bring people on board
who are bright, well-connected and resourceful. It is very difficult to go it
alone."
Despite such informal transactions, the withdrawal of the government from its position
of control has left a market, in which free market exchange relationships are poorly
developed. Firms may not know who their customers are, as they have never dealt with
them directly. The Soviet system was designed to work across national boundaries.
Hence, since the creation of independent states, the individual countries have faced
problems because of severance of their supply chains. A respondent from within Kiev's
local government (G2) expressed this as follows:
"When it was part of the Soviet Union, Ukraine always did as it was told to by
Moscow. The infrastructure, both industrial and social was not built to meet
Ukraine's needs, but those of the USSR. There is a big, rich industrial base;
power and atomic stations which Ukraine does not need. Co-operation with the
former USSR is still needed to gain access to those things, which Ukraine does
not have. However, all connections have been severed."
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Moreover, many firms have lost their guaranteed Soviet markets, for which quality and
competitiveness were not prerequisites. Consequently they are facing survival crises
(Fl, F2, F3, Ii). Analysis of two cases, one in the chemical industry and one involving
consumer goods firms illustrates some of the implications of the transition process in
Ukraine more fully.
7.5.2 The Case of the Chemical Industry
Ukraine's decision to become an independent state has caused significant problems for
its chemical industry. The industry was located in Ukraine, as part of the Soviet
Union's specialisation. Ukraine has some oil and gas, mainly in Crimea (F3). However,
it has never been able to capitalise upon the oil, as it has not had the technology to drill
to the necessary depth. Therefore, its large oil refining capability (65 million tonnes)
and the chemical industry, which was the largest former-Soviet producer in some
product categories, are reliant on oil imports from Russia and Turkmenistan.
All of the oil and 95% of the gas necessary to run the AZOT acetic acid plant were
previously supplied by these states (12). Moreover, these raw materials were supplied
at significantly less than world prices. The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers (May 1993)
indicates that natural gas was 44% of world prices. However, this rose to between
62% and 68% by September 1993, and 80% by early November 1993.
Officially, according to the central plan, a factory did not know where its products
were being sold. They were simply collected in the given quantity, to a given schedule.
This system operated in the chemical industry. Fediaev (Ii) describes the control of the
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planning and registration of major types of material resources for Ukraine by the State
Committee on resources of Ukraine (SCRU). The tasks of this committee included:
1. Determining material balances for major types of raw material and resources to meet
the state demands.
2. Placing state orders to for delivery of industrial and technical goods, according to
the Republic's demands.
3. Creating reserves of production and energy funds to meet the needs of the state.
4. Co-ordination of activities of organisations and enterprises and enterprises.
Facilitating direct economic relationships between suppliers and users of raw materials,
industrial goods and equipment.
5. In accordance with the above, the SCRU analyses the situation in supplying
resources, determines demand and volumes and the main types of production to
balance supply and demand.
Fediaev (Ii) describes the existence of "Glavsnabs" or raw material wholesalers.
These organisations are responsible for the "direct servicing of regional wholesalers".
The aims of such organisations included:
1. Timely and smooth delivery of goods to regional wholesalers
2. Establishing economic relations with suppliers and customers and supporting the
development of these relations
3. Finding outlets for the use of any surplus resources among regional enterprises
4. Managing the economic activities of the subordinate level of regional enterprises
The fulfilment of these objectives required:
1. Determining demand of industrial enterprises for all types of products
2. Studying the mix of goods demanded
3. Distribution of supplies among customers who have placed orders
4. Registration of suppliers and customers
5. Warehousing
6. Wholesale
7. Resource-saving
The Glasvnab responded directly to the SCRU. It co-ordinated and controlled the
imports, exports and intermediate distribution of products, so that it, not the individual
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organisation, had most knowledge about the Ukrainian industrial system. The
statistical information gathered by each Glasvnab was held centrally in Moscow.
Consequently, when Ukraine became an independent state, it lost access to the main
sources of information about its own industry.
Liberalisation brought major changes. The SCRU and Glasvnab withdrew from their
co-ordinating role, without replacement. Consequently, the firm did not have sufficient
information about its own suppliers and customers to continue its operation. In 1992,
sales continued virtually uninterrupted, in line with the previous plan. 99% of the
planned capacity was achieved. However, in the first nine months of 1993, this went
down to 27.8% of planned output. This seems to have resulted from a reduction in the
volume of gas and oil supplied and a loss of former Soviet markets. The supply chain,
of which this factory formed a part, has been ruptured. See Figure 7.7
Dislocation	 Dislocation
Since liberalisation	 Since liberalisation
Oil and Gas	 chemicals
	 End-Use
Supplier	 /	 4	 Manufacturer	 /	 CustomerçPçc
Russia	 Soviet system	 Ukraine	 Soviet system	 Kazhakstan
Turkmenistan
Russia
Figure 7.7
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However, AZOT does not know which part of their market has disappeared. Despite
this evident survival crisis, the plant gave a healthy portrayal of its market and
prospects to the potential western investor. It was seeking a joint venture partner.
A student project, using Ukrainian students, was set up by the Western firm. The aim
of this project was to determine whether Ukrainian students would discover any
further information about the firm and its market, than had already been disclosed. The
students travelled to the factory and interviewed a number of the employees. They
discovered that, whilst the senior management disclaimed any further knowledge, a
number of other employees were able to fill in some of the gaps. Firstly, the financial
function had some billing information, which revealed the names and addresses of
customers. Moreover, employees within the factory knew, from conversations with
truck drivers making deliveries and collections, the approximate source of raw
materials, at least in terms of country, and the location of customers.
No one within the factory was able to reveal the use to which their products were put
by these customers. However the student team held face-to-face interviews with a
number of customers. Some indication of the end-use of products was gained. Study of
the billing list of customers provided further information. Soviet firms were often
named according to their purpose, for example "Chemical Reagents Plant 'SHOSTA"
Whilst admittedly an inexact process, a far fuller picture could be recreated from these
"pieces ofjigsaw puzzle" than had originally seemed possible.
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7.5.3 The Case of the Household Goods Market
On entry into the Ukraine in 1988, firm Cl found that the prospects seemed excellent.
They sold all that they could produce "without any marketing effort." At this stage
they were still using the state -controlled distribution system. In the case of household
products, this comprised both warehouses "ba.za" and retail shops "gastronom". The
central control of this system had a number of implications. Firstly, gastronom were
only allowed to stock certain items, and the prices of these were fixed by government.
Every gastronom looks similar. Managers had no discretion to display or promote
particular products. Secondly, the mark-up of 25% from the whole chain, from
producer to retail price, was fixed centrally.
This system continued to operate, after the break-up of the Soviet Union, albeit with
the addition of a growing number of privately owned "kiosks", which were not subject
to such constraints. However it has gradually disintegrated:
"Consumer demand hasn't flagged (...) The problem now is distribution. Since
most wholesalers are now cash-strapped, 'we can sell as much as we want, but
not without advance payment.' Granting credit can produce losses within a
month 'I'm just not willing to do it.' (...) When Cl started up, purchasing was
one of its most important departments. Today it is sales - not the first change to
test the new venture." (Business Central Europe, February 1994)
One of the major problems of the disintegration of the former system is the problem of
cashflow. There are payment problems within the entire system. The banking system
doesn't work. Cash transfers may take three weeks. There is an increase in the number
of bad debts.
Cl stress the problem of finding alternative distribution channels to replace the state-
owned system. IFC, the privatisation arm of the World Bank in Ukraine, state that
244
relatively little privatisation has taken place. One respondent, who has worked on small
and medium-scale privatisation said:
"So far there have been 60 privatisations, mainly worker buyouts. There have
been several auctions, more are coming: Zaphozhye and Ribno. Large scale
privatisation is going very slowly, these are worker buyouts. 20% are on a
lease. Buyouts were revoked in a December 15th decree, will probably be
reversed again. Buyouts are at book value over 3 years, a very low figure
however it is measured. (...) Small- and medium-sized firms are auctioned, a
certain number by privatisation vouchers. These are non transferable
privatisation vouchers (55 000 coupons at June 4th 1993) There are rumours
that these will become transferable." (J7)
The consensus is that the privatisation process will be protracted. One local
government deputy stressed:
"The way ahead is to change the form of property ownership. Privatisation of
flats, shops and state enterprises. There is no privatisation yet. The process has
stopped. We have done some: shops, firms such as catering outlets and cafés."
(G2)
Meanwhile, western consumer firms must find ways of overcoming the breakdown of
the distribution system in order to survive. The "booming network of private Street
shops is an insumcient solution. The General manager of Cl says:
"there are too many intermediaries selling a small amount each. And the
distribution margin is too high. It would make the selling price too expensive.
At present there are a lot of intermediaries taking their commission just for
arranging the deal between a seller and a buyer, without any added value in
terms of distribution."
He concludes:
"There was a time when we thought Ukraine was the country with the best
prospects in the Soviet Union. [Now] our arguments to the Board of Directors
are much more subjective. I have no idea what will happen in Ukraine next
year..." Business Central Europe, February 1994.
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Even overcoming the distribution problems by vertical integration is problematic. Firm
B2, who opted for the retail solution, in the hope of attracting customers to their
visible Kiev store have found high levels of interest. However, sales are still
disappointingly low.
7.5.4 Home Market Relationships
The levels of uncertainty faced by those firms, which are developing their existing
relationships are considerably lower. Whilst the Ukrainian market still presents
problems, the firms who are not reliant on linking into Ukrainian networks operate on
the periphery of the market. Firms reported strong feelings of alienation. Psychic
distance is high. As a result of difficulties in understanding the way Ukraine works,
some respondents felt that there was an increased sense of needing to "pull together"
as an expatriate community. This has not yet happened:
"As yet there is no ex-pat community. There is the start of some social activity.
There are relatively few Western hotels, and some of the business people who
live there long-term have got to know each other. There is a fortnightly drink at
the British embassy, which tends to be a meeting point. However there are no
swimming pools or tennis clubs. The first 'Western' apartment complex has
just been completed." (Dl)
However, the Western business community has begun to develop. Beyond social
linkages, business contacts have developed. Client-Following firms, often followed
Pioneers into the market. They are a major source of information for these firms and
also for the Option-takers, who have entered the market more recently (See Section
7.1). Firm BI said that a major source of information was its financial advisor (A2).
Several of the law firms have high profile positions as advisors on the contradictory
legal environment. A6 are often approached by potential investors, looking to make
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sense of the confusion. It is common practice for business-to-business services firms
who are in the market, to provide a more basic bulletins on the legal system than might
be the case in a more certain environment. Three business-to-business firms
interviewed provide either risk indicators, brochures on privatisation or legal surveys.
Moreover, the firms who are externally-funded invest considerable time and effort in
developing their relationships in the regulatory environment. They are also providers of
information. Relationships are also developing between western educators in Ukraine
and the business community. Links are established by students doing market research
projects for western firms, or else through recruitment of graduates. The alumni of
llvlT-Kiev now provide a vital link between the institution and western firms.
7.6 Explanatory Variables for Decisions to Expand or Exit
So why have the fortunes of the firms studied diverged so much during the period of
data collection? The market environment has deteriorated for all firms, yet some seem
to be prospering, whilst others stand still or retract from the market.
7.6.1 Reasons for Negative Decisions
The three firms who had made negative investment decisions gave the following
reasons.
"At present the market potential is overridden by the level of risk. There is an
implosion of the economy; particular problems are inflation and the outcome of
the forthcoming elections (March 1994)" (D3 - March 1994)
"Any investment in the market would need to be upfront. However, Ukraine
suffers from the worst of capitalism. Its ministers are self-interested. Bribes are
asked for. There is market potential, but this is longer term. E2 considers the
risks too high. The market is too financially unstable." (E2 - March 1994)
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"Market research of the size of the market opportunity showed the available
market to be smaller than expected. Although (B l's) products were seen to be
high status, research showed occasional trading up from local brands, rather
than frequent purchase. Consumers do not have disposable income. At present
the size of the opportunity is seen to be insufficient to justify the levels of risk
involved." (Bi December 1993)
The reasons given relate largely to environmental conditions. Yet these are faced by all
of the firms. Thus, other variables must play a role.
7.6.2 Sector
The two firms who invested further, or expanded during the period of data collection
were both financial services firms. Thus, sector may be significant. However, the
negative decisions can be less easily explained by sectoral differences. They involve
firms in either consumer (Bi) or industrial product markets (E2, D3). The industrial
firms are in both high and low technology industries.
Case	 Sector	 Previous	 Entry Further	 Date of	 Criteria
Mode of	 Date Decision	 Decision
Operation
Al	 Business-to	 Joint Venture	 1992 Expansion	 Januaiy	 External
Business	 1994	 Contract
A2	 Business-to	 Joint Venture	 1992 Expansion	 March	 External
Business	 1994	 Contract
Figure 7.8
7.6.3 Date of Entry
The three firms making negative decisions are all firms whose initial interest in the
market was relatively late. Figure 79 shows the date of entry of these firms. Whilst the
initial interest may have been earlier, entry in three cases was in 1993. In mid 1993,
environmental conditions began to worsen dramatically. Firms, who were assessing
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market potential for a further expansion at that time, were less likely to reach a positive
outcome, than firms doing so a year earlier.
Case	 Sector	 Previous	 Entiy Further	 Date of	 Criteria
Mode of
	 Date Decision	 Decision
Operation
Bi	 High-margin	 Representative. April No further 	 November	 Russia
Consumer	 Office	 1993 Investment	 1993	 more
attractive
D3	 Industrial	 Possible	 Nov.	 No	 Januaiy	 Market
Products	 Entxy	 1993 Entry	 1994	 too unstable
B2	 High-margin	 Joint Venture Dec. Retract to
	 March	 Failure of
Consumer	 and retail	 1992 Representative 1994	 ventures
Office
E2	 High-Tech.	 Export	 1993 Withdraw	 March	 Failure of
products	 Representative	 from Ukraine 1994	 ventures
Figure 7.9
Both firms, which made positive decisions were early entrants into Ukraine.
7.6.4 Level of Commitment
Another distinguishing characteristic of the two firms, which have expanded, is that the
levels of risk which they face in operating in Ukraine are relatively low. Although they
have joint venture or wholly-owned subsidiaries in the market, these entail relatively
little investment.
However, three of the firms who have decided against further investment, or have
reduced their level of investment in the market, are those with the lowest levels of
investment of all the cases. B 1 has a representative office, which it will retain, despite
its decision not to invest further. E2 had an export representative, who was an
employee of the firm. However, they had not established a subsidiary in the market.
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Whilst D3 had not yet invested in the market at all. Level of commitment may be
significant, to the extent that it is easier to withdraw from a low level of commitment.
The firms who have withdrawn all had low levels of commitment to the market.
However, remaining in the market, and achieving the original entry criteria, would
have required the decision by B 1 and D3 to make a substantial further commitment.
At the end of data collection one firm was in the process of deciding whether to retract
(B2). Another, (Cl) expressed uncertainty over its future. These firms have high levels
of commitment in Ukraine. Their reluctance to withdraw or retract may reiate to t'his
high level of commitment. The financial and reputational stake in Ukraine is much
higher, for these firms. Therefore, they may be more likely to remain in the market,
through worse environmental conditions, than those firms who have little to lose by
withdrawal.
7.7 Ongoing Validity of Criteria for Entry
A key issue for firms in Ukraine is whether the original investment goal can still be
attained, or whether it has been eroded by the environmental changes.
7.7.1 External Funding
Firms Al, AS and E2 originally entered the market because of the possibility of
contracts from the regulatory sector. The risks for firms, which have external funding,
are low. Indeed, as the economic and political crisis worsens, Ukraine attracts more
attention from foreign government aid agencies. Additional funding has become
available and seems likely to continue. Both cases of further expansion are based upon
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this funding. Other firms, in sectors where such funding is available, continue to seek
funding opportunities.
7.7.2 Service to International Customers
Firms A2, A3, and A5 entered the market to serve global customers. These firms are
still present. They have begun to gain additional business from other foreign and local
customers. The lack of reliable information and technology in the market sustains the
need for western business service provision. However, few new international
customers are entering Ukraine. As yet, no major customers have withdrawn. The
impact of this would have a significant effect on the business-to-business services
firms.
7.7.3 Geographic Location
A major objective for entry into Ukraine was its location. After liberalisation, Ukraine
was widely heralded as potentially the most prosperous of the Soviet Republics, thus it
was viewed as "the gateway to Russia and the former-Soviet Republics" (Manninen
and Snelbecker 1993). Ukraine represented a low-risk base for forays into higher risk
markets further east. Indeed, from 1989 onwards, the pattern of entry moved
progressively from Central Europe towards the east.
The poor performance of Ukraine, and the relatively improved performance of
countries further east, has largely negated the value of Ukraine in this role. Investment
attention is switching from Ukraine to Russia, Kazhakstan, Turkmenistan and
Azerbaijan. The tobacco firm, which decided against further investment in Ukraine, is
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now looking at Russia. The manager of E2, who were withdrawing from the market
was en route to a new posting in Azerbaijan. B 1, who had bypassed Ukraine as the site
of a manufacturing joint venture gave the following reasons:
"We were looking for a market in which to build a production facility which
would supply the demands of the surrounding markets. Ukraine originally
appeared to have better potential than Russia: it seemed likely to accomplish
the process of transition more rapidly. However, in its current economic crisis,
Ukraine may even be a worse prospect than Russia. We are now looking at the
possibility of manufacturing in Russia or the Southern republics instead." (Bi)
7.7.4 Market Size
Ukraine's population size makes it an attractive market for firms in both consumer and
industrial markets. However, in the industrial market implosion of the economy, fuel
shortages and severance of ties with former-Soviet allies have created a survival crisis.
In consumer markets, low levels of disposable income raise questions as to the short-
term potential of the market.
If firms are flexible they may find ways of opening up end-user markets. B2 has opened
a high profile retail outlet to overcome distribution problems. Cl is selling basic
formulations, which they would usually reserve for Less Developed Countries. It has
introduced some new products, which are no longer sold in developed countries. Its
Ukrainian joint venture partner offers valuable access to such information as exists.
However, these operations are still meeting with difficulties and their future is
uncertain.
Assessment of market potential has proved to be a particular problem for industrial
firms. Market research into consumer preferences can, if necessary, be carried out by
252
western agencies. However, information which has disappeared in the breakdown of
the Soviet system is irrecoverable. Early entrants in this industry have struggled to
piece together chains of evidence to support further investment (Dl, D2).
7.7.5 Factor Advantages
Availability of raw material and low labour costs were key attractions of Ukraine. In
some cases, manufacturing in the market was considered necessary in order to compete
in price terms (Cl, Bi, C2). Cl has sold to surrounding markets to compensate for the
lack of disposable income in Ukraine. However, other sectors have been less fortunate.
Kravchuk banned agricultural exports. This adverse legislation destroyed the basis
upon which D2 had assessed potential. Ukraine is also suffering an energy crisis. Under
the Soviet régime, supplies of oil and gas were imported from neighbouring states at
less than world price. However prices have risen. Gas was 44% of world price in May
1993, but had risen to 80% by early November of the same year. Moreover, a poor
payment record by Ukraine has led to the restriction of the volumes of oil supplied to it
by Russia.
7.8 Level of Risk
The levels of risk in the investments of the four groups, identified in chapter six, differ
significantly. This relates both to level of commitment and to the focus of the firm. The
risks faced by firms attempting to develop relationships in the Ukraine have been
highlighted by the cases described in Section 7.2. Many of these problems seem
insuperable until such time as the transition process begins in earnest. The Externally-
funded firms have benefited from economic downturn. The more severe the problems
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in Ukraine, the more finding it has attracted. Both these firms, and the Client-
followers can develop their business based on home or third-market relationships. The
risks which this entails are minimal.
The expansion and exit decisions are split by typology and focus in Figure 7.10. Those
firms who are expanding are doing so, primarily, when there is a guaranteed return on
their investment. Both of the firms who have expanded, have done so on the basis of
external funding. Although, one of the firms originally entered the market following a
customer, it, too, is competing for external contracts.
Typology	 Sector	 Firm Level of	 Date	 Focus
Commitment of Entry
Externally- Financial	 Al Low-	 August 1991	 Home
funded	 Services	 Medium
Client-	 Low-	 December 1991	 Home
follower	 "	 A2 Medium
Option-	 Chemicals	 D3	 Low	 No entry	 Host
taker
Option-	 Consumer	 Bi	 Low	 April 1993	 Host
taker	 (High-margin)
Externally- High-Tech E2 Low	 June 1993	 Host
funded
Pioneer	 Consumer	 B2	 High	 December 1993	 Host
(High Margin)
Figure 7.10
The firms experiencing difficulties are those trying to develop relationships in the
Ukrainian market. Whilst high levels of risk were anticipated, most firms were awaiting
indications of an upturn in the economy. Stagnation of the privatisation process and
contradictory laws have resulted in short-term losses which some firms consider
unacceptable.
7.9 Chapter Summary
The majority of the decisions to enter Ukraine were made when commentators were
predicting a favourable economic development. Those decisions made after the market
conditions worsened have tended to be negative. In the run-up to the March 1994, the
prevailing pessimism led three firms who had low levels of commitment to the market
to exit or to defer a decision, this was largely because Ukraine was no longer
considered to be a better investment target than Russia or the Southern republics.
However, despite the worsening market conditions, successful operation in Ukraine is
still possible. Those firms who serve the western business community or are reliant on
funding from aid agencies or governments have been relatively little affected. It is these
firms who have invested further during the period. However, the environmental
conditions have been far more significant for firms who wish to penetrate the Ukrainian
market. Whilst there is a large available market, the economic crisis has lessened the
disposable income, such that western products are still an unaffordable luxury.
Economist publication "The World in 1995" concludes gloomily:
"There will be only limited sales opportunities for western goods, due to the
continued recession, low incomes and the fact that Ukraine's trade is still
heavily oriented towards Russia." The World in 1995 (1994).
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Furthermore, the transition has brought its own problems. The previous system has
broken down. In its aftermath, reliable market information is difficult to obtain.
Distribution channels are non-existent. In March 1994, the disintegration and its
consequences were clear. However, there was little sign that the transition process was
moving forwards.
As a result of this increasingly negative environment, finns who had relatively low
commitment to the Ukraine were beginning to exit. Those, who had high levels of
commitment were also contemplating how bad conditions could become, before they
too would exit. However, the stakes for the Pioneers were higher both financially and
in terms of reputation.
Chapter 8 - Discussion and Conclusions
Literature proposes a broad range of variables which, it contends, influence
international investment decisions. The propositions from the literature, upon
which this study was based, can be summarised as shown below:
Variables	 Propositions
a) Demographic Variables:
Firm Size	 1. High levels of resources in the firm may
reduce the signJIcance of individual investment
decisions
Forsgren 1989; Johanson and Mattsson 1988, Johanson
and Vahlne 1990
Product/Service Type 2. Modes of international investment may differ
between different product or service types
Erramilhi 1990; Sharrna and Johanson 1987
Ownership	 3. Subsidiaries may play a signfi cant role in
international investment decisions in IvfNCs
Forsgren 1989; Johanson and Vahlne 1990;
4. Investment Decisions may be routed via
geographically proximate subsidiaries
Forsgren 1989
International ExperienceS. Length of international experience may reduce
perceived risk of an investment decision
Forsgren 1989; Johanson and Vahine 1990
East and Central	 6. Experience of similar markets allows firms to
European	 generalise and reduces perceived risk
Experience	 Forsgren 1989; Johanson and Vahlne 1990
b) Country-Specific
Psychic Distance	 7. High levels of environmental uncertainty increase
the perceived risk of investment in a countly
Johanson and Vahine 1977; Goodnow and Hansz 1972
Klein and Roth 1990
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8. Traditional frameworkfor assessing market
attractiveness cannot explain the current pattern of
investment in Ukraine
Kami 1976, Paul et al 1978, Johanson and Vahine 1977;
Egan 1993
Location-Specific Advantage
9. Facior advantages increase attractiveness of
markets for investors
Dunning 1988; Rugman 1989
c) Strategic
Criteria for investment 10. The decision to enter or expand in Ukraine may be
influenced by the actions of oligopolistic rivals
Knickerbocker 1973; Buckley and Casson 1976
11. The decision to enter or expand in Ukraine may be
influenced by the actions of existing customers and
suppliers
Johanson and Mattsson 1988
12. The knowledge of a market, on which decisions are
built, may come from the network of relationships
which afirm has with other firms or with key
stake holders in the Ukraine
Johanson and Mattsson 1988
In this chapter, the findings of data analysis (chapters six and seven) are discussed
in their theoretical context. This discussion is first centred around the original
propositions. Then the main contributions of the thesis are synthesised in the
conclusions.
8.1 The Effect of Size and International Experience upon the
Internationalisation Process of Multinational Corporations
Length of international experience may reduce percei ved risk of an investment
decision Forsgren 1989; Johanson and Vahlne 1990
The firms, which were studied, were all multinational corporations. Johanson and
Mattsson (1988) classify firms as to their degree of internationalisation and that of
their industry. By this classification the cases involve finns which belong to either
the "International Among Others" group, or to the "Late Starter" category.
Thirteen of the firms belong to the first of these categories, as they are highly
internationalised firms, in highly international industries. However, two cases in the
business-to-business service sector may be "Late Starters." They operate in
international industries, but are smaller and less internationalised than their
competitors.
Daniels and Radebaugh (1992) define the multinational corporation as involving a
"world-wide approach to foreign markets and production and an integrated
global philosophy encompassing both domestic and overseas operations."
By this definition, all of the industries studied were highly international, though not
necessarily global. Definitions of global industries tend to use geographic coverage
or location of production facilities as defining variables. Hence, they may specify
that firms operate in all parts of the triad (Ohmae 1990). Alternatively, firms may
be said to be global if production and consumption take place in different
countries.
By either of these measures, the majority of the industries studied would be
classified as global. Tobacco, Drinks, Computing and Chemicals conform to both
of the above definitions. However, the Household Goods industry, whilst global in
its geographic coverage, may be more likely to manufacture for local consumption,
in each countly. Telecommunications is influenced by global technological
developments and is, increasingly, characterised by transnational strategic alliances.
However, it is heavily reliant on nationally-based infrastructure. Financial services
and law are global in their coverage, but services cannot be split by input and
output in the same way as manufacturing firms (Erramilli 1990).
For all but two of the firms, the length of international experience dated to before
the Second World War. A number of the firms had operated in Eastern Europe
prior to Communist rule. Forsgren (1989) suggests that firms which are highly
internationalised will make larger steps in the process of internationalisation.
Johanson and Mattsson (1988) also relate this to the internationalisation of the
industry:
"Both the firm and its environment are highly internationalised. A further
internationalisation of the firm only means marginal changes in extension and
penetration, which, on the whole, do not imply any qualitative changes in the
firm."
However, two of the firms studied had decided not to enter Ukraine, despite being
large multinational corporations (A4 and D3). Five others had opted for low
commitment in their preliminary mode of operation (El, El, E2, C2, Dl). A
further five (Al, A2, A3, AS, A6) had opted for the minimum possible level of
commitment, which allowed them to achieve their objectives in entering the
market.
Only three firms, B2, CI and D2 had made the large investments, which Forsgren
would expect of a multinational corporation. Thus, degree of internationalisation
may play a role in entry decisions, but it cannot explain the variation of entry
choices made by the "International Among Others" firms.
High levels of resources in the firm may reduce the sign jficance of mdi vi du ci
investment decisions Forsgren 1989; Johanson and Vahlne 1990
As well as being highly internationalised, the firms studied had high levels of
resources. Thirteen of the firms were very large multinational corporations. They
ranged in turnover from £2,293 million per annum to £70, 826 million. By number
of employees, the smallest of the thirteen was 12,630, and the largest 137,000. The
range of employee numbers, may, in part, be explained by differences between
manufacturing and services firms. In service firms, employee numbers were, on the
whole, significantly lower than those of manufacturing firms, ranging from 12,630
to 59,797 compared to a range of 17,700 to 137,000 for manufacturing firms.
Whilst there is a considerable overlap, the difference in mean values, 27,357 to 88,
824, shows the gap between the two.
It was found that the size of the commitments made in Ukraine are not
proportionate to the size of the firm. Firm B2 had a low number of employees for a
manufacturing firm. At 17,700 employees, it is smaller than two of the services
firms studied. However, it has made one of the largest commitments to the market.
Conversely, the largest firm, both in terms of its turnover and number of
employees, Dl, has taken a minimum investment in order to further assess market
potential.
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In some instances, however, it does appear that size and degree of
intemationalisation play a role. References were made by firms to their relative size
and degree of internationalisation, compared to competitors. Therefore, it may be
that these variables are most relevant if taken as relative, rather than actual, values
(Kutschke 1985).
Accordingly, firms may feel themselves more or less able to make high levels of
commitment because of their size or degree of internationalisation relative to other
firms in their sector. Bi explained that it needed to be more "cautious" in its
investment decisions than rivals, because they are:
"four times as big on turnover, assets and profits. Therefore, they can afford to
take the risk of a longer-term investment."
AS stressed that it avoided entering main centres of population where their large
rivals may be present:
"we deliberately entered Donetsk, rather than Kiev, when we entered Ukraine,
because we knew that the Big Six would all go into Kiev."
Conversely, Cl said that the size of its firm made it "able to take risks" especially
as it is present in almost all geographic areas of the world. It was large enough to
take this risk:
"We took a risk [in Ukraine], and its one Cl can afford. The question is: can
we survive until Ukraine goes back up, and are we building a competitive
advantage in the meantime?" Business Central Europe, February 1994.
Those firms, with high levels of international experience or high levels of
resources, may make high commitment entry decisions. Yet they do not always do
so. Thus, firm-specific variables, alone, cannot explain the entry choices made in
this research.
Experience of similar markets allows firms to generalise and reduces perceived
risk
Forsgren 1989; Johanson and Vahine 1990
One important distinction may be that between overall international experience and
specific experience of Eastern and Central Europe. Johanson and Vahlne (1977)
contend that the only type of knowledge, which allows firms to overcome psychic
distance, is market specific. However, Forsgren (1989) contends that firms can
generalise international experience between markets. Johanson and Vahlne (1990)
acknowledge that this may be true, however, they restrict this to the ability to
generalise between "similar" markets.
Whilst firms such as A6 and A5 have less international experience and are less
internationalised in general, than some of their larger rivals, they have an equally
strong presence in east and Central Europe. A6 specialises in East and Central
Europe:
"Partners in the firm have been active in the former-Soviet Union since the
1960's" (A6 company document)
Four of its total seven investments are in Eastern and Central European Countries.
The mean number of Eastern European investments for firms in the business-to-
business service category is 6.66. Proportionally, A6 is far more committed to
Eastern Europe than firm A3, which has the highest number of Eastern European
investments. A3 has ten investments in the area, of a total 67 investments world-
wide. It is not clear whether the firms which are focused upon the region behave
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differently to those which greater geographic coverage. As this only applied to two
cases (AS and A6) it is difficult to postulate any conclusions.
Each of the other thirteen firms had an Eastern European Division or Practice
Group, within which relevant experience could be shared. Firms suggested that the
situation in Eastern Europe was so unique that even experience gained in the
region prior to liberalisation was of limited value. This coincides with the views of
Thomas (1994) and Egan (1993) that the challenges faced during the process of
transition to free market economy are unprecedented and unparalleled. The earliest
that firms could begin to gain experience of transition was in late 1989. Therefore,
all have a similar length of experience in Eastern Europe.
8.2 Country-specific Influences
High levels of environmental uncertainty increase the perceived risk of
investment in a country
Johanson and Vahlne 1977; Goodnow and Hansz 1972, Klein and Roth 1990
Factor advantages increase attractiveness of markets for investors
Dunning 1988; Rugman 1989
These two propositions represent the trade-off between positive and negative
aspects of the Ukrainian market at present.
Because of the high levels of uncertainty in Ukraine, Johanson and Vahlne (1977)
would anticipate low levels of commitment to be used in entering the market.
However, two of the Pioneer firms entered the market with high commitment
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modes of operation (B2 and Cl). Others reached high commitment decisions, after
brief periods of assessing market attractiveness (Al, A2, A3, A5, A6, D2).
Cardozo (1979) suggests that firms may accept high levels of risk, if the expected
return is high. A number of the firms pointed to the large available market in
Ukraine (B!, B2, Cl, C2), or factor advantages, such as rich agricultural soils (D2)
and oil and gas (Dl and D3), as offering high potential returns upon their
investment. However, these were acknowledged to be long-term goals, especially
by those firms who were seeking to penetrate the Ukrainian market. Therefore, in
Cardozo's terms, in the short-term risks are high, and rewards will not compensate.
Rather, investments are speculative and offer only longer-term rewards.
These high levels of uncertainty were acceptable to firms, in part, because of the
recognition that there are few large markets remaining, in which the firms do not
operate:
"B 1 is a global player in a global industry. CIS and China, Vietnam and Korea
are the last "virgin" markets. left for us to contest."
"In the early '80's' there were three main places in which Cl was not yet
present: India, Pakistan and the USSR."
Despite high levels of environmental turbulence, firms were more concerned with
assessment of the extent of the opportunity, than with the risks (B!, Cl, D2, B2).
These were acknowledged to be high. However, the issue appears to be that of the
relative attractiveness of the remaining untapped markets. Thus, firms were
interested in Ukraine, as having a greater potential for transformation than Russia:
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"using experience gained in the Ukrainian market, B2 will then expand its
operations in Russia, a market three times the size with a population of three
million."
One factor in the negative decisions seen in the later part of data collection,
appears to be that this relative attractiveness has decreased. By late 1993, the
Southern Republics of Kazhakstan and Azerbaijan, and in some cases Russia itself
were seen to have advanced further, in their transition than Ukraine.
8.3 Relevance of Existing Theories to Turbulent Markets
From the preceding section, it can be seen that location-specific advantages
(Dunning 1988) do appear to play a role in the investment decisions made by
Pioneers and Option-takers, although they are less influential in the decisions made
by Client-following and Externally-funded firms. However, firms do not,
necessarily, internalise capabilities as economic literature suggests (Caves 1971,
Teece 1986).
It may also be because the principle uncertainty of operation in Ukraine does not
arise from protection of a firm-specific asset. It arises, largely, from operation in a
turbulent market, where there is a high level of psychic distance (Klein and Roth
1990). Many of the problems, which firms find in assessing market attractiveness,
or predicting the likelihood or rate of transition, stem from poor availability of
reliable market infonnation.
Internalisation may provide information, gained from local employees. However,
this information can be gained at less financial risk by use ofajoint venture, or
even a distributor. Entry into the market may be prompted by poor ability to assess
market attractiveness from outside of the market. Cost of information may be less
than thecost of entry into the market (Aharoni 1966). Preference for an equity
stake over a contractual agreement seems to relate to issues of ensuring service
quality (Erramilli 1989). In such cases, the control versus risk trade-off of
Anderson and Gatignon (1986) seems applicable. Few of the firms, who wish to
penetrate the Ukrainian market see benefits, at present, in wholly-owned
subsidiaries.
Traditional frameworks for assessing market attractiveness cannot explain the
current pattern of investment in Ukraine
Johanson and Vahlne (1977) base their assumption of incremental
internationalisation upon the belief that high levels of psychic distance, comprised
of cultural dissimilarity and geographic distance, may inhibit the commitment of
firms to a market. Accordingly, they will adopt lower commitment modes of
operation, when entering the market, and increase their commitment as they gain
more knowledge of it. This knowledge must be direct and experiential (Penrose
1959) to be of value.
In section 8.1, the validity of this model for large, highly internationalised firms is
challenged. Whilst the Option-takers have chosen low levels of commitment in
entering Ukraine, the other categories do not fit with the model.
Johanson and Mattsson (1988) suggest that multinational corporations are
concerned with a different set of issues, than less international firms. Individual
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investment decisions may relate to a portfolio of investments. Hence, the previous
investments, which the firms have made within Eastern and Central Europe, may be
significant in the entry decisions which they make in Ukraine.
Firms cited both good and bad experiences in other markets, in justification of the
choices which they made in Ukraine. B 1 stressed that it wished to establish a plant
in Ukraine to serve Eastern and Central Europe, because it had "lost out" to large
rivals in bids for privatisation targets in the Czech Republic and Hungary. Dl said
that they were proceeding cautiously in the Ukraine, because of heavy losses
incurred in their Hungarian subsidiary.
However, positive motivations for entry into Ukraine also resulted from the belief
that this was an episode in a more extensive process. B2 had made large
investments in the Czech Republic and Hungary in September 1992, Poland in
early 1993, Ukraine in December 1993. They have already established a
representative office in Russia, which is their ultimate goal. Investment in Ukraine
was only one episode in the stream of activities in the region (Forsgren 1989):
"This summer after considerable groundwork earlier in the year, affiliates were
established in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In population terms, these two
markets are relatively small, with ten million people each (...) B2' s strategy is
to use these markets as a bridgehead into Central and Eastern Europe, as they
are ideal for testing and refining propositions for the total region (...) Satisfied
that the business [in Hungary and Czechoslovakia is on a sound footing, B2 is
preparing to move into Poland in early 1993 (...) The plan is to replicate what
has been achieved in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, in a market of 30 million
people (...) The next stage is to enter Ukraine, and then increase our presence
in Russia (...) Using the experience gained in Ukraine, B2 will then expand its
operations in Russia, a market three times the size with a population of 150
million (...) [The country manger for Russia says] The foundations which we
are laying right now are critical for the long-term success of our (...) business in
Central Europe." (B2 Press Release December 1992).
Similarly, Cl view their manufacturing operation in 'Ukraine as a way of serving
the less stable, neighbouring Russian market.
Indeed, the process of international expansion in Eastern and Central Europe, by
the firms studied, has been nearer to that suggested by Johanson and Mattsson
(1988) for 'International Among Others' firms. They suggest that firms in this
category will make internationalisation decisions, in order to strengthen and
develop their "positions in global nets":
"As extension takes pLace in a globally interdependent network, the thvipg
forces and the obstacles to this extension are closely related to this
interdependence. Models of global oligopolies fit the argument here." (r). 3 14)
The decision to invest in Ukraine involves the process shown in Figure 8.2
Investment	 Assessment of
in Ukraine	 \Potentlal of
'Next markets
further East
Investment in	 Assessment of Interest in
Czech Republic	 Potential of	 Ukraine
and Hungaiy	 'Next markets
further East
Figure 8.2
The cases studied have also shown that rational planning techniques were little
used by multinational firms in deciding to enter Ukraine. Little interest was
expressed in exploring the precise nature of the uncertainty in the market
environment. The risks of operation in Eastern Europe were known to be high.
However, changes were so rapid that further precision of its composition by use of
models was rarely mentioned. Only the chemical finns acknowledged the value of
any risk models, and then only as one stage of the decision process. Fuller market
knowledge was felt to be gained by operation in Ukraine.
8.4 The Role of Relationships
Tue decision to enter or expand in Ukraine may be influenced by the actions of
existing customers and suppliers
This proposition refers to the network view, that firms cannot be viewed in
isolation from each other (Thorelli 1986, Johanson and Mattsson 1988, Easton
1992). It is supported by the findings of this study. Three of the firms followed
existing customers into the market (A2, A3, A6). Another firm, which is not
currently in the Ukraine, stated that it had entered other East and Central European
markets, when major customers had done so. The same criteria would be applied
to Ukraine.
The criteria for entry was justified as follows::
"to serve major customers (...) Business is centred mainly on international
clients. A2 must offer a world-wide service in order to develop relationships
with these clients across markets (...) we followed major clients (...) into the
market with whom we have long-standing relationships in many markets" (A2)
"because of a number of requests from client firms" (A3)
"In 1988, the Firm assisted one of its multinational clients in the establishment
of one of the first joint ventures in Ukraine, in the personal hygiene area. The
Firm opened its Kiev office in 1992, when Oleg Batyuk returned to Kiev after a
year of working with members of the Firm in London." (A6)
However, customer relationships are only one of the categories of relationship
which are relevant to entry decisions into Ukraine.
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The knowledge of a market on which decisions are built may come from the
network of relationships which a firm has with other firms or with key
stakeholders in the Ukraine
A further three firms entered Ukraine because of relationships, which they had with
actors in the regulatory environment (E2, Al and AS). In some cases, gaining the
contract which precipitated entry into Ukraine, was only an episode in the
developing relationship between the firm and the regulatory agency.
Al explained that they were strongly motivated to enter Ukraine by their existing
relationship with the EC. Al is an advisor to the EC, on its Technical Assistance to
the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) programme. This connection is
centred around a direct relationship between the company's Brussels subsidiary
and the EC. In addition, the firm also has links with the World bank, which is
actively interested in Ukraine. This relationship is via its Washington Subsidiary.
Hence, in accordance with Johanson and Mattsson's suggestion (1988):
"since important customers or joint-venture partners in one country are also by
definition international, the International Among Others is faced with
opportunities for further extension or penetration in 'third countries.' Thus, a
Swedish firm might increase its penetration in a South American market
because of its relationship in Japan with an internationalising Japanese firm."
(p. 315)
In this case the countries in question are Ukraine, Belgium, USA and UK, where
the decision to enter Ukraine was instigated. However, the influence of
relationships is comparable.
Moreover, many such externally-funded projects demand, by their very design,
partners from a number of different countries. One EC TACIS project involved
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academic partners from UK and Belgium, consultants from Belgium, France,
Ireland and Germany, a French co-ordinating firm and a Ukrainian recipient. The
consortium has developed links between the institutions, such that different subsets
of this group are involved in other EC bids. This is also referred to by Johanson
and Mattson (1988) as a case of international firms in an international situation:
"Other examples of such international interdependence are 'big projects' in
which design, equipment supply, construction, ownership and operation can all
be allocated to firms of different national origin, but with internationally more
or less dispersed activities." (p. 315)
However, not only complementaiy relationships were found during this study, but
also competitive relationships.
The decision to enter or expand in Ukraine may be influenced by the actions of
oligopolistic rivals Knickerbocker 1973.
All of the firms studied referred to the actions of their oligopolistic rivals. They
wished to gain first-mover advantage over these competitors, to gain their share of
available government funding or to invest in the highest potential investment
opportunities.
This preoccupation with competitors was particularly strong for those firms, which
felt themselves in a position of "inferiority" vis-à-vis competitors. Hence B I
stressed that it was easier for their larger competitors to make large investments, as
they are:
"four times as large on turnover, assets and profit. therefore they can afford to
take the risk of a long-term investment. We would need an investment to pay
back in two to three years."
Whilst A5 claimed:
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"We deliberately entered Donetsk, rather than Kiev, when we entered Ukraine,
because we knew that the Big Six would all go to Kiev"
The firms, which are larger, or more internationalised, also consider the actions of
their rivals, but proactively rather than defensively. Cl's aim was:
"to be there before the others and develop a volumeJcost competitive
advantage in order to build up strong barriers to late entrants (...) to invest in
the development of a strong presence now, in the hope that late entrants will
have to spend more to build up a defensible position, when the market becomes
attractive."
Investment in Ukraine was also described as:
"the next move in a global chess game" (Cl)
and:
"jockeying for position by global rivals" (C2)
The nature of the relationships between competitors may have both positive and
negative effect on the actions of firms. Porter (1990) stresses that strong domestic
rivalry may provide the impetus for international expansion. In this study, it has
been seen to provide an impetus for many firms to enter a new market.
Firms tend to have indirect relationships with their competitors. This may be via a
shared customer, or supplier. Therefore, in this study, two firms A5 and A2
provide services to the same customer. Whilst these two firms are not direct
competitors, they both provide a market information service for these customers,
so may overlap. Similarly, firms Al and A2 are both co-ordinators of contracts for
the EC, therefore they have an indirect link with each other via the EC (See
Figures 8.3 and 8.4)
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Figure 8.3
Figure 8.4
In the computer industry, one finn suggested that there were:
"no formal links. However there is an IT community, or 'village' in which
firms know what competitors are doing. Information comes from distributors,
major suppliers, publications or press."
Thus the nodes in the indirect relationships in the computer industry can be either
via customers, or suppliers (See Figure 8.5).
Figure 5.5
In all of these cases, the primary exchange in indirect relationships between
competitors is information. However, there may also be social exchange.
Competitors in Ukraine were happy to perform introductions to other respondents,
in their industry, who they tended to know socially.
Knickerbocker (1973) suggests that there will be "bunching" between the date of
entry into Ukraine of the leader in an industiy, and the entry of following firms.
Indeed, this bunching of investment activity is discernible in Eastern Europe, as a
whole. Although, in each industry sector it is not always the same firm which takes
the lead. Moreover, it can be seen, to some extent, in Ukraine. However, by the
end of data collection, not all of the large rivals in each sector had entered Ukraine.
Indeed, the time lag between entry of the leader and the actions of the followers
spanned five years in the household goods sector. Two large firms were still only
present as representative offices. Two of the Big Six accountancy firms had not
entered Ukraine, although four had done so three years previously. One tobacco
firm decided not to enter Ukraine, whilst major rivals were making high profile
investments. Moreover, firms in consumer and industrial product sectors opted for
differing levels of commitment on entry into the market.
Thus, it does not appear that Knickerbocker's proposition can be empirically
proven in this research. The suggestion of Buckley and Casson (1976), that, in
uncertain market conditions, following firms may await the outcome of the leading
firm's investment, seems more applicable. The time lag, between entry of the leader
and following firms, may be explicable by ongoing uncertainty as to the success of
high commitment investments. All three Pioneers, Cl, B2 and D2 were reviewing
their future at the end of data collection. Competitor firms, in each of these sectors,
may have deferred a decision until they gave their verdicts.
8.5 Typologies of Firms
In Section 6.4, four groups of firms were identified, on the basis of level of
commitment, criteria for entry and level of risk. These were:
Client-Followers
Externally-funded
Option-takers
Pioneers
The first two groups focus on relationships in their home or a third-party market.
Whilst the latter two are concerned with developing business in the host market,
Ukraine. This differing focus of the firms, by sector and by typology was shown in
Figures 6.6 and 6.20.
The two groups, which focus on host market relationships, Client-Followers (A2,
A3, A4 and A6) and Externally-funded firms (Al, A5 and E2), appear to be
connected to each other. Although these two groups entered Ukraine in response
to a stimulus from different sectors of the external environment, both entered for
reactive reasons. Indeed, the criteria for expansion given by each of these two
groups overlaps. One of the Client-followers (A2) subsequently expanded when it
gained external funding. Another, A5, entered the market, when it gained a
contract from the regulatory sector, but its aim is to develop a network of
relationships, within its firm and within each market, to provide comprehensive
information for its customers:
"The development of their activity and a determination to take advantage of
opportunities lead many companies to establish activities in foreign markets,
often very distant, culturally if not geographically, from the environment with
which they are familiar. Integration in such an environment involves many risks
and uncertainties. A5's international network was created with a view to
reducing these uncertainties and to limiting these risks in the most important
markets world-wide." (AS internal document)
Thus, it appears that these two groups are linked to each other. This link can be
represented as a spectrum. Firms in business-to-business services may see
international customer service as essential to their continuation. However, they
must also remain profitable. Therefore, in the interim, if income can be earned from
aid agency contracts, then the Client-follower will capitalised upon it. Likewise,
Externally-funded firms will seek to develop a broad base of Ukrainian and
international customers.
The balance between these stimuli may vary at different stages of the firm's
development. The precise divide between the groups is not clear and, indeed, may
vary on different occasions and within the same firm. Two respondents from A2
were at opposite ends of this continuum:
"Business in centred mainly on international clients. A2 must offer world-wide
service in order to develop relationships with these clients across markets (...)
we followed major clients (...) with whom we have long-standing relationships
into the market (...) Currently, the objective is to provide the necessary cover
for the client base."
"A2 are looking for funding opportunities in the area. If a large enough
contract were available, then an investment, or a further investment would be
made in the target country."
The two groups can be represented as follows:
Firms	 A3, A6	 A4, A2
	 Al, AS, E2
Client-Followers <---------------------------------->Externally-funded
Figure 8.6
The second pairing, Option-takers and Pioneers are also connected to each other.
Both of these groups focus upon development of their operation in Ukraine.
Therefore, they have a host market focus. The difference between the groups is
only that of level of commitment to the market. Pioneers have chosen high
commitment modes of entry, whilst Option-takers have made only low
commitment to Ukraine.
The relationship between these two groups is complex. Option-takers can increase
their level of commitment to Ukraine by a subsequent investment in the market.
This could equal that of a Pioneer firm. However, they would not be level in terms
of risk. The Option-taker would have the benefit of knowledge, gained in the
market. Therefore, their position has been placed lower on the scale of risk,
because of this prior involvement (See Figure 8.7)
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It is not clear that Option-takers could ever become Pioneers. An essential part of
the entry strategy of the pioneer was the use of high commitment modes of
operation, to pre-empt competitors. This first-mover advantage is complicated by
the slow rate of entry into the market. In the accountancy sector, Big Six firms are
still entering Ukraine. They would view the Option-takers as relatively early
entrants. Indeed, by Miles and Snow's definition, all of the firms in this study
would rate in their most proactive category.
However, the decision of an Option-taker to invest in a higher level of commitment
in Ukraine may not involve a move towards the Pioneer category. One of the
Option-takers (El) was actively seeking external contracts, which would move it
towards the Externally-funded sector. Another, Dl, said that it would make a
higher level of investment, if a major customer were to enter the market. This
would move them towards the Client-Follower.
8.6 Home and Host Market Relationships
The knowledge of a market, on which decisions are built, may come from the
network of relationships which afirm has with other firms or with key
stakeholders in the Ukraine
Johanson and Mattsson (1988) suggest that firms expand internationally by a
process of developing their existing "positions" within networks. This can be
achieved both by marketing and by market investments (Mattsson 1985). In this
research, the activities of Externally-funded firms and Client-followers, who build
upon existing relationships are seen as a marketing investment. Pioneers and
Option-takers, who invest in a subsidiary and seek to develop relationships in the
host market are involved in market investments.
The incremental model proposed by Johanson and Vahlne (1977) suggests that any
form of market investment will move the firm forwards in the process of
overcoming psychic distance. Thus, direct, market-specific knowledge, gained
from operation in a market will reduce the risk of investment.
If this is true in any situation, then it is certainly not so in Ukraine. The country is
perceived as culturally alien by many of the western managers, who operate within
it. It was referred to as "the Wild West" by one respondent (B 1) and by another as
"another world, which stopped forty years behind our own" (J3). However, the
cultural distance between Ukraine and more advanced western economies is not
only perceived from the western side. One respondent (Fl) suggested to the
members of the EC TACIS Marketing Team:
"it is as though you are from another planet."
Even operation in the market for a length of time, may not be sufficient to
overcome this psychic distance, or to gain the knowledge necessary to make the
next investment decisions. Thus Chapter 4 describes some of the gaps in market
information. These are described by one respondent as:
"a series of inter-dependent links. If one vital piece of information is missing
(..) then the chain is broken" (Dl)
Another describes the "legal fog" (A6). B 1 explains how contradictory the
information is, which can be obtained. Whilst the manager ofCl, present in
Ukraine for three years describes how VAT rates have "ping-ponged from 20 to
28% and, now, for the time being, back to 0 again. He concludes:
"I have no idea what will happen in Ukraine next year"
The nature of the market, prior to liberalisation, was substantively different from
advanced western economies. Yet, firms entering the Soviet Union at this time,
whilst constrained in the choices available to them, were able to operate
successfully within these constraints. Cl, entering Ukraine in 1990 found their
products:
"gobbled up by a market 'screaming for new products'.
Liberalisation of the former-Soviet states was heralded as the opening up of new
opportunities:
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"The rapidly changing situation in Central Europe provides new challenges -
and opportunities - for El. Gone are the restrictions on what can be exported,
who can buy goods, and who can sell. No longer is the Western ftechnologyj
restricted to a few, centrally-controlled, organisations. The market is opening
up and quickly." (El Company Newsletter 1991)
However, the environmental situation is so turbulent, that uncertainty is now much
higher than under the previous régime. Accordingly, many western firms are falling
back on home market relationships, to obtain reliable market data.
Although some of the Option-takers have been present in Ukraine for two years,
they have gained relatively little in-depth information about the country. What little
they have ascertained might be invalidated by legislative changes. D2, for example,
had set up a Sales and Marketing Joint Venture to assess the potential of the
market for agro-chemicals in Ukraine. Kravchuk banned exports of agricultural
produce. Overnight, the market potential disappeared, for the foreseeable future.
The turbulence of the situation in Ukraine calls into question the assumption of
direct market-specific knowledge as a means of overcoming psychic distance. It
appears that those firms with high commitment investments have come further in
gaining information about Ukraine. They have encountered, at first hand, some of
the critical issues of operation in the market.
As reliable data are so difficult to obtain, it may be that, in uncertain markets, the
cost of information, may be to make a high commitment decision. If the firm is
working at close quarters with a Joint Venture partner (Al, Cl, D2), then it is
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more likely to gain knowledge of the market. However, the cost of this information
is high. Cl say of their operation:
"[The General Manager of Cl] is in 'continuous discussion' with his American
board over how - and whether - to soldier on with its plant in Kiev, now
working at half capacity (...) Cl's future is anyone's guess - including Cl's
board in the US. Despite some progress, like locals' improved business
mindset, 'it's always possible that we will pull out' (...) We took a risk here,
and it's one Cl can afford. the question is: can we survive until Ukraine goes
back up, and are we building competitive advantage in the meantime."
Business Central Europe, February 1994.
8.7 Acceptance of Risk
Modes of international investment may differ between dfferen1 product or
service types
One of the key conclusions of this study is the importance of industry sector. The
specifics of the sector have a significant influence on criteria for entry, level of
commitment and the type of relationships necessary for the survival of the firm.
Industrial firms, either in product or services markets, can gain business via home
market relationships. However, consumer goods firms are reliant on host market
consumers and channels. The level of commitment required by a firm which
manufactures in the market, or adopts a high profile investment is far higher than
that required for a wholly-owned subsidiary in the business-to-business sector.
Moreover, whilst there are ways of minimising the risk of investment in business-
to-business services, and in industrial product markets, no such option is available
to consumer goods firms.
However, if firms enter Ukraine as part of a process of investment (See Figure
8.2), then the level of risk must also be viewed in comparison with other
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investment targets. All of the firms studied had already invested in other Central
European markets (See chapter five). Their entry into Ukraine is made in the
knowledge of the levels of risk, which they have accepted in the region. Moreover,
the decisions in Ukraine may be influenced by knowledge of the success or failure
of these previous investments.
Ukraine was either the first or second investment in the former-Soviet market for
all of the firms. From 1991 to mid -1992, it was frequently referred to as the
market with the greatest potential in the former-Soviet region. However, its
attractiveness has declined relative to other markets in the region:
"There was a time when we thought Ukraine was the country with the best
prospects in the Soviet Union. [Now] our arguments to the board of directors
are much more subjective. I have no idea what will happen in Ukraine next
year" Business Central Europe, February 1994.
The Economist's forecast for 1995 makes the following assessment:
"Czech Republic and Slovakia - The Czech Republic will remain the most
stable former communist country, but tensions in the ruling coalition will
surface. Radical reforms in the Czech Republic will show the first convincing
results in 1995, in a second year of GDP growth. Despite Vladimir Meciar's
victory, extremism should be quelled, but the political scene will still be
unstable. GDP growth 1994: 0%; 1995: 1.5% (...) Russia - the political scene
will be more stable after the severe upheavals of recent years, but campaigning
for the 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections will intensi&. Russia will
come to grips with inflation and output decline will be halted by the end of the
year. Relations with the former Soviet republics will improve. The thaw in
relations with Ukraine, following the election of a pro-Moscow president in
Kiev, will be particularly noticeable. GDP growth 1994: - 10%; 1995 -2% (...)
Ukraine - Despite a likely IMF agreement, the economy will collapse. the
Kuchma government will prove as indecisive as the old Kravchuk
administration. Relations with Russia may become less tense, and Ukraine may
concede Sevastopol to Russia as a naval base. Nuclear disarmament will gather
pace in 1995. Regional divisions will come to the fore in Ukraine. The extreme
right could opt for violence. There will be only limited opportunities for
western goods, due to the continued recession, low incomes and the fact that
that Ukraine's trade is still heavily oriented towards Russia."
Firms, interested in the market potential of Ukraine, began, increasingly, bypass the
market for healthier investment targets further East. Although it was not foreseen
when data collection began, this research studied six decisions to expand in, or exit
from, Ukraine. These decisions were made in the period from November 1993 to
March 1994, against a backdrop of economic crisis and a stalled process of
transition.
Indeed, the worsening environment in Ukraine raise the issues of outer and inner
context, suggested by Pettigrew (1985a, 1985b). The outer context, the external
environment in Ukraine, has worsened for all of the firm in the study. However, the
extent to which this has impinged upon the inner context varies.
Those firms who are not significantly dependent upon the fortunes of Ukraine,
such as Client-Followers and Externally-Funded finns, have been relatively little
affected by the worsening outer context. However, for firms which are reliant on
the fortunes of Ukraine the demise in the outer context is significant. There is an
increased tendency to view other markets, as potentially more attractive than
Ukraine. Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazhakstan, were often mentioned.
2R6
8.8 Centre-Periphery Issues
Investment Decisions may be routed via geographically proximate subsidiaries
Subsidiaries may play a significant role in international investment decisions in
MNCs. Forsgren 1989; Johanson and Vahine 1990
Some firms prospected the Ukraine from a geographically-proximate subsidiary in
Moscow or Central Europe. It was common for the firm to be part of an Eastern
European Practice Group (Firms Al - A6), or else to respond to a European Head
Office in Germany (C2) or Austria (B3, B4, C3).
Moreover, there was some evidence of difference in the views of Subsidiary and
Head Office Managers. The representative of E2, on withdrawal from the Ukraine,
suggested that he had argued to remain. Similarly the managers ofDl and A2 both
claimed that there was no one at Head Office, who was worth speaking to. They
know nothing of the realities of operation in Ukraine.
However, Head Office does appear to play a role, when decisions to retract or
withdraw from Ukraine are concerned. The subsidiary manager of B2 claimed that
he was "not authorised" to speak about the possible retraction of the firm from
Ukraine. Corporate Information at the European Head Office, should be contacted
instead. Cl respond to a European Head Office, but reported "continuous
discussion" with the US Board of Directors over how, and whether, to continue
operation in the market.
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Thus, Forsgren's claim that the periphery plays an important role in the investment
decisions of multinational corporations seems justified. However, some decisions
can exceed the "authority" of the periphery. In such cases, decisions revert to the
centre. This may relate to both positive and negative decisions. Thus, firm A2
reports that the Ukrainian investment was funded, at first, by the UK subsidiary.
However, it grew so rapidly that its expansion was funded globally, by the umbrella
corporation. In the two cases highlighted in the last paragraph (B2 and Cl), day-
to-day operations are autonomous, but negative decisions involve the Head Office.
8.9 Conclusions
It is apparent that the size and degree of internationalisation of the firms in this
study enables them to make higher commitment entry decisions into Ukraine than
would be expected by Johanson and Vahlne (1977). This may relate to the
confidence of the managers in their international ability (Casson 1994). The levels
of investment required for by high commitment modes of operation may also be
considered insignificant by firms of this size. However firms did not always enter
the market using high commitment modes.
One reason may be that even the "International Among Others" firms (Johanson
and Mattsson 1988) vary in size and level of resources. Consequently, they may be
concerned at their size relative to each other. Relative size is seen to provoke both
pre-emptive and defensive reactions. Thus, firms may justif' cautious entry
strategies and low commitment decisions with reference to having lower levels of
resources than competitors. Conversely, firms may justiIr high levels of
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commitment by ascribing this to pre-emptive strategies and the ability of the firm to
take a long-term view of market potential.
The size of investment implied by high commitment varies significantly between
industry sectors. The average size of initial investment ranges from $937,600 in
business-to-business services and high technology and $495 million in the
chemicals sector. Erramilli (1991) refers to the fact that service firms are able to
take control early in market entry because of the relatively low level of investment
which this involves.
In this thesis, firms for whom high commitment involves relatively low levels of
financial outlay are seen to have expanded rapidly throughout the Eastern
European region. Rapid expansion may also be motivated by the proactive criteria
of providing high levels of service to international customers (Johanson and
Mattsson 1988) or on the defensive grounds that the firm might otherwise lose
business to rival firms with a presence in the market. This latter seems reminiscent
of the belief of oligopolistic reaction theory (Knickerbocker 1973) that rival firms
will enter a market rapidly once the lead firm has done so. In industry sectors
where higher levels of investment are required, firms have focused upon a smaller
number of key investments and may take low commitment modes in other markets
whilst further assessing their potential.
It is clear that for all firms there is a high level of psychic distance in the decision to
enter Ukraine. Klein and Roth (1990) contend that this could favour
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internalisation. The cost of external transactions in Ukraine is high. The country is
still in the process of transition and the market, if it can be defined as such, is still
subject to governmental control. Many of the difficulties of the previous system
still pertain. In contrast, Johanson and Vahlne (1977) would suggest that the high
levels of psychic distance would result in low commitment entry modes. However,
Forsgren (1989) counters that firms with high levels of international experience
may be able to draw upon lessons learned in similar markets. In most cases,
Ukraine is not the first country in the region which the firm has entered, although a
number of the causes of environmental uncertainty are unique to it. Casson (1994)
points to the contention of globalisation literature (Porter 1980, Ohmae 1990) that
as consumers' preferences are converging and as the distinguishing characteristics
of each country are unique, there is little to be gained by deferring entry.
This thesis has taken an inductive approach, so as to avoid prejudging which, if
any, of these theories are relevant in explaining the entry decisions of multinational
corporations in turbulent markets. Indeed, the entry decisions of the firms in this
study differ even within the same sector and, at first sight, appear to offer some
evidence for different views. The largest variation in entry decisions is found
between firms where entry involves high levels of up-front investment. These firms
are primarily manufacturing firms, for whom penetration of the Ukrainian market
may entail modernisation and development of infrastructure, in addition to plant
and facilities.
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Amongst these firms, two divergent types of entry behaviour were seen. A number
of firms, described in this study as pioneers, entered Ukraine using high
commitment modes. The concerns of these firms tended to relate to pre-empting
competitors and gaining first-mover advantage. One influential factor in the entry
behaviour of these firms may be that the cost of waiting to gain fuller information
carries the danger that a rival might enter the market first. Conversely, a number of
firms entered the market using minimal investment, as a means of taking an option
on a positive outcome in the transition process. The number of firms in the latter
category who withdrew when environmental conditions worsened may relate to
their low level of commitment to the market. It may even suggest that operation on
the periphery of the market is insufficient to overcome psychic distance and gain
fi.iller market information. A number of option-takers referred to feelings of
alienation.
A major objective in this thesis, which draws upon theories from a diverse range of
fields, is to locate the position of its findings in the key debates. One such debate is
that as to the nature and role of networks. Section 2.7 highlights the tension
between the body of literature which views the network as an intermediate form
between markets and hierarchies (Williamson 1975, Miles and Snow 1984, Thorelli
1986, Jarillo 1988) and that which sees markets as being comprised of networks
(Johanson and Mattson 1987, Johanson and Mattsson 1988, Easton 1992).
The first of these schools of thought views the network as a mode of organisation a
firm might use if it is the most effective or efficient. Miles and Snow (1984) favour
01
the use of networks in turbulent markets as their dynamism is seen to offer
flexibility. This would suggest the strategic use of networks by firms entering the
turbulent Ukrainian market. However, Johanson and Mattsson (1987) identify
fundamental differences between the "transaction cost" and the "markets as
networks" approach. The major implication of the latter view is that mutual
interdependence of firms means that use of assets is influenced by existing
relationships. These may prompt or constrain investment decisions. This view
underpins the belief that firms may make international investment decisions to
develop their positions in global networks (Johanson and Mattsson 1988). The
findings of this research lend support to this contention and constitute the major
conclusion of the thesis.
The entry decisions of all of the firms studied were significantly influenced by
existing relationships. These included direct relationships, between business-to-
business services firms and their international customers and between business-to-
business or high technology firms and actors in the regulatory sector. There were
also indirect relationships with competitors, on the basis of which firms decided to
pre-empt or react to the investments of others. For all of the groups, these
relationships, which might be in the home or another international market seemed
to override the specifics of the Ukrainian situation. Thus, firms entered the market
after a customer, on gaining an international contract, or because it was one of the
few remaining geographic areas as yet uncontested by international rivals. The
decision to enter Ukraine should not therefore be studied in isolation, as it is part
of an ongoing process of investments, whereby each firm is developing its position
in global networks.
8.10 Chapter Summary
Firms are attracted into Ukraine, in part, by location-specific advantages (Dunning
1980). Investment activity by multinational corporations in Eastern Europe has
been concentrated, because of the rapidity of liberalisation. Investment in Ukraine
was favoured by its relatively good prospects for transition to market economy. It
is larger than the markets of Central Europe, in which many of the firms studied
already operated. In the period from 1991 to 1993, Ukraine seemed more stable
than Russia.
The "bunching" of entry into the market by firms, within industry sectors, concurs
with Knickerbocker's suggestions of oligopolistic reaction (1973). However, the
impact of the level of risk, which the firm incurs by investment, must also be taken
into account. Thus, a bunching of investments can be seen for all of the industry
sectors studied. Whilst business-to-business firms had all opted for high
commitment modes of operation, this involved relatively low levels of financial
outlay and risk to the firm. However, in sectors such as chemicals or consumer
industries, wherein the level of financial investment required was far greater, firms
had opted for different levels of commitment. Therefore, the behaviour witnessed
may be nearer to Buckley and Casson's suggestion (1976) that, in conditions of
uncertainty, follower firms may await the outcome of the investment decision made
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by the leading firm, before making its own decision. This seems to fit with the
Option-taker category.
Furthermore, oligopolistic reaction theory does not explain all the entry decisions.
Influences were also seen to come from the regulatory sector and from the actions
of industrial customers. Thus, some firms seemed more motivated by co-operative
relationships, which spanned international markets.
Overall, entry into Ukraine did not appear to use rational marketing planning
techniques. The validity of these has been called into question for situations of
discontinuous change (Kami 1976, Paul Ct al 1978). The uncertain market
conditions were seen to pose high levels of risk. The consumer and chemical firms
studied found entry decisions justifiable, despite the levels of risk, because of the
size of the opportunity (Cardozo 1979). Accepting high levels of risk was justified,
in the light of longer-term gains over competition, or else, the conditions in the
Ukrainian market were overshadowed by a stronger motivation. For business-to-
business firms and high-technology firms, this motivation was to guarantee
consistent levels of international service or to gain external funding.
This research lends support to the "markets as networks" view that investment
decisions are influenced by the mutual interdependence of firms in existing
relationships. Investment in Ukraine can be viewed as part of an ongoing process
whereby the firm develops its position in global markets.
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Chapter 9 - Future Research Directions
9.1 Limitations
This research has taken the form of an exploratory, qualitative study. It has raised
some interesting issues relating to investment decisions in an uncertain market
environment. The disparate levels of risk associated with the entry of multinational
firms in different sectors is apparent. Moreover, explanatory variables can be
identified, which explain the diverse experiences of the fifteen firms, as
environmental conditions in Ukraine worsened. In-depth study has provided
insights, which would not have been possible using a broader and more
generalisable study, although the trade-off between depth and generalisabiity is
acknowledged.
In the course of the research, a number of issues have been encountered, which
should be accepted as limitations:
9.1.1 Contextual Changes
The rapidity, and unpredictability, of changes in the Ukrainian context had both
positive and negative consequences for this research. Firstly, the study has been
enriched by the additional decisions made by finns during the course of data
collection. Although the constraints on the PhD process limit its extent, an element
of longitudinal study has been possible in this research, which is not often possible
in data collection spanning nine months. The implosion of the Ukrainian economy,
in 1993, after its promising outset on the process of transition in 1991 is
n
unparalleled, even within Eastern Europe. The rapidity of the contextual change
has provided a richer understanding of the impact of the uncertain environment
upon firms' investment decision-making behaviour.
Changes in attitude within, as well as between firms, can be examined to gain
critical insights. Resrarch into strategic investment decisions may be criticised for
failing to include firms which decided not to invest. It is difficult, however, to
determine which finns should be approached, as the population is infinite.
Moreover, if investment in the market is not on the "strategic agenda" then few
insights can be gained. In this research, study of decisions to enter and expand in
the market is combined with study of decisions not to enter, not to expand and
even to exit. A total of twenty decisions were studied, rather than the anticipated
fifteen.
However, given the time constraints, the cut off point for data collection was set at
the Ukrainian parliamentary elections on March 18th, 1994. Commentators
differed in their assessment of the significance of these elections. It was felt that
they might end in turmoil and lead to civil war, perpetuate the fragmentation of
Parliament or have little impact. Whatever the outcome, it was assumed that the
context would switch once again either positively or negatively.
This cut-off point was determined in response to one of the negative consequences
of the contextual changes. As highlighted in chapter three, negative changes in the
context prompted increased consideration by firms of the possibility of withdrawal
I
from Ukraine. As a result, the research instrument was amended to incorporate
two additional questions covering criteria for exit. Moreover, the contextual
differences necessitated care in ensuring the comparability of earlier and later data.
An additional phase of data collection was carried out in March 1994, in which all
respondents were interviewed. However, this placed limitations upon the number
of additional cases, which could be added to the study.
An additional challenge for this study was that of isolating the explanatory
variables, which are firm and strategy-dependent, from those which are country and
environment-specific. This bias is limited, as far as possible, by use of a case study
methodology which analyses investment decisions in their context, rather than in
isolation. However, it is difficult to determine the extent to which data were biased
throughout the study by knowledge of the worsening conditions in Ukraine.
Furthermore, the predominantly negative mood in the latter part of data collection
resulted in an increasing reluctance of firms to talk about their strategy in Ukraine.
Respondents were reluctant to give bad news. Moreover, in some cases the Head
Office was involved in decisions of withdrawal. Some respondents were no longer
authorised to participate in the study. This placed greater emphasis on secondary
data, giving an "official line," which might introduce an element of bias.
9.1.2 Use of Key Informants
Given the size of the firms studied, the investment decision in Ukraine was not
always viewed as being very significant. In order to ensure the objectivity and
validity of the data collected, multiple sources of evidence were used. However, it
was often found that there was only one expatriate representative of the firm in
Ukraine. Moreover, only one key person might have been involved in the decision
to enter Ukraine. Thus, there is a heavy reliance upon data gathered from key
informants. However, respondents were interviewed in both the Ukrainian
subsidiary and western end of the entry decision in eight cases. Supplementary data
from sources internal and external to the firm were used to veriFj data.
9.1.3 Historical Bias
As with many decision-making studies, there were problems, at times, in identifying
the respondents who were involved in the decision-making process. Fortunately
respondent firms had entered Ukraine since liberalisation in all but one case.
Therefore, memories of the process are reasonably fresh. However, there are some
cases where the original decision to enter did not involve any of the people
currently working for the firm. In such cases, information may have been distorted
in transferral. Also, the information which is now communicated may be biased by
subsequent positive or negative outcomes.
9.2 Future Research Directions
In the course of this study, a number of areas arose, which could not be researched
within the constraints of a PhD thesis. However, these may merit attention in
subsequent research:
1. Further longitudinal study will allow for the continued study of the impact of
environmental changes upon investment decisions.
2. Both small, entrepreneurial firms and multinational corporations were operating
in Ukraine at the time of data collection. The focus of this study was upon large,
multinational corporations. However, the study could be broadened to encompass
a greater variation in size and degree of internationalisation of firms.
3. The extent to which data are context-specific could be explored by studying the
investments of the same firms in other Eastern European markets, in which the
transition process has moved forwards further. This would show the extent of the
bias in data gathered in Ukraine, which results from the downturn in market
attractiveness.
4. The findings of this study could be generalised by means of a further quantitative
phase of research. Explanatory variables for the decision to enter Ukraine and the
level of commitment chosen are postulated in the conclusion to Chapter six. Data
collection in Ukraine allowed the identification of a database of multinational firms
operating in Ukraine. Use of a questionnaire covering these variables would allow
statistical validation of the conclusions of this study.
5. An additional area, which might merit further attention is that identified by
Johanson and Mattsson (1988). They raise the question of how firms build
positions in global networks. Further exploration of the relationships between
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multinational corporations and their customers, or with external funding bodies,
may provide valuable insights into this question.
7. Additionally, the growing body of literature, which explores marketisation in
Eastern Europe might be enhanced by further analysis of the nature of exchange in
Ukraine. This would involve further study of the Ukrainian firms.
.nn
Codicil
Since completion of the data collection for this thesis, the market environment
in Ukraine has continued to be equally turbulent. In March 1994, the outlook
for Ukraine appeared bleak:
"Four seemingly intractable problems held it in thrall: failure to
implement economic reform; a widening political divide between the
nationalist west and the pro-Russian east of the country; secessionism in
Crimea; and the rusting stockpile of nuclear weapons" (Economist,
November 19th, 1994).
The outcome of the March 1994 elections brought no immediate changes.
However, the election, in June 1994 of Leonid Kuchma as the Ukrainian
President may have brought the long awaited impetus needed for successful
transition. November 1994 saw the liberalisation of prices. In January 1995, the
mass privatisation of medium and large-scale enterprises in Ukraine began
(Financial Times, January 28th/29th 1995). The negative slide has seemingly
been arrested. The Economist (November 19th, 1994) concludes:
"Doubts remain on all fronts. But, for the first time, all four problems
seem to stand a chance of being resolved."
The Ukrainian context has taken a positive swing. Consequently, the
investment activity of the multinational corporations studied has altered once
more. Neither of the firms contemplating withdrawal at the end of the study did
so. Furthermore, firm Dl in the chemical industry has entered a joint venture
agreement in the market. The two remaining Big Six accounting firms have
entered the market and a new tier of multinational firms are prospecting
Ukraine.
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